

## Public Sector HRM Reform: A Multi-Nation Perspective Marie-France Waxin and Robert Bateman, American University of Sharjah

Waxin M-F., Bateman R., 2009. HRM Reform in the Public Sector: A Multi-Nation Perspective, 10th International Human Resource Management Conference, College of Business, Santa Fe, New Mexico. June 21 – 24.

**MARIE-FRANCE WAXIN.** American University of Sharjah, School of Business and Management, E-mail address : MWaxin@aus.edu  
Associate Professor of Human Resources Management and Management

**ROBERT E. BATEMAN.** American University of Sharjah, School of Business and Management, E-mail address : rbateman@aus.edu  
Assistant Professor of Public Administration and International Business

### **ABSTRACT (305 words)**

The objective of this research is to describe and discuss trends in HRM practice as they have emerged in public sector organizations undertaking new management reforms over the last two decades. To do this, we reviewed available literature on government HRM practices across countries to identify and assess the degree to which reforms in the period from 1988 to 2008 reflected changes in recruitment, selection, training and development, performance management and compensation approaches used in the private sector.

This review finds significant evidence of change in public sector HRM in a number of developed nations, though these are uneven across countries and fields of practices (e.g., compensation, training, etc.). Information on emerging economies is less available, but shows that some developing regions retain traditional patterns. Achieving a strategic perspective on HRM remains a challenge for governments, even in the OECD. Government organizations in developed nations have been adopting HRM practices that draw on private sector experience, yet the use of specific approaches to recruitment, selection, training and so forth may do little to attract and retain qualified people if key strategic issues are not addressed.

The principal limitation of this research is the relative lack of cross-country comparisons on the evolution of HRM practices in public organizations. Our study is also admittedly constrained by the degree to which most research has focused on tactical elements rather than the strategic perspective. In many developing countries, HRM in the public sector is still in the “personnel administration” phase and little attention is paid to organizational efficiency or motivation aspects.

This article contributes to the field by offering an overview and international perspective on trends in public sector HRM over the last two decades. It also describes impediments to the implementation of Strategic HRM in government organizations.

**Keywords:** Literature review, HRM reforms, public sector, multi-country perspectives, Strategic HRM

## Introduction

---

Two decades of administrative reform have seen governments around the world initiating changes ranging from the bold in some nations to the rhetorical in others. New human resource management (HRM) practices have not received the same attention devoted to contracted service delivery or performance-based budgeting, but the drive to make government more business-like has had significant impacts on public-sector employment. Batal (1997) suggests that increased attention to HRM in government can be attributed to the large number of public sector employees in many nations, their impact on public budgets, and the essential role that employees must play in improving organizational efficiency and customer service. Though these same arguments may be made for many private sector enterprises, lower entry and departure rates for employees in public service increase the importance of effective HRM and the ongoing internal renewal and upgrading of competencies and capabilities.

A variety of approaches to making government more business-like have been grouped under the rubric of New Public Management (NPM). Although each nation has followed its own path drawing on its unique culture and history, several common trends have emerged. Increasingly, governments have subjected internal capabilities to competition with private sector alternatives, in many cases forcing public organizations to adopt market-driven perspectives. In some cases, line organizations and managers have been given greater flexibility and freedom through various decentralization and devolution policies, and in return, political leaders have tried to secure accountability and highlight their commitment to improving public services by stressing performance against agreed service goals based on defined indicators. With this accountability, however, have often come reductions in the job security that was a key attraction for many civil servants in the past. The prospect of less secure employment emerges, however, at a time in which public organizations face growing difficulty in attracting new employees. Governments in many societies have traditionally provided compensation below that of private enterprises, but Shim (2001) suggests that difficulty in attracting capable employees has led some organizations to reposition themselves as model employers. Governments in progressive societies must now compete more actively for the best and brightest workers. Fortunately, public organizations do have some unique appeal to individuals interested in specific causes or issues, a factor that contributes to both motivation and stability (Batal, 1997; Gouvernement du Canada, 2000).

Although government organizations in many nations have adopted some elements of HRM “best practice” in an attempt to improve performance, implementation has been less than complete (Morris and Farrell, 2007). Our objective here is to describe and discuss changes in HRM practice as they have emerged in public organizations undertaking new management reforms. To this end, we have reviewed both comparative and single-country studies to identify trends in public sector HRM over the period from roughly 1988 through 2008.

In the first section, we present a conceptual framework that will allow us to point out key elements of change in the public sector. We then review specific developments that have appeared in recruitment and selection, training and development, performance management, and compensation. Finally, we consider the notion of psychological contract in a public service setting.


---

## 1. The conceptual framework of Public HRM

---

Although public employment or civil-service systems may be characterized in several different ways, an OECD (2004) report on strategic HRM in the public sector identifies three general approaches used by central governments: career-based, position-based, and department-based. In Figure 1, individualization refers to the degree to which management rules and practices vary according to the situation of specific departments or individuals and less according to the idea of a unified service. Delegation levels are measured by the locus of decision-making power, from central HRM bodies to line departments and lower administrative levels. Within each of the systems identified, HRM practices vary.

Figure 1: Delegation and individualization approaches to HR practices in central governments of OECD countries



Source: Adapted from OECD (2004)

In *career-based systems*, civil servants are hired at the beginning of their professional career and may be expected to remain in the public service for their entire working life. Initial entry is based primarily on academic credentials and/or a civil service entry examination. Promotion is based on a system of grades or ranks attached to the individual rather than to a specific position. Mid-level entry possibilities are usually limited. There is a strong emphasis on career development. Collective values are promoted at entry into specific sub-groups of the civil service (e.g., the notion of “corps” in France), with relatively weaker cross-hierarchical and cross-corps values. The emphasis is often less on individual performance and accountability than on group cohesion and cooperation.

*Position-based systems* focus on selecting the best-suited candidate for each position, whether by external recruitment or internal promotion or mobility. These systems allow more open access, with lateral entry relatively common. Position-based services tend to have weaker cross-government values at entry than career-based systems but may create stronger links across levels of hierarchy and status.

*Department-based systems* characterize hybrid approaches with relatively high levels of delegation and a low level of individualization. These systems give responsibility for HRM policies and practices to the line ministries, with civil servants usually making a career in a single ministry. Because these systems may be considered a relatively new category, their inherent benefits and failings will require more study in the future.

A few countries have attempted to apply new public management reforms in making system-level changes, perhaps moving from one category to another; but overall, the three forms of civil service systems remain relatively intact.

### **Three models as basis for a new HRM reform model**

The World Public Sector Report (WPSR) (UN/DESA, 2005) offers governments a number of HRM reform ideas and suggests guidelines for realizing continuous innovation and recovery of trust in the public sector (Kim and Hong, 2006; UN/DESA, 2005). The WPSR 2005 advocates striking a balance between three broad models or schools in public administration (PA): traditional PA, NPM, and the emerging perspective of responsive governance. The last of these refers to an emphasis on greater openness and the creation of partnerships with civil society and the private sector. Each of these models has particular strengths and highlights core values that are relevant in addressing contemporary HRM challenges in the public sector. Traditional PA relies on the values of obedience, merit and impartiality. In contrast, NPM approaches favor efficiency, professionalism, and responsiveness to the citizen as customer. The governance perspective also values responsiveness but aims to empower the citizen through enhanced participation.

The HRM framework advocated in the WPSR report would first establish an effective institutional framework for HRM as an underlying infrastructure to achieve high

performance. A strategic system might then build on this base, drawing on the skills and resources of the private sector and using the fundamental public sector values of impartiality, professionalism and responsiveness. Of course, HRM professionals in the public sector, as well as the private, have long advocated the need for input in the strategic decision processes of their respective organizations, but these calls have now taken on the language of NPM. In addition to calls for more influence in these discussions, public HR managers increasingly point to the need for merit-based appointment; competence-based development; competence-based appraisal and performance management; equity vis-à-vis the private sector; the embrace of a total pay approach; and, in the retention field, rightsizing and effective labor management. Some of these values have been advocated in PA (and HRM) for many years, yet they remain consistent with the tenets of NPM. For more details on the WPSR model of public HRM, see UN/DESA (2005) or Kim and Hong (2006).

Although champions of the NPM movement point to a new administrative paradigm, skeptics argue that it represents little more than incremental evolution from established traditions in HRM (Page, Hood and Lodge, 2005). In contrast, Thompson (2006) suggests that the creation of separate, agency-specific human resource systems represents a real threat to the institution of a unified civil service, the viability of which is contingent on its inherently collective nature. Kim and Hong (2006) argue for an alternate contingent HRM reform model, taking into account indigenous factors such as political governance styles (presidential or parliamentary systems); socio-institutional maturity; regional or cultural blocs; economic development stages; and other situational considerations. These authors warn that governments must start HRM reforms on the basis of their current needs, developing and adjusting them gradually to meet the requirements of the day rather than adopting a blueprint NPM model drawn from a notion of international best practice. According to David (2000) and Lavelle (2006), the trend of convergence may be accelerating in government policy networks, but we may actually see new public HRM moving toward divergence, because cultures and historically developed, path-dependant policies are embedded in people's values and behaviors.

---

## **2. Changes in recruitment and selection**

---

We turn now to changes that have taken place in both recruitment and selection practices. Because permanence and job security are still more common in government than in the private sector (Lemire and Gagnon, 2004), attracting and selecting capable public employees is essential. The adoption of merit-oriented, career-based civil service systems is generally accepted as a key factor in explaining public sector performance in both developed and many less developed countries (Rauch and Evans, 2000). The WPSR (2005) defines merit as “appointment of the best-suited person for any given job.” Yet, governments worldwide are increasingly unable to find qualified staff (Soni, 2004).

### **Recruitment**

Public sector recruitment in many nations has had a reputation for being slow, unresponsive, bureaucratic and passive. However, in order to attract more qualified

applicants, some public organizations have made their entry procedures more flexible (Center for the Study of Social Policy 2002), user-friendly and transparent by introducing process and technological changes intended to enhance their attractiveness to applicants (Lavigna and Hays, 2004; Reichenberg, 2002). Public agencies increasingly use internal and external recruitment methods that have long been exploited in the private sector. Use of temporary workers and interns has also increased (Hoque and Kirkpatrick, 2008).

Systematic internal and external job posting increases the quality of recruitment by enlarging the pool of candidates, enhancing retention rates, and improving employee motivation. From the manager's perspective, electronic posting helps to identify and track qualified candidates for different positions simultaneously. Many public organizations now use computer bulletin boards, toll-free automated telephone systems, and electronic mail to publicize their job vacancies.

Due to long-standing concerns about propriety and the desired neutrality of the civil service, public organizations have only recently involved their employees in the search for new talent. Employee referrals have become more widely accepted in the public sector, with bonuses sometimes paid to employees who help recruit successful candidates for high-demand or high-skill positions.

Some public employers also pursue aggressive outreach strategies at job fairs, college campuses and in local communities, use media advertising in print and electronic formats; and distribute marketing materials promoting public sector careers. Increasingly, some employ full-time government recruiters who directly and regularly communicate with multiple potential sources of job candidates (Lavigna, 2002; Lavigna and Hays, 2004).

Increased use of information technology has also attracted much attention from public sector recruiters (Marchack, 2002). Resume databases allow thousands of individuals with professional credentials to be pre-screened simultaneously. Automated systems are now used to match resumes with skill sets for particular jobs (Selden and Jacobson, 2003). Applicant tracking systems ensure that no candidate falls through the cracks or misinterprets a lack of communication as a sign that the employer is no longer interested.

More effort has also been devoted to recruitment of minorities, particularly in nations undergoing a demographic shift. As the number of minority individuals increases within the populations of many developed nations, ignoring minority candidates becomes increasingly untenable. The Montreal Police Department, for example, places recruiting ads in community journals (e.g. *Magasin Egyptien*), broadcasts on ethnic-oriented radio and television stations, and uses promotional materials highlighting minority members of its force. This effort also includes organizing conferences and other meetings of cultural organizations with ethnic appeal (Waxin and Panaccio, 2004).

In contrast, recruitment and staffing practices have changed little in some regions. Favoritism remains a significant issue in Middle Eastern hiring practices, for example. Staffing in large Iranian government organizations is marked by the pervasiveness of

networking, entitlement, nepotism, and compliance with Islamic revolutionary criteria (Yeganeh and Su, 2008, p. 203). Bulmer (2000) points out that overstaffing is a widespread problem in the region, resulting in a shift in focus from recruitment to rationalization.

### **Selection**

Some public organizations have dramatically modernized their selection practices in the last decade. To a degree, these changes have been forced by the increasing difficulty of finding qualified employees.

Rapid applicant screening has in some cases supplanted long and often complex procedures that previously discouraged many qualified candidates. Some jurisdictions now require applicants to submit nothing more than a resume; qualified candidates are then promptly interviewed by telephone (Lavigna, 2002). Another trend is to automatically certify applicants as eligible for appointment if they meet certain conditions, such as holding a professional license or credential (Lavigna, 2002). Some employers even permit immediate hiring of applicants whose college grades are sufficiently high.

Public employers have also modified their selection criteria. A recent trend is to de-emphasize experience and education. Criteria that artificially limit the applicant pool, hinder efforts to diversify the workforce, or unnecessarily exclude candidates who might be excellent performers are eliminated (Sullivan, 2002). Instead, the selection process is refocused on job-related criteria. Currently the trend is to remove requirements that cannot be validated and then add flexibility by allowing substitution of education for experience (and vice versa) up to a certain point (Nigro et al., 2007).

Competency frameworks have allowed public sector organizations to move away from narrow and unique job specifications toward the use of broader, more behavioral attributes (Page et al., 2005). The Irish Civil Service Competence Framework defines competence as “necessary behaviors and attributes as well as knowledge and skills required to do our jobs well and in a way in which we realize our potential and provide the highest quality service to our customers” (CMOD, 2003). Selection on the basis of competencies in Belgium allowed the Flemish and federal administrations to look more attractive as an employer on the labor market by breaking through the highly formalized and rigid career system (Brans and Hondeghem, 2005). However, Page, Hood and Lodge (2005) point out that nations often specify different competencies for similar positions, perhaps following local patterns in the private sector or simply attempting to repackage existing agendas through hiring practices.

Public organizations have also modified the way they conduct tests and interviews. Administrative organizations often select candidates using a university-style competitive examination (sometimes called assembled exams), such as in Pakistan and the Republic of Korea, or by scrutinizing educational qualifications, experience and references required in the application process (unassembled exams), such as in Singapore. However, one meta-analysis found very weak statistical relationships between qualifications and

job performance (WPSR 2005, pp. 82). On the other hand, sophisticated selection tests commonly used in the West are impractical in most developing and transition countries (WPSR, 2005). In developed economies, the pressure to devise valid and non-discriminatory tests has led to the growing adoption of performance-based tests. As computer technologies and software become more sophisticated, more complex mixes of knowledge, skills and abilities will be evaluated using these instruments. Performance tests have high face validity and are generally perceived as fair and objective, although concerns about ethnic or racial biases remain (Nigro et al., 2007). Assessment centers remain a gold standard in the public sector and are used in several countries that have borrowed from the UK model (WPSR 2005, 83).

Although recruitment and selection practices in many public western organizations have undergone changes that reflect best practice in industry, these shifts are often neither drastic nor complete enough to allow public organizations to compete for capable staff. Many small agencies simply lack the resources and expertise to take advantage of new technologies and approaches. Nor are government and industry requirements identical: rushing to adopt private-sector approaches without recognizing fundamental differences can be a high-risk strategy. A challenge for governments is to select the reforms most suitable to their own settings and adapt them to local needs, particularly in hiring individuals who will meet citizen service expectations (Lavigna and Hays, 2004). Whether political leaders will support the more fundamental rethinking necessary to change the nature and perception of public service is an open question (General Accounting Office, 2001, pp. 159).

---

### **3. Changes in training and development practices**

---

In recent years, training and development (T&D) have been viewed as crucial management tools in responding to the increased need for skills requisite to a knowledge economy and to the need for ongoing organizational change and adaptation. T&D is also important for governments in improving performance and in motivating and retaining staff. In some highly individualized, position-based systems, training is increasingly used as a way to provide a common culture and an opportunity to meet and discuss professional issues across the civil service (OECD, 2004). In the following paragraphs, we offer comparative information on training practices, explore the major difficulties encountered by public sector employers in the training process, and consider the concept of competency-based development.

The OECD (2004) report allows us to provide a broad picture of training practices in more than two dozen high- and middle-income nations. In thirteen countries, civil servants spend between 5 and 10 days in training per year; in four countries they receive between 11 and 15 training days yearly; and in seven countries, they spend less than 5 days in training per year. Training policy is defined at the level of central HRM bodies in twenty OECD countries. Implementation is left to line departments or even lower management levels in all but eight countries. A number of nations with position-based

systems use private-sector companies or universities for training, while most countries still insist on the use of a specific training institute for civil servants. Some nations, such as the US and Sweden, have set up special institutions to recruit and develop their managers and leaders (Shim, 2001).

Consistent with private-sector practice, training and development has become a shared responsibility in some public service systems. Employees are increasingly responsible for self development and successful application of training. In addition, they share with their agencies the responsibility to identify T&D needed to improve individual and organizational performance (Clardy, 2008). That said, life-long training has yet to become a reality in most OECD countries. A few nations, including Germany, Iceland, Japan, Mexico, Sweden and the U.S., claim to have developed coherent life-long learning strategies. In the most advanced cases, ongoing education has been integrated with the staff performance management system, as in Australia. Consistent with a strategic approach to HRM, Sweden and the U.K. have made the establishment of business plans contingent on reflections about needed competencies and skills.

Public organizations continue to encounter difficulties with training needs assessment, training transfer and training effectiveness evaluation. Research indicates that US states conduct substantially less formal assessment of employee training needs than the private sector (Patton and Pratt 2002). According to Bjornberg's (2002) benchmarking survey in US agencies, learning transfer occurs best through action planning or learning, peer coaching circles, job aids and regular email communication between managers and the training staff. Although evaluative review is essential to deciding whether training should be continued in its current form, Bjornberg (2002) suggests that results-level training evaluation is seldom implemented in the public sector.

Competency-based models have become an important component of learning organizations and are necessary to provide high quality public services. By promoting a consistent approach across all HRM activities, the competency framework ensures that HRM will contribute to achieving the government's objectives (vertical integration) and that the HRM whole is greater than the sum of the individual activities (horizontal integration) (WPSR, 2005). Indeed, for the competency approach to be successful, identified core competencies should both inform and be integrated into the different HRM practices: recruitment and selection of future employees, managers and leaders; performance appraisal; promotion; training and development processes; compensation; rightsizing activities; succession planning; and career management. Many governments (e.g., in the UK, Ireland, Malaysia, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, and the US) already use competency approaches in diverse HRM practices. The formation of senior executive services in the US, UK and some other nations may be considered in part as an effort to identify and promote high-level managerial competencies and spread them throughout the public service (OECD, 2004; Shim, 2001).

Nevertheless, the bureaucratic structure of many public organizations continues to be an impediment to training effectiveness. Critics cite as examples rigid classification systems, rewards not tied to skill acquisition, poor development of subordinates, an overemphasis

on technical rather than managerial qualifications for advancement, and pension systems that discourage the movement of uniformed personnel into civilian management positions (Heisel, 1980). Training is still viewed by some political leaders as an expense to be deferred in times of fiscal shortfall. This problem may be more acute in developing nations. As Mentz (1997) stresses, training and development must be approached as a sustained process within an overall capacity building program. However, in many countries—especially those considered developing or less developed—T&D programs are still organized to deliver inputs according to relatively short timescales (12–24 months), where program budgets have to be spent and quantifiable indicators of success must be produced within the lifetime of a program. These efforts and their outcomes are all too often considered in isolation from other preceding and parallel activities (Healy, 2001). In Iran, (Yeganeh and Su, 2008) note the prevalence of training which is unplanned or highly theoretical in nature.

---

#### **4. From performance measurement to performance steering**

---

New public management approaches have directed increased attention to performance measurement, accountability and the use of data to direct organizational efforts (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). Historically, the appraisal systems used by public organizations have been technically crude and relatively ineffective as performance management tools, where performance appraisal was merely an annual review exercise carried out by a single rater, with each supervisor completing appraisals for his or her immediate subordinates. The performance appraisal system was rarely linked to the mission and strategy of the organization or to other HRM and management practices. In contrast, the NPM movement has promoted a results-based culture in the public sector. Performance measurement and management is expected to play a central role in this process, helping officials and analysts assess achievements against key targets and creating results-based accountability mechanisms (Ospina et al., 2004). At the organizational level, more emphasis has been placed on missions and objectives than in the past. At the individual level, performance has become a more important aspect of HR management. We will review below some of the most common changes and challenges related to performance appraisal and performance management in public organizations and discuss the degree to which public organizations have actually accomplished the transition.

**New performance approaches.** Three relatively new perspectives have emerged in public sector performance management: the Results, TQM and Competency approaches (Roberts, 2003; Cederblom and Pernerl, 2002; Grote, 2000). The *Results* orientation draws on principles of Management-by-Objectives and involves having the employee meet with his or her immediate supervisor to review organizational goals, consider the employee's expected contribution, and set individual performance expectations (Roberts, 2003). However, Thompson (2006) notes that cascading performance objectives is considered to be an inhibitor of the exercise of individual judgment that reinforces existing hierarchies, already very strong in public organizations. Clardy (1998) suggests that appraisal systems incorporate *TQM* principles by including systems factors and

considering individual performance in a team or work unit context. Two fundamental characteristics of this quality approach are a customer orientation and a prevention approach to errors (Roberts, 2003). Appraisal forms reflecting TQM principles promote a flexible approach, focus on effective efforts and solicit citizen input to identify and deal effectively with local problems (Cederblom and Pernerl, 2002). Grote (2000) cites the *Competency* approach, with its focus on critically important behaviors, as one of the most significant recent developments. For example, the Malaysian public sector model, which places emphasis both on respect for citizens as customers and on continuous knowledge acquisition, introduced a competency-based merit component to reinforce these characteristics in contrast to a more narrow criteria-based system (Lavelle, 2006). Cederblom and Pernerl (2002) report how integration of the results, TQM and competency principles, linking of individual performance to organization goals, and integration of appraisals with other management and HRM processes have helped move the police agency in the American state of Washington to a PM approach.

### **Performance management standards.**

Setting quantitative performance measures has long been considered problematic in the public sector, where organizations must often respond to competing interests; work with vague or conflicting directions from political leaders, and tailor services to meet a variety of circumstances in ways that undermine efficiency. Nevertheless, setting clear organizational objectives is essential for implementing PM effectively at all levels and is especially important for middle managers who must have a clear perception of what they need to achieve in order to effectively assess their own staff (OECD, 2005). Pollitt (2005) studied the implementation of PM in four European countries (Finland, Netherlands, Sweden and the UK) and observes that it has addressed some of these concerns by acquiring greater multidimensionality, incorporating not only producer concerns such as efficiency and cost effectiveness but also user elements such as service quality and customer satisfaction. Agencies in all four countries were using or developing versions of balanced scorecards.

Overall, the most important evaluation criteria categories used for assessing civil servants' performance in OECD countries are the following: outputs achieved, including pre-identified objectives; competencies and technical skills; and interpersonal, teamwork, leadership and management skills. Other criteria mentioned by individual countries include ethics (Canada) and innovation (Denmark) (OECD, 2005).

### **Evolution of rating instruments.**

Experience indicates that raters are reluctant to use the full scale in their evaluations, no matter how complex and formal the criteria might be. For example, in the US more than 95% of managers are rated as “fully satisfactory or better” under traditional performance review schemes (OECD, 2005). Considering these limitations, there have been two notable trends in the last decade. First, centralized and scientific methods have been slowly replaced by more relaxed performance management tools designed at a lower level (OECD, 2005, pp. 4). Rating systems have become less detailed, focusing mainly on the distinction between best and worst performers—since performance can be more easily assessed for the extremes. Second, there has been increased use of quota and

forced ranking methods to specify the proportion of employees placed in the higher categories of the rating scale (e.g., in Canada, Germany, Korea, Switzerland, the U.K. and the U.S.). However, Lawler (2003) warns against forced distribution methods, arguing that this evaluation method quickly starts attacking the middle of the bell curve where there may be few stars but equally few, if any, poor performers. Skill-based approaches make particular sense when work is heavily interdependent and outcomes derive from strong team work, as is often the case in public organizations. Emphasis on individual performance is increasingly recognized as counterproductive. Lavelle (2006) concludes that public service relies on high levels of collaboration and does not lend itself to the leveraging of competitive instincts. HRM tools must be fashioned to take into account this reality.

**Use of performance information in performance steering.** To make the transition from performance measurement to active management, performance management information must be an input to an organization's strategies and tactics (Kettl, 1997). Several studies have examined the extent to which performance indicators influence the top management of governmental agencies and the degree to which performance data is used as a steering instrument in different parts of the world: Latin America (Ospina et al., 2004), Europe (Pollitt, 2005) and the US (Ingraham et al., 2003). Pollitt (2005) concludes that although appraisal has become all but universal and PM is growing steadily but varies in form and force among different countries and tasks, performance steering of agencies is still a rarity and may never become particularly common. Although balanced scorecards are increasingly used in ministry/agency relationships, the link between performance and budgets frequently remains weak or unclear, at least when there is competition with political priorities. European findings align closely with recent large-scale research in the US, concluding that many governments are definitively identifying and measuring outcomes and progress, but that using that information to create change remains a challenge (Ingraham et al., 2003). One significant attempt to tie performance to organizational direction has been the use of performance contracts, particularly for senior officials. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004, pp. 77) point out that many executives now work on fixed-term agreements, increasingly with specific targets. In some respects, the business CEO has become the model—even in name—for the expectation that an agency head will be accountable for organizational performance. Indeed, in some nations these individuals are increasingly moving back and forth between the public and private spheres. In contrast, Yeganeh and Su (2008) find that “appraisal” receives little attention in Iranian public organizations. Most of time, “appraisal” is a top-down process based on unstructured or subjective mechanisms and deals with personnel behavior rather than performance evaluation.

---

## 5. Evolving pay systems in the public sector

---

Public sector employees in many nations traditionally enjoyed some protection from political caprice, but forms of tenure have become decidedly less secure as governments have emphasized performance and accountability. No longer offering a job for life and often burdened by lower pay scales, public organizations continue to experience

difficulty attracting sufficient numbers of employees, much less the best performers. This challenge is particularly worrisome in nations where the demographic balance is shifting and a high proportion of civil service workers will be eligible for retirement in the near term. In a political environment in which governments face significant resource constraints, remuneration decisions must balance the goals of motivation and equity with the ability of governments to pay and the desire to attract and retain the most competent people (WPSR, 2005).

Freibert (1997) sums up the main features of traditional pay management in the public sector: “In the past, most public service systems, in spite of national and regional variations, shared certain common features, including centrally determined pay structure, across the board increases, pay scales based on grades rather than job content, occupational category or individual merit, and progress up the scale according to seniority rather than performance.” In contrast, new pay systems place value on flexibility, decentralization and individualization of compensation, the organization’s strategy and needs, external equity, and market compatibility. In new compensation systems, pay structure is ideally based on individual or team performance and competence, pay determination is individual (instead of collective), and individual employees can choose from a diverse range of benefits (Risher, 1997; 1999; White, 2000).

#### **Performance-related pay.**

Until about 20 years ago, nearly all civil servants in OECD countries were given pay increases primarily based on length of service. Governments have turned to PRP for at least five reasons 1) to foster individual motivation by recognizing effort and achievement in a concrete way, 2) to attract dynamic and risk-taking managers who are confident of their ability to perform, 3) to contain salary costs by reducing automatic progression through salary levels or as a way of lifting an overall salary ceiling, with non-pensionable financial rewards, 4) to compensate for the loss of security entailed in introducing fixed-term contracts, as in New Zealand, and 5) to refute any idea that civil service employees are unaccountable and overpaid by showing that their level of performance is monitored and their compensation is contingent (OECD 2004; 2005).

The spread of performance-related pay (PRP) relates both to the number of people involved and to the range of grades covered, extending from top management to managerial to non-managerial to manual employees. By 2005, more than two thirds of OECD countries had introduced some form of PRP for at least part of their civil service, but the design and application of such systems varies considerably. Nevertheless, we distinguish three trends (OECD, 2005). First, until recently, the few OECD countries with the most extended, formalized PRP policies were those with position-based systems and a high degree of delegated responsibility for human resources and budget management. These include Denmark, Italy, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. However, this trend has started to change, with PRP policies having been introduced into career-based systems in countries such as Hungary and Korea. Second, in countries such as Canada, Ireland and Norway, PRP is applied only at the management level. In Ireland, Norway and France, it has been applied in six pilot ministries, though only for the most

senior officials. Third, several countries have strongly encouraged the move toward a more collective approach to PRP over the past five years. The OECD (2005) reports several positive examples of this. In the United Kingdom, a number of departments made the transition from individual to team-based systems in 2004, and preliminary results of this new policy encouraged the government to promote the extension of collective PRP. In Finland, results-based rewards applied at the team level are considered the most effective method of allocation. The Spanish National Institute of Social Security introduced collective PRP along with improved information and communication technology, reporting highly positive effects. The average time to complete procedures related to social security benefits dropped from six months at the end of the 1980s to less than seven days by 2000. In career-based systems, the resulting accountability structure is more collective than in position-based systems, so it is possible that collective pay rewards might be appropriate in these circumstances (OECD, 2004).

Another element of variation concerns the significance of PRP in the typical financial reward package. Monetary incentives for good performance are relatively stronger in position-based systems, while the emphasis on promotion is relatively stronger in career-based systems. PRP rewards can be given as permanent additions to the recipient's basic pay (merit increments) or as one-time payments that have to be re-earned during each appraisal period (bonuses). In the last decade, the use of bonuses has become more common because they provide greater flexibility and do not add to fixed payroll or pension costs. The size of payments varies across OECD countries, but it is generally a fairly modest percentage of the base salary, especially among non-managerial employees. PRP merit increments are usually below a maximum of 5% of the base salary. PRP bonuses tend to be higher, but overall, maximum rewards usually represent less than 10% of the base salary for civil servants. For managers, the size of performance payments is often larger and represents, on average, 20% of the base salary for maximum awards.

In some countries, performance-related pay must be cost-neutral. For example, this can be achieved by decreasing the salaries of the worst-performing staff. In Switzerland, for a public employee rated "B" (partially satisfies requirements), the wage is reduced to 94% of the pay band ceiling after a two-year period. Other countries share cost savings with their employees, though productivity in the public sector is notoriously difficult to measure. For example, in Finland, one third of any improvement in results is to be devoted to staff rewards. Overall, however, in public organizations as in the private realm, the proportion of income that an employee experiences as being at risk under PRP typically tends to be low in principle and still lower in practice.

The larger question may be whether PRP actually works as a motivational tool. In practice there is often a gap between the existence of a so-called "performance-related pay scheme" and its concrete functioning, which may be barely linked to performance. Marsden (1997) mentions that only a very small minority of personnel actually receive unfavorable scores. Willems et al, (2004b) show that line managers still have a tendency to distribute bonuses to the entire staff to avoid jealousy and conflict, thereby undermining the motivational aspect (OCED 2004). Irrespective of its design, PRP appears to motivate only a minority of staff in the public sector because the large majority do not see it as an incentive to work more efficiently. Extensive staff surveys

conducted in the United Kingdom and the United States show that despite broad support for the principle of linking pay to performance, only a small percentage of employees thought their existing performance pay schemes provided them with a sufficient incentive to work beyond minimum job requirements. Many commented that they found PRP divisive (OECD, 2005). Evidence from the government of one industrialized country suggests that PRP can actually damage performance and motivation (Marsden and Richardson 1994). Swiss measures to increase individual and collective performance led to an increase in organizational fragmentation and internal competitiveness (Bolgiani, 2002). Why should this be true? Most government workers, particularly those in non-managerial roles, consider basic pay and how it compares to the wider job market far more important than supplementary pay increases for performance. Moreover, public employees are perhaps more inclined to be motivated by job content and career development prospects than by PRP payments (OECD, 2005).

Despite important limitations, PRP appears to create windows of opportunity for wider management and organizational changes. First, PRP gives managers an added incentive to manage effectively and encourages them to fully endorse a goal-setting approach. Second, PRP allows the linking of broader organizational objectives to those of individual employees. Third, PRP facilitates wide-ranging organizational changes by linking pay bonuses to new objectives at the individual and the departmental levels. PRP may be used as a lever to introduce more flexible working methods, encourage teamwork, reinforce information and communication flows, and emphasize the implementation of new behaviors associated with training. Finally, PRP also has a positive effect on recruitment, as demonstrated particularly in the Scandinavian countries. In Denmark, 57% of managers indicated that PRP leads to better opportunities for recruitment. Similar outcomes have occurred in attracting and retaining top quality school teachers in England and Wales (OECD, 2005).

**Moving toward modern pay systems.** Willems et al. (2006) have examined the occurrence of new pay systems and the extent to which the central governments of six European countries (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Finland, Sweden and the UK) are following the new pay trends. They find that although PRP is becoming popular and although there have been changes in the pay systems studied, a new pay model has not been fully adopted, and traditional rewards systems are still strong, with the exception of Sweden and to a lesser extent the UK and Denmark. In Belgium and in Germany, federal pay systems are still predominantly traditional, although the former uses competence-based pay and the latter plans to change to more performance-related compensation. The Netherlands still has mainly traditional pay system features, like pay scales with fixed increments, but civil servants there can also expect in the future more use of performance-based pay and individual choice concerning benefits.

The degree of decentralization is also an increasingly visible issue. In the UK and Denmark, pay systems lean toward more innovative forms, with decentralized responsibility for compensation decisions and performance-related pay. The UK also uses pay bands as a basis for compensation structure, which some US organizations have also employed in an effort to move to competence-based pay systems. Only the Swedish

system could be characterized as completely new, with a highly decentralized and individualized pay system largely based on performance.

In the absence of increased overall funding levels, however, traditional compensation systems in some nations are no longer able to provide sufficient rewards to attract adequate numbers of capable individuals to staff a modern public service. Performance pay and other forms of recognition, as well as personal growth and fulfillment, may have some appeal to a new generation of public employees less concerned with security and tenure, but PRP and other new approaches should not be considered a panacea: their implementation is often difficult; organizations encounter major methodological and measurement problems; evidence is often inconclusive and ambiguous; and the experience of OECD countries has not been altogether satisfactory (WPSR, 2005). Based on a study of ten public organizations in the UK, Morris and Farrell (2007) argue that recent reforms have often resulted in significant adverse outcomes, such as longer working hours, added complexity and reduced job satisfaction. However, the OECD (2005) concludes that PRP and related changes can help improve performance when applied in the right managerial context, if not because of the financial rewards then indirectly through the changes in work and management organization needed for their implementation.

---

## **6. Politics and the Psychological Contract**

---

We highlight here three broad and interrelated issues impacting strategic HRM reform in government: denigration of public service, psychological contract, and overall compensation relative to the private sector.

Although government organizations are adopting HRM practices used in the private sector, these reforms may be driven as much by political considerations as by the desire to ensure a vibrant and capable public service. Political leaders want to be seen to be fixing performance problems and improving public services available to their constituents, but their rhetoric often reinforces the perception of public employment as the refuge of workers simply marking time until retirement. This image will not allow public service to attract a younger generation of workers less concerned with job security relative to the prospects of challenging work and empowered decision making. Winchell and Risher (cf Risher, 2003) agree that giving employees more participation and decision authority will be essential to the future of the US civil service, but they disagree about the likelihood of empowerment efforts actually overcoming existing obstacles.

An important consideration not explicitly addressed in many HRM reforms is the degree to which mutual understandings underlie the relationship between employee and employer. Public sector workers have traditionally had a strong sense of psychological contract, a delicate balance of interrelated expectations (Willems et al., 2006). Though

public servants are typically willing to offer a high degree of loyalty (Janssens et al., 2003) and commitment, they expect loyalty, long-term involvement, job security, fair treatment and quality of opportunity in return (Willems et al., 2004a). Compared to employees in the private sector, public workers have traditionally been motivated more by intrinsic rather than extrinsic rewards (Brown and Heywood, 2002). The degree to which performance-based approaches may alter this balance remains unclear.

The influence of political disparagement on the commitment level of public servants has yet to be established, but even efforts at reform may undermine the appeal of working in government. Thompson (2006) suggests that such practical innovations as pay banding and PRP often exacerbate the tensions between enhancing performance and the desire to maintain a cooperative public service ethic. Changing a civil service pay system from collective pay grades to individual pay setting could jeopardize established notions of equity, particularly in societies that place high value on respect for seniority and experience (Risher, 1999).

Risher (2003) argues that the focus on borrowing technical improvements successfully implemented in large commercial enterprises has shifted attention away from the need for a fundamental rethinking of how public employees are viewed. As the US General Accounting Office (2001) has pointed out, public employees are often seen as “costs to be cut rather than assets to be valued.” Notwithstanding PFP and more attention devoted to competency building, public service will not be attractive to innovative and committed employees until they are convinced that the organization and public leaders view them as a strategic asset.

Consistent with their perceptions of underperforming organizations, few political leaders have been willing to advocate significant increases in the overall compensation of public employees, though some have acknowledged an impending crisis in the ability of government to attract new workers (Voinovich, 2000). As mentioned above, amounts allocated for performance pay must often be “cost neutral,” with incentives paid out of savings due to staff reductions or lower pay for some workers. The size of the overall compensation pie has generally not increased; it is simply sliced differently. Talk of performance pay, especially in small increments, will not attract the best employees when base salaries are substantially below those in the private sector. In spite of a deepening crisis in the ability of some nations to attract new workers, the political will does not yet exist to resolve the overall compensation disparity between public and private employees. Of course, exceptions exist, notably in Singapore and Hong Kong where public workers are well rewarded and government work attracts the top graduates from local universities.

---

## **General conclusions**

---

Changes to HRM practice have been uneven among the sub-fields (e.g., recruitment, performance management, etc.) and across nations. Some advanced countries have made progress; in other nations only the discourse has shifted. In more than a few developing economies, the problem has yet to be engaged. Further research is needed to describe,

compare and analyze the evolution of public HRM practices with the goal of learning to make reform more effectively support organizational strategy.

The principal limitation of this research is the relative lack of cross-country comparisons on the evolution of HRM practices in public organizations. Our study is also admittedly constrained by the degree to which most research has focused on tactical elements rather than the strategic perspective. Also, some regions are underrepresented in the bibliography of this article: in most African, Arab and Asian countries, HRM in public sector is still in the “personnel administration” phase and little attention is paid to organizational efficiency or staff motivation. However, this work allows a better understanding of the effective changes that has happened in public sector HRM over the last two decades and in an international perspective. It also suggests what is still to be done to achieve Strategic HRM.

HRM can be an important management tool for achieving higher performance in public sector organizations, if integrated with appropriate institutional arrangements, budgeting authority and accountability. Although cautious, Shim (2001) stresses the multiple and positive effects of reform across countries. Thompson (2006) is more skeptical, pointing out that performance shortcomings in public sector organizations often result from interaction with the political system, a complication for which private-sector experience may have little to offer. Giaque and Caron (2004), underline the fiscal motivation behind most changes, noting that some governments see employees (i.e., human resources) merely as an “adjustment variable” and not as an asset in which to invest. New HRM practices are too often used after major disruptions to alleviate or mitigate the negative effects of financially motivated reforms. A better strategy might be to start integrating new HRM practices in the first stages of a reform plan. However, in the absence of a new perception of public service and rewards commensurate with private sector employment we question whether the specific reforms mentioned above may be likened to simply rearranging the proverbial deck chairs on the Titanic, giving the appearance of performance-oriented change but doing little to attract capable employees and leaders for the future.

The boundary between public and private is becoming more porous, and the temptation is often to import “best practices.” As when the Pendleton Act in 1883 triggered in the US the shift to a professional civil service, public authorities today are searching to find the “one best way” to approach HRM reform. However, non-critical adoption of management principles and tools borrowed from the private sector has in some cases fostered a shift to an ideologically based and mechanical vision of change in the public sector (Giaque and Caron, 2004), without addressing the fundamental problems. Indeed, judicious adaptation and learning from the private sector can be beneficial, but care is needed in crafting practices and approaches that respect the unique character of the public sector, its workforce, spirit and values (Lavelle, 2006). As in the private sector, the best public employees have more employment options and alternatives than ever before.

## References

---

- Batal, C. (1997), *La gestion des ressources humaines dans le secteur public (Human Resource Management in public sector, Tome 1, L'analyse des métiers, des emplois et des compétences (Jobs and competencies analysis)*, Editions d'Organisation, Paris.
- Bjornberg, L., (2002), "Training and Development: Best Practices", *Public Personnel Management*, Vol 31No.4, pp. 507–516.
- Bolgiani, I. (2002), *L'application des nouvelles méthodes de gestion publique dans les secteurs sanitaire et hospitalier: Risques et opportunités (Application of the new public management methods in the public health and hospital sectors : risks and opportunities)*,. Muri, Société suisse pour la politique de la santé, Suisse.
- Brans, M. and Hondeghem A., (2005), "Competency Frameworks in the Belgian governments: Causes, Construction and Contents", *Public Administration, Vol. 83* No. 4, pp. 823–837.
- Brown, M. and Heywood, J. (Ed). (2002), *Paying for Performance: An International Comparison*, Sharpe, New York, NY.
- Bulmer, E.R., (2000), "Rationalizing Public Sector Employment in the MENA Region: Issues and Options, Social and Economic Development Group Middle East and North Africa Region", December, available at: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMENA/Resources/WP19.pdf> (accessed 9 January 2009).
- Cederblom, D. and Pernerl, D.E. (2002), "From Performance Appraisal to Performance Management: One Agency's Experience", *Public Personnel Management, Vol. 31* No. 2, pp. 131–140.
- Center for the Study of Social Policy (2002), *Human Resource Management Innovation*, Center for the Study of Social Policy, Washington, D.C.
- Clardy, A., (2008), "Policies for Managing the Training and Development Function: Lessons from the Federal Government", *Public Personnel Management, Vol. 37* No.1, pp. 27–54.
- CMOD (Centre for Management and Organization Development) (2003), "A guide to competency development in the civil service", available at [http://finance.gov.ie/cstc/cstcresources/cmod\\_report.pdf](http://finance.gov.ie/cstc/cstcresources/cmod_report.pdf) (accessed 9 January 2009).
- David, P. A. (2000), "Path Dependence, Its Critics and the Quest for "Historical Economics", working paper, All Souls College, Oxford University, available at: <http://www-econ.stanford.edu/faculty/workshop/swp0011.html> (accessed 9 January 2009).
- Freibert, A. (1997), "Public Pay Programs in OECD Countries", in Risher, H. and Fay C. (Ed.), *New Strategies for Public Pay: Rethinking Government Compensation Programs*, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, pp. 294–311.
- General Accounting Office (2001), *High Risk : An Update*, Report GAO-01-263. Washington, DC.

Waxin, Bateman (2009). HRM Reform in the Public Sector: A Multi-Nation Perspective, 10th International Human Resource Management Conference, Santa Fe, New Mexico. June 21 – 24.

- Giauque D., and Caron, D.J. (2004), “Réformes administratives et gestion des ressources humaines: Comparaison de la Suisse et du Canada”(“Administrative reforms and HRM : comparisons between Switzerland and Canada”), *Revue internationale de Politique Comparée*, Vol. 11 No. 2, pp. 225–240.
- Gouvernement du Canada (2000), Une organisation apprenante, d’un océan à l’autre: Sur la voie de l’avenir, Rapport du comité sur l’apprentissage et le développement, juin. (A learning organization, from one ocean to the other, Report of the committee on learning and development, June) , Canadian Centre for Management Development, Ottawa, Ontario.
- Grote, D. (2000), “Public Sector Organizations: Today’s Innovative Leaders in Performance Management”, *Public Personnel Management*, Vol. 29 No. 1, pp. 1–20.
- Healy, P. (2001), Training and public sector reform: An integrated approach, *Public Administration and Development*, Vol. 21 No. 4, pp. 309–319.
- Heisel, W. D. (1980), “A Non-Bureaucratic View of Management Development”, *Public Personnel Management*, Vol 9 No. 2, pp. 94–98.
- Hoque, K and Kirkpatrick I., (2008), “Making the Core Contingent: Professional Agency Work and Its Consequences in UK Social Services”, *Public Administration*, Vol. 86 No. 2, pp. 331-344.
- Ingraham, P., Joyce, P., and Doonahue, A., (2003), *Government Performance: Why Management Matters*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, M.D.
- Janssens, M., Sels, L., and Van den Brande, I., (2003), “Multiple Types of Psychological Contracts: A Six-cluster Solution”, *Human Relations*, Vol. 56 No. 11, pp. 1349–1378.
- Kettl, D. F. (1997), “The Global Revolution in Public Management: Driving Themes, Missing Links”, *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*, Vol. 6 No. 3, pp. 446–462.
- Kim, P. S. and K. P. Hong (2006), “Searching for Effective HRM Reform Strategy in the Public Sector: Critical Review of WPSR 2005 and Suggestions”, *Public Personnel Management*, Vol. 35 No. 3, pp. 199–216.
- Lavelle, J. (2006), “It’s All About Context and Implementation; Some Thoughts Prompted by: Unlocking the Human Potential for Public Sector Performance—The United Nations World Public Sector Report 2005”, *Public Personnel Management*, Vol. 35 No.3, pp. 217–228.
- Lavigna, R. (2002), “Timely Hiring in Public Sector Organizations.” In *International Recruitment and Selection Strategies*. Washington, D.C.: International Public Management Association for Human Resources, US., available at: [unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN/UNPAN021818.pdf](http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN/UNPAN021818.pdf) (accessed 9 January 2009).
- Lavigna, R. J. and. Hays, S. W., (2004), “Recruitment and Selection of Public Workers: An International Compendium of Modern Trends and Practices”, *Public Personnel Management*, Vol. 33 No. 3, pp. 237–253.
- Lawler, E. E. (2003), *Treat people right*, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco.
- Lemire, L. and Gagnon Y-C. (2004), *La gestion des ressources humaines dans les organisations publiques* (Human resource management in public organisations). Les Presses De L’Université De Montréal, Montréal.

Waxin, Bateman (2009). HRM Reform in the Public Sector: A Multi-Nation Perspective, 10th International Human Resource Management Conference, Santa Fe, New Mexico. June 21 – 24.

Marchack, S. (2002), “Alternative Recruitment Strategies: Case Study on Contract Employment in the Public Service of Trinidad and Tobago”, *International Recruitment and Selection Strategies*, International Public Management Association for Human Resources, Washington, DC, available at: <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN/UNPAN021826.pdf>, (accessed 9 January 2009).

Marsden, D. (1997), “Public Service Pay Reforms in European Countries”, *Transfer*, Vol. 3 No. 1, pp. 62–85.

Marsden, D. and Richardson, R. (1994), “Performing for Pay? The Effects of Merit Pay on Motivation in a Public Service”, *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, Vol. 32 No. 2, pp. 243–261.

Mentz, J. N. (1997), “Personal and Institutional Factors in Capacity Building and Institutional Development,” working paper 14, European Centre for Development Policy Management.

Morris, J. and Farrell, C. (2007), “The Post-Bureaucratic Public Sector: New Organizational Forms and HRM in Ten UK Public Sector Organizations”, *International Journal of Human Resource Management*, Vol.18 No. 9, pp. 1575-1588.

Nigro, L., Nigro, F., and Kellough, J. E. (2007), “Recruitment and Selection”, in *The New Public Personnel Administration*, 6th edition, Wadsworth Publications, Belmont, C.A., pp. 85-123.

OECD (2004), “Trends in HRM Policies in OECD Countries: An Analysis of the Results of the OECD Survey on Strategic HRM”, OECD, Paris.

OECD (2005), “Performance-related Pay Policies for Government Employees”, OECD, Paris.

Osborne, D. and Gaebler T. (1992), *Reinventing Government*, Addison Wesley, Boston.

Ospina, S., Cunill, N. G., and Zaltsman, A. (2004), “Performance Evaluation, Public Management, Improvement and Democratic Accountability”, *Public Management Review*, Vol. 6 No.2, pp. 229–251.

Page, E.C, Hood, C. and Lodge, M. (2005), “Conclusion: is competency Management a passing fad?”, *Public Administration*, Vol.83 No.4, pp. 853–860.

Page, Hood and Lodge, S. (2005), “What's New about the New Public Management? Administrative Change in the Human Services”, *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 65 No. 6, pp. 713-728

Patton, D. and Pratt C. (2002), “Assessing the Training Needs to High-potential Managers”, *Public Personnel Management*, Vol. 31 No4, pp. 465–485.

Pollitt, C. (2005), “Performance Management in Practice: A Comparative Study of Executive Agencies”, *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, Vol. 16, pp. 25–44.

Pollitt, C. and Bouckaert, G. (2004), *Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis*, 2nd Ed. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Rauch, J. and Evans, P. (2000), “Bureaucratic Structure and Performance in Less Developed Countries”, *Journal of Public Economics*, Vol. 75 No. 1, pp. 49–71.

Reichenberg, N. (2002), “Branding the Government as an Employer of Choice.” In *International Recruitment and Selection Strategies*, International Public

Waxin, Bateman (2009). HRM Reform in the Public Sector: A Multi-Nation Perspective, 10th International Human Resource Management Conference, Santa Fe, New Mexico. June 21 – 24.

- Management Association for Human Resources, Washington, D.C., available at: <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN/UNPAN021819.pdf> (accessed 9 January 2009)
- Richer, H. (2003), “Point-Counterpoint on Empowerment”, *The Public Manager*, Vol. 32 No.3, pp. 3-6.
- Risher, H. (1997), “Competency Base Pay: The Next Model for Salary Management”, in Risher H. and Fay C. (Ed.), *New Strategies for Public Pay: Rethinking Government Compensation Programs*, , Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, pp. 145–58.
- Risher, H. (1999), “Are Public Employers Ready for a New Pay Program?”, *Public Personnel Management*, Vol. 28 No 3, pp. 323–343
- Roberts, G. (1998), “Perspectives on Enduring and Emerging Issues in Performance Appraisal”, *Public Personnel Management*, Vol. 27 No.3, pp. 301–320.
- Roberts, G. (2003), “Employee Performance Appraisal System Participation: A Technique that Works”, *Public Personnel Management*, Vol. 32 No1, pp. 89–98.
- Selden, S. and Jacobson W. (2003), “Human Resource Management”, In Colonna A. & Puma J. (Ed.), *Paths to Performance in State and Local Government: A Final Assessment from the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs*, Campbell Public Affairs Institute, Syracuse.
- Shim, D-S. (2001), “Recent Human Resources Developments in OECD Member Countries”, *Public Personal Management*, Vol.30 No.3, pp. 323–347.
- Soni, V. (2004), “From Crisis to Opportunity: Human Resource Challenges for the Public Sector in the Twenty-First Century”, *Review of Policy Research*, Vol. 21 No.2, pp. 157-178.
- Sullivan, J. (2002), “Experience—‘It Ain’t What It Used To Be.’ ” In *International Recruitment and Selection Strategies*, International Public Management Association for Human Resources, Washington, D.C., available at <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN/UNPAN021824.pdf>, (accessed 9 January 2009).
- Thompson, J. R. (2006), “The Federal Civil Service: The Demise of an Institution”, *Public Administration Review* , Vol. 66 No.4, pp. 496–504.
- United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN/DESA) (2005), *World Public Sector Report (WPSR), Unlocking the Human Potential for Public Sector Performance*, United Nations, New York.
- Voinovich, G. (2000), *Report to the President: The Crisis in Human Capital*. US Senate Sub-committee on Oversight of Government Management, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC.
- Waxin, M. F. and Panaccio, A. J. (2004), “Le recrutement et l’intégration des minorités visibles dans les entreprises Québécoises” (“Recruitment and integration of minority employees in Quebec companies”, *Congrès AGRH*, Montréal.
- White, G. (2000), “Pay Rflexibility in European Services: A Comparative Analysis”, in Farnham D. and Horton S. (Ed.), *Human Resources Flexibilities in the Public Services: International Perspectives*, Macmillan, London, pp. 255–279.
- Willems, I., Janvier, R., and Henderickx, E .(2004a), “The Unique Nature of Psychological Contracts in the Public Sector: An Exploration”, Paper presented at the EGPA conference, Ljubljana, September (2004), Available at <http://soc.kuleuven.be/io/egpa/HRM/index.html>, (accessed 9 January 2009).

Waxin, Bateman (2009). HRM Reform in the Public Sector: A Multi-Nation Perspective, 10th International Human Resource Management Conference, Santa Fe, New Mexico. June 21 – 24.

Willems, I., Janvier, R., and Henderickx, E. (2004b), “Beter beloond bij de buren? Het beloningsbeleid in de UK Civil Service en de Nederlandse Rijksoverheid doorgelicht” (Better Paid in Neighboring Countries? Research into the Pay Policy in the UK Civil Service and the Dutch State Sector), *SBOV*, Working Paper, Leuven, Belgium.

Willems, I., Janvier, R., and Henderickx, E. (2006), “New Pay in European Civil Services: Is the Psychological Contract Changing?”, *International Journal of Public Sector Management*, Vol.19 No.6, pp. 609–621.

Yeganeh and Su, H. (2008), “An examination of human resource management practices in Iranian public sector”, *Personnel Review*, Vol. 37 No. 2, pp. 203-221.