

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The narrator of L. P. Hartley's novel *The Go-Between* (1953) states, "The past is a foreign country. They do things differently there" (as cited in Schoeler, 2006, p. 1). Classical texts are equally challenging, particularly those from different languages, as they are often written differently too. Fortunately though, the 'foreign' and 'unfamiliar' can be garbed in the guise of the familiar only by a skilful translator, whose chief role is manifested in being a "mediator" (Hatim & Mason, 1997, p. 111). Classical texts, especially those of al-Ghazālī, are often studied either from a theological perspective or a philosophical one. However, the many translations of his 'mystical literature', which mirror the two stages of his 'technique' and 'experience' (Winter, 1995, p. xv), are an area worth investigating from a perspective that has always been overlooked - a linguistic perspective. Among the many features the current thesis tackles not only the overlap between orality and literacy presented in al-Ghazālī's writing but also his abstruse argumentation style. In this case, "discourse awareness" becomes indispensable in the process of rendering his texts, and more precisely, is considered "one of the essential skills of translators in negotiating a coherent meaning with a target reader" (Hatim & Mason, 1997, p. 126).

The thesis at hand questions the dichotomy of 'sentence' vs. 'text' in translation studies and the ability of each to negotiate a coherent meaning. 'Text-type awareness' is also tackled and is considered indispensable in achieving coherence. The two notions of 'oral' vs. 'literal' argumentation techniques resorted to by al-Ghazālī are examined and the competency of native vs. non-native translators in relaying the essence of his message is also examined and compared. The current study proposes that coherence can only be achieved under certain conditions. First, translators should be capable of differentiating an argumentative text from a descriptive or expository one. Furthermore, translators should be fully aware of the norms of both Source and Target languages. In order to reach their goal, translators should be able to answer questions of the following nature: what characterizes arguments of an oral language and of a literal one? How can each be translated meaningfully in a way that conforms to target audience's norms? Additionally,

what indicators are used in each language to pave the way for a new argument? In order to answer these questions, a translation quality assessment needs to be carried out.

In the second chapter, ‘Coherence in the Translation of Argumentative Texts’, the theoretical framework for the present thesis is discussed and the strategies employed in the chapter of data analysis are examined. Translation, which is defined as a ‘process’ or a ‘product’ that focuses on the role of the translator in taking the source text (ST) and turning it into a text in another language (the target text, TT) (Hatim & Munday, 2004, p. 3), is verified from the perspective of the two most polemic dichotomies in translation studies, ‘sentence’ versus ‘text’ linguistics. While the former failed to traverse its limitations, the latter went global, emphasising the concept of textuality and its seven standards. Albeit their seemingly insignificant role, it is almost impossible to verify whether the (TT) ‘hangs together’ coherently without referring to the seven standards of textuality. Therefore, the question that the first literature review shall attempt to address is: is it ‘sentence’ or ‘text’ that should be considered the unit for analyzing discourse when considering the process of translation quality assessment for al-Ghazālī’s argumentative text?

In the third chapter, ‘al-Ghazālī’s Texts between Orality’ and Literacy, orality, literacy and Sufism are touched upon and the way they are presented in *al-Munqidh min ad-Dalāl* (“the Deliverance from Error”) by al-Ghazālī is investigated. Growing up in a highly cultivated civilization, having sought classical knowledge following the conventional methods available in his milieu and predominantly relying on aural study with a master, al-Ghazālī’s religious *weltanschauung* does not express conformity to the norms and consequently, may be considered somewhat unconventional. It is not only his writing style, which is unwittingly influenced by the literate style of Greek philosophy, but also his contrived fashion in which he sets forth his intellectual and spiritual evolution. “Sūfism, generic term (*taṣawwuf* in Arabic)”, John Renard writes, “is commonly used to describe various aspects of the Islamic mystical tradition and its institution” (2009, p. 229). What is original about al-Ghazālī’s approach to Sufism, however, is his attempt to show the coherence of all the different parts of religion, and that they together lead to the immense simplicity, which is embodied in the “practice” (*sunna*) of the Prophet. In his approach, the revival of the religion in its holistic totality is

stressed upon; bringing back the primal wholeness and mutuality that existed in the soul of the Prophet and his Companions. His approach impresses upon the fact that “knowledge” without “action” (Ghazālī, 2004, p. 27) leads only to useless futility and creates more morally polluted psyches. This chapter shall adopt Walter Ong’s theory of Orality & Literacy (1982) to answer the chief questions of this thesis, what category does al-Ghazālī’s writing fall in, ‘oral’ or ‘literal’? What makes his writing style unconventional, bearing in mind that even his approach towards Ṣūfism is considered unconventional?

In the Data Analysis chapter, the argumentation style adopted by *al-Munqidh* is tackled and its oral/ literal orientation is scrutinised. While critics argued that *al-Munqidh* is nothing more than a memoir and is not even worth being categorised as a biography, admirers praise its ‘own uniqueness’ (Ghazālī, 2004, p. 22), arguing that Ghazālī’s primary purpose in writing seems to have been didactic, not to give a detailed and precise historical account for himself (p. 26). The approach followed to handle the different heresiographical groups cannot be misconstrued since the argumentation is employed systematically. Its chief purpose is best expressed in Hatim & Mason’s words:

Argumentation has as its cognitive basis the notion of the ‘plan’. As a global processing pattern exploited in argumentative texts, the plan regulates how events and states lead up to the attainment of a goal. All argumentative texts seek to promote or simply evaluate certain beliefs of ideas, with conceptual relations such as reason, significance or opposition becoming naturally meaningful and frequent. (1997, pp.130-1)

Al-Ghazālī’s ‘plan’ sounded the death knell of all trends that upheld dutiable knowledge. His argumentation ‘pattern’ sought to rectify all doctrines that beset with doubts about the faith and is initiated by paying tribute to each adversary group, followed by incisive and decisive critique that vehemently destroys their premise. In order to examine his argumentation style, excerpts from three translations of his *al-Munqidh* are compared and examined:

1. R.J. McCarthy (2004), *Deliverance from Error*.
2. Montgomery Watt (1996), *The Faith and Practice of Ghazālī*.
3. Muhammad Abūlaylah (2002), *A Translation of Al Munqidh min Al-Ḍalāl*.

Hatim & Mason (1997) posit that “different languages and different cultures handle rebuttal differently” (p. 138). Subsequently, this explains the noticeable tendency of English language towards counter-argumentation and of Arabic language toward through-argumentation (Hatim and Mason, 1990, p. 133). This broaches three key questions, how could Ghazālī’s argumentation techniques be categorised as ‘oral’ or as ‘literal’? Whose translation is more ‘orally oriented’, native English speaking translators (McCarthy and Montgomery) or that of a non-native translator (Abūlaylah)? Whose translation is more reflective of an awareness of and an ability to distinguish the different persuasion and argumentation strategies across cultures?

Having briefly touched upon the main features of this thesis, it is worth noting that the analysis of the excerpts is crucial in drawing a map towards the preferred reading of the (TT). The thorny job of translators leaves them with no choice other than staying tuned to the latest findings in the field. With no background knowledge on how languages function across cultures, and with no systematic, unified strategy for translating a text loaded with oral residue, the rendered text might read just as perplexing and ‘foreign’ as the source text. This thesis tries to pinpoint the flaws that caused an incoherent reading of the (TT), rectify the haphazard choices of translators and finally, suggest solutions on how argumentation can be better handled by fully aware translators of the different persuasion and argumentation strategies across cultures.

## 2. COHERENCE IN THE TRANSLATION OF ARGUMENTATIVE TEXTS

### 2.1. Overview

“Translation is not a matter of words only” writes Anthony Burgess, “it is a matter of making intelligible a whole culture” (2007, para. 4). Translating classical texts is no exception, as they are looked at as a string of words and grammar, not as a whole coherent package inseparable from its culture and linguistic norms. This represents the on-going debate between the two most important trends in translation studies: those who posit that translation is a matter of vocabulary (terminology) and grammar (general linguistic competence) on the level of the sentence, and the other trend, which addresses issues the aforementioned criteria made no claim to encompass such as texts, genres and discourses as a whole (Beaugrande, 1980, para. 3.1). The latter approach, which is adopted by the current thesis, “is intended more to complement traditional ones than to compete with them” (Beaugrande, 1981, para. 3).

With the aim of embarking on a general re-appraisal, specifically of al-Ghazālī’s *al-Munqidh*, which happens to be argumentative, and more broadly, of oral texts in translation, relevant aspects of text linguistics will be discussed. To set the scene, text and the ‘seven standards of textuality’ (Beaugrande, 1981, para. 1), specifically cohesion that covers how units of language in use are connected to each other on the surface will be discussed (Brown & Yale, 1983, p. 191). In addition, coherence, which proffers the conceptual relatedness of meanings at a deeper level of text (Brown & Yale, 1983, p. 223) will also be defined. In addition, the translators’ sensitivity towards preserving the source text message in the process of discourse translation of al-Ghazālī’s argumentative text will be examined.

In his *New Foundations for a Science of Text and Discourse*, Robert De Beaugrande (1997, para. 82-104) points out that linguistics has experienced a number of evolutions. Conventional schemes like ‘phonology - lexicology - syntax’ have been developed into more well-defined terms such as ‘text’ and ‘discourse’. Text was handily defined as a ‘well-formed sequence of sentences’. However, it was steadily realized that

the text lies ‘beyond the sentence’ not just in length and sequence over time and space, but in its richer connection to human activities of cognition and communication in society. Attention extended far outside the field of linguistics proper to semiotics, ‘the science of signs’, which encompasses not just language but all phenomena treated as signs. For semiotics, a text would be not a piece of written language, but a ‘configuration of signs’. This suggests that the relation between ‘signified’ and ‘signifier’ might hold not for each sign but for the whole text-system (as a ‘supersign’).

Relating ‘text’ to ‘discourse’ was the next decisive step and a replica of previous attempts to model the relation between ‘language’ versus ‘use’ or between ‘theory’ versus ‘practice’ took place. The constraints remain too sparse if this theoretical ‘text’ applies to all text types, yet if it applies to just one text type, then it is less a theoretical than a practical concept developed for human interaction. Therefore, there is a good reason not to oppose text against discourse but to reconcile them, just as linguists and translators seek to reconnect theory with practice. When ‘text’ is reconciled with ‘discourse’, text linguistics can be integrated with discourse analysis, extending across whole discourses and not just phrases or sentences (1997, para. 105-9).

Another study that tackled the ‘text vs. discourse’ debate was carried out by Jeremy Munday. In his *Introducing Translation Studies: Theories and Applications* (2001), the chronological order during which discourse analysis approaches emerged is presented. The Hallidayan Systemic Functional Grammar, which is geared to the study of language as communication, seeing meanings in the writer’s linguistic choices and systematically relating these choices to a wider sociocultural framework (p.90), is also discussed. The Hallidayan model, including Hatim and Mason’s addition to the pragmatic and semiotic levels of discourse analysis, is considered a common trend in translation studies. While text analysis concentrates on describing the way in which texts are organized (sentence structure, cohesion, etc.), discourse analysis looks at the way language communicates meanings and social power relations. Discourse was represented in its wider sense, defined as “modes of speaking and writing which involve social groups in adopting a particular attitude towards areas of socio-cultural activity (e.g. racist discourse, etc.)” (p. 99).

Not only Beaugrande's research focused on discourse, George Yule (1996, p. 83) also pointed out that:

Discourse analysis covers an extremely wide range of activities, from the narrowly focused investigation of how words such as 'oh' or 'well' are used in casual talk, to the study of the dominant ideology in a culture as represented, for example, in its educational or political practices. When it is restricted to linguistic issues, discourse analysis focuses on the record (spoken or written) of the process by which language is used in some context to express intention.

For Hatim and Mason (1990), discourses are modes of talking and thinking which, like genres, become ritualized. For example, 'sexist discourse' (or feminist analyses of such discourse) may be taken as a concrete pattern identified within the format of a genre such as rugby songs (p.71).

While most researchers and linguists defined discourse in a similar fashion, Edwards, Nicoll, Solomon, and Usher (2004) argue that the primacy of linguistics represents an atrophying of the study of rhetoric. The imperialism of linguistics within the field of language study needs to be replaced with the bringing to the fore of the rhetorical aspects of human interaction and communication. (pp. 6-7) However, Edwards et al. quote Atkinson's counter-argument (1996: 32) who puts it perfectly in the quote "although it creates ire and resentment in some quarters where views are entrenched, it is by no means novel or revolutionary to suggest that science is a human activity suffused with rhetoric" (as cited in Edwards et al., 2004, p. 7).

Nevertheless, linguistics is still a nascent field and just like any other growing discipline, is subject to criticism and is bound to evoke controversy. Therefore, it is unsurprising that some partisans would remain loyal to what they believe to be the only proper domain of linguistics - the sentence - and deny the value of text linguistics altogether. Others might stay hesitant and shy away from adopting the transformation. Even those who adopt it may not pursue the same direction forward, and rather disagree about each other's findings.

## 2.2. A Brief History of 'Text Linguistics'

According to Beaugrande (1997), text linguistics evolved by making a fundamentally new departure from the earlier approaches such as those of Saussure, Bloomfield and Chomsky. Such scholars focussed their attention on the level of the sentence and defined it as merely 'a unit of language use ('parole'); or 'an independent form not included in any larger form'; or 'the central unit of language (or 'grammar')' consecutively (para. 83). Then came the stage of text grammar that was featured as "closely allied to syntax and featured a repertory of morpheme distributions and phrase structures in a descriptive approach" (para. 105). The major departure is text linguistics which, in contrast, was expected to justify itself by discovering formal constraints, e.g. on conjunctions and pro-nouns, that apply 'beyond the sentence boundary' in different ways than within the single sentence (para. 105).

Text grammar was a project for reconstructing the 'text' as a uniform, stable, and abstract system and would state the formal 'rules' that 'generate' the 'underlying structure' of all texts. However, the interaction between the 'virtual system in the language' versus the 'actual system of the text' went unexplored. Since the early stage of text grammar remained rather closed and uniform, text linguistics traversed its more open and diversified stages and moved further to the next stage which focused on the concept of textuality. It is not just a linguistic property or feature or a set of these, but a multiple mode of connectedness activated wherever communicative events occur. It became a must to restore the social connection of text to context and of text producers and receivers to society, formerly eclipsed by the conventional focus on the individual text and author (para. 10).

Whereas the text grammar stage had emphasized local aspects and sought the formal rules needed to link text constituents into a formal unit, the textuality stage emphasized the global aspects of texts and took the functional unity of the text to be empirically given. The actual processes whereby a text is produced and received are invested not in gluing element to element but in controlling the connectedness among these choices. Textuality rethinks even more intensely the problematic dichotomy between language by itself (virtual system) versus language use (actual system) and

thereby reconnect theory with practice (Para. 111). Moreover, many researchers paid close attention to discourse and agreed on a unified definition of it, however, only a few were those who attempted to take it a step further and study it in depth, especially the aspect of textuality.

### 2.3. Textuality Explained

While Brown and Yule (1983, p. 190) admit that their definition of text as merely “the verbal record of a communicative event” is incomprehensive, Beaugrande and Dressler (1981, para. 3) provide a more comprehensive definition that is concerned with the principles of connectivity that bind a text together and force co-interpretation. It is a “communicative occurrence” that satisfies the seven standards of textuality. The text is not considered communicative if meeting any of these standards is defied. The seven standards are outlined as follows:

1. Cohesion is the first standard. It covers how units of language in use are mutually connected to each other on the surface of the text. However, it is considered meaningless unless supported by the retrieval of the second standard (para. 4).
2. Coherence is the second standard and caters for the conceptual relatedness of meanings at a deeper level of text structuring (para. 6).
3. Intentionality is the third standard. Unlike the previous standards which are text-centered, this is a user-centered notion and concerns the text producer’s attitude and intentions (para. 13).
4. Acceptability is the fourth standard and concerns the text receiver’s attitude towards the text produced (para. 14).
5. Informativity is the fifth standard. It serves as a forum where creativity resides and where expectations are deliberately defied (pra. 17).
6. Situationality is the sixth standard and captures the relatedness of utterances to the situation in which they occur (para. 19).
7. Intertextuality is the seventh standard. It attends to how whole situations and texts within are dependent upon knowledge of one or more other encountered texts (para. 21).

The standards that concern this thesis and ensure that a text ‘hangs together’ both linguistically and conceptually are cohesion and coherence. Both, once ensured, provide translators with actual references to test their translation before producing the target text and thus, help them relay smooth translation from ST to TT. According to Hatim and Mason (1990), the sequence of coherence relations represent basic relations as cause-effect, problem-solution, temporal sequence, and so on (p. 195). Thus, translators are given an insight into the type of text they are dealing with and an opportunity to translate each text using a unique approach that caters for the text at hand. Having briefly explained text and textuality, further issues in text processes need to be addressed.

#### 2.4. Text Type: Argumentative Texts

Unlike the study of text typology that was centered on minimal units, i.e., on repertoires for distinctive features, phonemes, morphemes, etc., the approach of text typology adopted by this thesis evolved from social and linguistic factors. These in turn strongly influence the translator’s preferences for selecting, arranging, and mapping options during the production and processing of the target text. Some translators are able to utilize texts without identifying the type. However, the efficiency of their product suffers and the mode of interaction of translator/ audience and ST/TT remains vague. “Given the hybrid nature of texts, and the mutual overlap between text types, any classification or categorization of text type to decide what sorts of occurrences are probable among the totality of the possible will remain fuzzy” (Beaugrande, 1980, para. 1.5). Therefore, in order to ensure efficiency, it is crucial for translators to identify with the different text types along with each text’s underlying pragmatics.

Beaugrande (1980) discusses some conventional categories of text types, e.g. descriptive, narrative, argumentative, literary, poetic, scientific, didactic, and conversational (para. 1.8-1.8.8). However, Hatim and Mason (1990) reduce the categories to include only the following three texts: the argumentative, the expository and the instructional. The term text-type focus, “subsumes the set of communicative, pragmatic, and semiotic procedures, which are followed when relating a text to its context” (p. 149). For the purpose of the current thesis, the argumentative text shall be explored. Hatim and

Mason (1990, p. 154) quote Beaugrande and Dressler (1981, p. 184) who perfectly define the argumentative texts as:

Those utilised to promote the acceptance or evaluation of certain beliefs or ideas as true vs. False, or positive vs. Negative. Conceptual relations such as reason, significance, volition, value and opposition should be frequent. The surface texts will often show cohesive devices for emphasis and insistence, e.g. recurrence, parallelism and paraphrase.

Different persuasive strategies across languages, especially in English and Arabic, are tackled and differences in argumentative styles have been investigated. In the text-type adopted by this thesis, two forms of argumentation are distinguished: through-argumentation “the statement and subsequent substantiation of an initial thesis” and counter-argumentation “citing an opponent’s thesis, rebutting and substantiating the point of the rebuttal” (Hatim and Mason, 1990, p. 127). The translator’s choice of one form of argumentation over the other is not haphazard. On the contrary, it is closely bound to, and reflective of, his ability to distinguish the different persuasion and argumentation strategies across cultures, as well as his ability to recognize the distinctive signs and features of each form. To illustrate, the English language has a noticeable tendency towards counter-argumentation, whereas Arabic leans toward through-argumentation (p.133). Cohesion and coherence of argumentative texts are handled differently across cultures, particularly cultures of Oral vs. Literal origins. While the former is characterized by “repetition, redundancy, imprecise lexis and an additive paratactic syntax” (p. 141) the latter, is characterized by “elaborate organization of both content and expression, varied and precise lexis, complex hypotactic syntax and clearly signalled relations of contrast and causality” (p. 141).

Having briefly defined the on-going debate of sentence vs. text/discourse in linguistics and textuality along with its seven standards, and having shed light on how to preserve the coherence of argumentative texts, the necessity of the translators’ sensitivity towards recognizing and relaying the salient features orality and literacy will now be highlighted.

### 3. AL-GHAZĀLĪ'S TEXTS: BETWEEN ORALITY AND LITERACY

It is generally assumed that “establishing coherence in intercultural communication may be problematic” (Hatim & Mason, 1996, p. 138) especially when it comes to translating religious and semi-religious texts in general, and texts which are characterized by residual orality in particular. Yet the writing of the esteemed theologian and mystic, Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, not only defies this assumption, it continues to perplex translators and rhetoricians alike. Aside from mastering both Greek and orate argumentation conventions and despite the image that promotes him as a mere philosopher and nothing beyond, al-Ghazālī's abstruse mystical language has carved out a distinct niche in the field. These miscellaneous factors make translating any of his texts an exceptional task. The stereotype that speakers of indigenous languages adhere strictly to its conventions is challenged by al-Ghazālī's writing style. This chapter discusses the importance of identifying residual orality and its features for translators and investigates to what extent it shaped al-Ghazālī writing style throughout his life, starting from what Crow (2001) describes as, “the well travelled byways of legal methodology into the steep paths of rational theological and philosophical speculation, and beyond onto the narrow highway of trans-rational experience” (para.4).

#### 3.1. Residual Orality: An Overview

A considerable body of literature has been published on residual orality and both orality and literacy have been argued from several perspectives. Some researchers such as Walter J. Ong, focused on the orality-literacy shift in human conscious in general. Others like Eric A. Havelock and Gregor Schoeler specialized in the shift occurred from ancient Greece to Islam in classical times. While yet others such as McLuhan, were interested in the ‘replica’ modern world has witnessed in form of the shift from written to print then to electronic media. This chapter shall benefit from these multifarious discussions and pick the ones most relevant to its subject area.

The rise of linguistic and cultural differences urged many researchers to look for solutions. A conspicuous name in the field is Walter J. Ong who not only introduced, but amply explicated two notions: orality and literacy, which most translators have rarely

recognized. In his book, *Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word* (1982), a distinction between oral cultures, “cultures with no knowledge at all of writing” and “cultures deeply affected by the use of writing” (p. 1) is underlined. Moreover, he highlights the comparison between, “thought and its verbal expression in oral cultures” and “literate thought and expression in terms of their emergence from and relation to orality” (p. 1). The interrelationship between the ‘oral’ and the ‘literate’ is identified and in turn other ‘movements’ such as Formalism, Structuralism and New Criticism (p. 2) are discussed. Equally, a ‘synchronic’ and ‘diachronic’ comparison between orality and literacy is conducted and their origin is explored. Orality is believed to have evolved since the evolution of *Homo-sapiens*, which is 30,000- 50,000 years ago, while the earliest scripts date from only 6000 years (p. 2). Literacy began with writing, evolved to print, and later involved electronic media (also known as ‘secondary orality’), which depends on writing and print for its existence. The contrast between media and print resembles the earlier contrast between writing and orality (p. 3).

Some other academic that dealt with orality across history is Marshall McLuhan. In his *The Gutenberg Galaxy* (1962), he sheds light on the birth of “the global village” and the stages of its parturition are tracked; from oral to written structure of knowledge and from the print evolution onto the later pervasive media revolution. The impact of the shift from print to media on the masses, which is in essence a reflection of the shift in Greek culture from orality to literacy, is the book’s main focus (p.1). In the chapter “The Manuscript Shaped Medieval Literacy Conventions at all Levels”, he quotes Dom Jean Leclercq’s *The Love of Learning and The Desire For God*, wherein the oral dimension of manuscript culture is highlighted and its spiritual aspect is delved into. “The act of reading in the Middle Ages requires the participation of the whole body and the whole mind. Unlike today, reading is not only done with the eyes, but with lips; to pronounce the words, and with ears; to listen to the pronunciation and hear the “voices of the pages” (p. 89).

In medieval times, the action of reading aloud was interwoven with conceptions such as meditation, prayer, study and memory and proves that writing, reading, and oratory remained inseparable until well after printing (p. 89). The act of *meditatio* is

defined as applying oneself with full awareness to that which is beyond the mere visualization of the written words, but to a combination of a ‘muscular memory’ of the words pronounced and an ‘aural memory’ of the words heard, which is in essence being in a state of total memorization, inseparable from the *lectio* (reading or recitation). “It is what inscribes, so to speak, the sacred text in the body and in the soul” (p. 89). This ‘mastication’ of the divine words is described by the idea of spiritual nutrition and is a main reason for referring to reading and meditation by *ruminatio* ‘repetition’ (p. 90). For example, to praise a monk who prays continually, it was claimed that the murmur of his lips pronouncing the Psalms resembled the buzzing of a bee” (p. 90). Thus, to meditate is:

... to attach oneself closely to the sentence being recited and weigh all its words in order to sound the depths of their full meaning.” It means assimilating the content of a text by means of a kind of mastication which releases its full flavor. It means, as St. Augustine and others say in an untranslatable expression, to taste it with the *palatum cordis* or in *ore cordis*. All this activity is necessarily, a prayer; the *lectio divina* is a prayerful reading (p.90).

In this study, orality is amply explored from different dimensions, including the spiritual dimension. The act of *meditation*, which helps identify with al-Ghazali’s concept of mysticism and the ecstatic experience, is also elucidated. The extent in which literacy was initially submerged in and affected by orality, even during prayers and meditation, is tackled.

However, one criticism of McLuhan’s study is that the evolution of orality is acknowledged from a socio-cultural viewpoint, overlooking the significance of linguistics. Furthermore, no attempt is made to direct translators towards a methodology on how to translate spirituality. What McLuhan fails to do is to draw a distinction between how spirituality in the earlier orate era and in the later literate era is handled by translators. It is not easy to resolve the paradox of what would indicate something that is meant to be heard by using a terminology which refers to something meant to be read. Such a study helps translators understand the masses’ reaction and interaction with these shifts. However, it might have been far more original if the author had considered directing translators to how better deal with the linguistics of translation or more precisely, how to express that which is ineffable and what happens to the structure of a

spoken language when it becomes a written artifact? Readers need to know the relation between the spoken word and the written text.

### 3.2. Residual Orality: A Phenomenon Investigated

In his lecture, “Residual Orality; a Translation Perspective”, Basil Hatim (2007) defines residual orality as “a communicative condition which certain languages and cultures go through long after they have shed full-fledged orality and replaced it often by some very elegant written mediums (e.g. Arabic, Chinese, Spanish)”. However, there is some oral residue that still exists. In his book, *Orality and Literacy* (1982), Ong argues that deepening our understanding of orally based thought leads to a better understanding of chirographically, ‘handwriting, especially as distinct from typography’ and typographically based thought (p. 33). To imagine a culture with no knowledge at all of writing is very challenging for literate people. It means that the expression “to look up a word” is an empty phrase. Words as such cannot be pictured but only heard. They can be “called” back or “recalled” as occurrences and events, but never traced or “looked up” (p. 33).

For oral people, language is “a mode of action and not simply a countersign of thought”. Words, due to being necessarily spoken and sounded, are believed to have great power, and sound is what makes them ‘dynamic’. Without sound, words are deprived of this power. On the contrary, words for deeply typographic folk are assimilated to things ‘out there’ (p. 33). They are essentially ‘dead’ though subject to ‘dynamic resurrection’. Oral people believe that names give them power over what they name. Without a rich term-bank, man is incapable of learning or understanding. For chirographic and typographic folks, names function as tags and labels. They are not restricted to or determined by sound. Furthermore, in an oral culture, due to total absence of written texts or any arranged materials, solving a complex problem cannot be done in an organized fashion or an analytical order.

Moreover, since listeners cannot keep jotted notes, the easier way to recall a laborious solution or an articulated thought is through memorable phrases that come in a “heavily rhythmic, balanced patterns, in repetitions or antitheses, in alliterations and in proverbs” (p. 34). Factors as such aid recall. Fixed, rhythmic expressions like, “sorrow is

better than laughter, because when the face is sad the heart grows wiser” and “To err is human, to forgive is divine” can be ‘looked up’ easily in books of sayings and can be found occasionally in print (p. 35). However, substantial thought in oral culture is impossible without such formulas and expressions and serious thought is intertwined with memory system. They are the core component in achieving a successful communication act. Speech, if it is not enshrined in formulaic sayings and proverbs, is considered a waste of time and ineffective (p. 34).

According to Ong, cultures of oral origins, which are recently introduced to literacy, are still immensely intertwined with and carry oral residue, producing texts with the following features:

- *Additive rather than Subordinative*

Meanings are built up cumulatively for the convenience of the speaker, often with a series of “and” rather than “when”, “thus”, “although” and “while” to provide a discourse flow with analytic and reasoned subordination (p. 37).

- *Aggregative rather than Analytic*

Because oral society relies on formulas to ease memorization, meanings are often expressed by set phrases, e.g. not a soldier, but a brave soldier (p. 38).

- *Redundant or Copious*

Since there is no written record for reference in an oral society, repetition is necessary for the spread and continuation of knowledge (pp. 39-41).

- *Conservative or Traditionalist*

In oral societies, old people are always knowledgeable and respected and young people have to gain their knowledge from old people's memories (pp. 41-2).

- *Close to the Human Life world*

As oral societies have no writing technology to categorize and structure knowledge at a distance from lived experience, “oral cultures must conceptualize and verbalize all their knowledge with more or less close reference to the human life world, assimilating the alien, objective world to the more immediate, familiar interaction of human beings” (pp. 42-3).

- *Agonistically Toned*

For many oral or residually oral cultures Knowledge cannot be impersonalized and disengaged from the arena of interpersonal struggles (pp. 43-5).

- *Empathetic and Participatory rather than Objectively Distanced*

If the previous feature means a person is condemned when his knowledge is defied, this feature represents the reverse case: when a person is condemned, his knowledge is equally condemned; or when a person is honored, whatever he represents becomes esteemed (pp. 45-6).

- *Homeostatic*

In an oral society, only words and happenings that bear meaning in the present context can be remembered. Other things have to be forgotten in order to reduce the mnemonic load, including the original context for the words and happenings (pp. 47-9).

- *Situational rather than Abstract*

People in an oral society tend to rely on real situations for the understanding of abstract things. Conversely, oral people tend to draw conceptual analogies from real situations and use them in other situations as standards (p. 49).

In her *Oral Sources in Translation: 19<sup>th</sup> Century and Contemporary Perspectives on Translating Orality*, Maria DalBrun (2006) ponders on Ong's notion of orality as a collective heritage or "folklore" or as an individual element. Features of orality are classified into two categories, verbal and nonverbal that when put into effect by a specific narrator, acquire an individual "flavor". Orality is narrowed down to one dimension "the narrator" and the relationship stemmed with his audience, a notion expressed by Gerald Vizenor, "the stories that are heard are not the same as the silence of the written word" (as cited in DalBrun, p.127).

The discussions provided by Ong, McLuhan and DalBrun, provide translators with a better understanding of oral texts and ease the challenge posited by arcane discourses such as al-Ghazālī's. However, a vintage perspective is still lacking. The previous discussions fail to precisely encapsulate the dicta attributed to al-Ghazālī in relation to the tradition he belongs to, which is albeit initially oral, underwent a tremendous transition and became codified.

One study that reflects a sustained engagement with the subject of orality and literacy on the early Islamic tradition is carried out by Gregor Schoeler. In his book *The*

*Oral and The Written in Early Islam* (2006), he casts a critical eye over the transmission and preservation of the sciences in early Islam, exploring whether the materials which constituted the core of classical compilations were derived from oral or (pre-classical) written sources. The textual heritage of early Islam is described as culturally dynamic and as a kaleidoscopic blend of writing and orality, a blend which was never stable, but was rather protean in its creative possibilities (p. 5). In the very beginning, writing was used sporadically. However, over time, its use became more and more widespread (p. 30). The stage of codification of knowledge began shortly after and was based on a strict system. The disciplines within Islamic studies which were recorded had to be examined against their reliance on the *isnād*, or “the chain of authorities used to specify the personal contact which existed between transmitter and his source” (p. 12). Equally the *isnād* relied on *tawātur* or “i.e. that repeated transmission of an item of information will eventually lead to an acceptance of that item of information as knowable with certainty” (p.19), and on *ijmā‘*, or “scholarly consensus” (p.19). It is concluded that oral and written transmission, instead of being mutually exclusive, supplemented each other. Thus, the question of *either* an oral *or* a written transmission of knowledge in early Islam can easily result in a dispute about definitions (p. 41).

Despite the fact that Schoeler ambitiously hoped that his work will be accessible to ‘scholars not familiar with Islamic studies but with an interest in the oral and the written’ (p. 6), he admits that his work is more concerned with the authenticity than with the oral or written. (p. viii) Regardless of Schoeler’s suspicions on the authenticity of the transmission, the methodology adopted for codifying classical texts allows researchers to examine the authenticity of any given text and how it has been preserved and transmitted, and thus, it is indeed his suspicions that leave no room for doubt of the authenticity of the classical compilations. It is not authenticity but the transformation from the oral to the written that concern this thesis. However, Schoeler’s debate gives readers a glimpse on the tradition al-Ghazālī belongs to, which despite being codified, is still heavily loaded with oral residue, as the following discussion makes evident.

### 3.3. Orality and al-Ghazālī

It is important to understand the psyche of al-Ghazālī who, despite the influence of Greek logic, philosophy, and argumentation conventions over his mindset, elements of orality still crept in into his writings. To begin with, despite his non-Arab origin, al-Ghazālī, just as the majority of authors back then, used the *lingua franca* of the medieval Muslim empire - Arabic - in order to produce much of his *oeuvre*. Translations of his works into English, however, ‘lacked grace’ due to ‘adhering slavishly to peculiarities of the Arab style’. In other words, idioms in the original language were not expressed adequately in the language of translation. Also, paraphrasing failed to convey the correct meaning intended by the author (Ghazālī, 2004, p. 7).

Born in Ṭūs, Khurāsān, near the modern Mashhad, in 450/1058, and orphaned at an early age, Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, had an insatiable appetite for knowledge from childhood and followed the usual course of theological studies. The teacher to whom he owed much and whom influenced him the most was al-Juwaynī, *īmām al-ḥaramayn*, who travelled the Ḥijāz where he taught at Mecca and at Medina: hence his honorary epithet of “Imām of the two holy Cities” (Brockelmann, n.d., in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*). Equaling if not surpassing his teachers with an elevated degree of scholarship, al-Ghazālī was appointed as a professor in what would be considered the top ranked college in the Seljuk territories, the celebrated ‘Nizāmiyya *madrasa*’ in Baghdad, which proved to be a model for later colleges in the medieval Muslim Empire (Schimmel, 1975, pp. 91-2).

In order to further satisfy his intellectual thirst, he vigorously attempted to unravel the mystery of philosophy and so he studied the Neo-Platonism of al-Fārābī, who was regarded in the medieval Islamic world as the greatest philosophical authority after Aristotle (al-Fārābī, 2011, In *Encyclopedia Britannica*), and Ibn Sīnā, who was known as Avicenna and was particularly noted for his contributions in the fields of Aristotelian philosophy and medicine. He composed the *Kitāb al-shifā*’ (*Book of Cures*), a vast philosophical and scientific encyclopedia, and *al-Qanūn fi al-Ṭibb* (*The Canon of Medicine*), which is among the most famous books in the history of medicine (Avicenna, 2011, in *Encyclopedia Britannica*). al-Ghazālī also produced *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*, in which he appraised the philosophers and clarified the essence of their ideology. His book

was welcomed by the educated classes worldwide, especially in Spain and Europe. This he followed by an unassailable attack on philosophers in his *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, “The Incoherence (or Inconsistency) of the Philosophers” in 488/1095 (Watt, n.d., Works and Doctrines section. Para. 4). He concluded that all the philosophers who were inspired by Greek thought, although developed the logical tools required for scholarly discussion, have nevertheless remained outside the pale of orthodox Islam (Schimmel, 1975, p.92). Al-Ghazālī’s corpus and especially his argumentation style reached the Muslim West and greatly influenced Ibn Rushd *al-ḥafīd* (the grandson), the “Commentator of Aristotle”, was famous in the Mediaeval West under the name of Averroes (d. 1198) (Arnaldez. n.d, *Tha Tahāfut al- Tahāfut* section. para. 1), who in turn very severely handled Ghazālī’s *Tahāfut*, persuaded that “the only way to counter attacks against philosophy is to disentangle Aristotle’s doctrines from those of Ibn Sīnā” (Arnaldez. n.d, *Tha Tahāfut al- Tahāfut* section. para. 1).

Acquainted with all aspects of Muslim intellectual life, and having proved his philosophical and logical adroitness in many defenses of orthodox Islam, al-Ghazālī eventually turned to mysticism (Schimmel, 1975, p.93). Perhaps it is due to a subtle incident, combined with other major accumulations that led to al-Ghazālī’s sudden conversion towards the mystical quest. He did not adopt it haphazardly, but meticulously examined its principles until finally his intellect adhered to it. As the realization struck him, he became a changed person whose approach to life altered dramatically. Throughout his transformation period, he started documenting his daily experience which turned to be volumes. The nature of this writing is weaved with orality, which makes the task even harder for today’s readers as the subject tackled not only explores spirituality but it is expressed in the most oral manner.

Throughout his journey, al-Ghazālī exhausted all possibilities to “familiarize the unfamiliar”. To illustrate, based on his experience of a reality, which is familiar to him and to everyone else, that of this current life and its affairs, he applies this experience to that which is unfamiliar - the afterlife and beyond. According to al-Ghazālī, who was acutely aware of the dramatic difference in human temperaments, attainment of this type of familiarization can be done not only by transforming one character from the greedy,

selfish, satanic and dishonest to the exceptional selfless, honest, angelic, veracious, etc. alone. On the contrary, it requires essentially aspiring to transform the heart from a piece of flesh, which man has in common with beast and a corpse, to a spirit that is the seat of knowledge of God. The ego will cling, argue and instill negative feelings for fear of being replaced with anything honest and positive from the soul, but eventually, the transformed character prevails. Just as with all gardens, it takes time for flowers to bloom. Al-Ghazālī aspired to experience this unfamiliar reality and when he witnessed this ‘ineffable’ bliss, the current existing reality became satisfying no longer for him. His main challenge was the attempt to document this ineffability.

Al-Ghazālī’s books cover various branches of learning and reflect his attempts at coping with the challenging elements of Islamic intellectual life. One of his major fields of specialties is the philosophy inspired by Greek thought which established the logical tools required for scholarly discussions. Submerged in logic, philosophy and their conventions, al-Ghazālī’s writing was still profoundly colored with orality, which is obviously expressed in his *magnum opus*, *Iḥyā’ ‘ulūm ad-dīn* (“Revival of the Religious Sciences”). This comprehensive work of forty chapters came as a result of his personal mystical experience. In the *Iḥyā’*, he contributed a great deal to a better understanding of both theory and practice of Islam in a detailed synthesis of theological and mystical sciences. This raised his caliber to become the most influential theologian in medieval Islam. (*Iḥyā’ ‘ulūm ad-dīn*, n.d., in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*.)

Each volume of the the *Iḥyā’* begins with a speech *khuṭba* form, which follows the norms of Arab orality. For instance, “The Book of Disciplining the Soul, Refining the Character, and Curing the Sicknesses of the Heart”, being the second book of the quarter of mortal vices, begins with the customary *khuṭba* form:

*In the Name of God, Most Compassionate and Merciful.* Praised be God, Who has disposed all matters through His arrangement thereof, Who has equitably composed His creation and given it excellent form, Who has adorned the aspect of man by granting him good stature and proportion.....And May Blessings and Salutations Be Invoked upon Muḥammad, the Bondsman of God, His prophet, loved one and chosen one, who was His bearer of good tidings and His warner, from the lines of whose brow the radiance of Prophet hood shone forth,.....in this Book we shall indicate a number of sicknesses of the heart, and provide a general discourse on how these are to be treated, without giving details of cures for specific ailments, ... (1995, p.3-5).

This passage portrays a genuinely religious discourse that although written, takes the form of a spoken *khutba*. It begins with abundant praising of God and His messenger through the use of the plural *we* to refer to the self instead of the singular *I* or the passive. The myriad of images depict the exhausting battle between the intellect and the spirit in a conversational tone that is very serious at certain places but retain its audience's attention nonetheless.

The load of oral residue above could only be explained by Lesley Hazleton's statement, "The Arabic has an incantatory almost hedonistic quality that begs to be heard rather than read. Felt, more than analyzed, it wants to be chanted out loud to sound music in the ear and on the tongue" (Hazleton, 2011, Ted.com). When translating challenges emerge, yet with them an encounter between the oral and the literal modes reemerges as a result of the exchange happens from interaction of the two modes, creating a slight transformation in their nature. It is as DalBrun (2006) puts it, although woolen and silk yarns are different and separated but when blended together they make an excellent fabric. Likewise, weaving together the oral and the written, the two different elements intertwine and fully retain their nature, creating a blended valuable product (p. 14). It is not impossible for thought and its verbal expression in oral culture to coexist with literate thought and its expression and indeed, al-Ghazālī is a prime example of this.

## 4. DATA ANALYSIS

### 4.1: “Deliverance from Error” (*al-Munqidh min ad-Dalāl*)

*Al-Munqidh* is not a mere narration of al-Ghazālī’s experience, it is the refutation of groups and doctrines that, as he believed, upheld dubitable knowledge. Despite their seemingly unassailable arguments, these groups failed to deliver on their claims, proving to al-Ghazālī their disguised heresy. In the overall of his tiered approach to truth, al-Ghazālī, is:

Wholly uninterested in intellectual partisanship for its own sake and his concern is always with validity and intellectual merit wherever it may be found. He thus rarely rejects a school’s teachings outright. Rather, at the exoteric level he fiercely suppresses whatever in them he deems at odds with the formal norms of *religio revelata*, but as the esoteric level of his thought is approached (via the discipular) elements of these very doctrines are absorbed and enrich his thinking. The broad trend is thus to rescue insights from ‘heretical’ contexts and integrate them into a totalized Islam (al-Ghazālī , 2005, p. xvii).

In other words, al-Ghazālī characteristically adopts the conceptual framework of the groups he is arguing with, before he notoriously attacks them. The main groups discussed in *al-Munqidh* are, the *Mutakallimūn*, the *Baṭīnites*, and the Philosophers. His intention behind refuting them is to promote “a totalized Islam”, which leads to “the light of prophecy” and which he believes to be manifested in Sufism. His theoretical study and practical experimentation has led him from the doubt of the sophists to the certitude of the mystics (Ghazālī, 2004, p. 25). The mysticism he promotes is distinctive in ultimately sub-serving the renewal of Muslim society in general and is not simply autotelic (al-Ghazālī , 2005, p. xxi)

Although al-Ghazālī belongs to an oral society, his writing is profoundly influenced by Greek rhetorical conventions, especially Aristotelian syllogism. Nevertheless, his innate orality refuses but to manifest itself every now and then. Throughout his book, al-Ghazālī opts for the two customary, most distinguished types of argumentation; through-argumentation and counter-argumentation. It is the translator’s awareness not only of how persuasive strategies differ across cultures, but also of the author’s tricky, unanticipated shifts between the Greek and the oral argumentation conventions that determine the coherence of the overall product. This chapter aims at

discussing samples of al-Ghazālī's style of argumentation as well as analyzing whether the translators succeeded in depicting the implicit and explicit techniques of argumentation and thus, preserve the coherence of the source text.

Before embarking on the analysis proper, examining the translation of a given text remains, in most cases, inadequate unless it is entwined with quintessential notions in the fields of discourse analysis and especially, the seven standards of textuality. To examine the following translations, conspicuous concepts immediately spring to mind such as the dichotomy between cohesion and coherence. Cohesion, which covers how units of language in use are connected to each other on the surface, remains meaningless unless it is upheld by the retrieval of coherence, which proffers the conceptual relatedness of meanings at a deeper level of text. While the former is signaled by the intersentential relationships between grammar and lexis, the latter is determined by maintaining sense and clear elaborations, which are essentially, semantic relationships that stimulate the readers' interaction. When fulfilled, both cohesion and coherence ensure a successful communicative event.

When the elements of argument, especially the counter argument, claim, counter claim, and support, are all present, it is easy for translators to maintain coherence. However, the absence of counter claim elements such as "*lakinna*", "*illa anna*" meaning "but" and "however", due to them being substituted with the initial/cohesive conjunctive element "*wa*" which is equivalent to "and", requires more awareness from translators. Following orate cultural behavior, sentence connectivity is not established separately or even subordinately, rather it is built up cumulatively. Generally, the "and" contributes a smoother flow of information for the convenience of the speaker especially when a point is being argued through.

## 4.2. Translation Quality Assessment

### SAMPLE 1:

ST. 1	وهذا وأمثاله من المحسوسات يحكم فيها حاكم الحس بأحكامه ، <u>ويكذبه</u> حاكم العقل ويخونه تكذيباً لا سبيل إلى مدافعته (2005, p. 33-34).
TT. 1.1	McCarthy: In the case of this and of similar instances of sense-data the sense-judge makes its judgments, <b>but</b> the reason-judge refutes it and repeatedly gives it the lie in an incontrovertible fashion (2004, p.56).
TT. 1.2	Watt: In this and similar cases of sense-perception the sense as judge forms his judgments, <b>but</b> another judge, the intellect, shows him repeatedly to be wrong; and the charge of falsity cannot be rebutted (2005, p. 9).
TT. 1.3	Abūlaylah: This and similar cases exemplify how the evidence of one's senses leads one to a judgment which reason shows irrefutably to be totally erroneous (2002, para. 31).

Throughout al-Ghazālī's journey, which started with doubting everything, including his own existence, he intends to contrast between reliance on the senses to realize the surrounding environment and ultimately reach a truth of some kind and reliance on the intellect. At this stage of his search, his intellect is always victorious. This contrast is preserved in the first two translations because the rebuttal in the sample text is implicit and is stated additively, using "and = *wa*", so that the counterargument is hardly distinguished from the argument. Although they have different functions, both claim and counter claim look as if they are one congruent whole. As native English speakers, McCarthy and Watt were quick to observe the counterargument and state it separately. They opted for what English rhetorical tradition call the "Strawman Gambit" strategy, and so used "but". The "Strawman Gambit" is when the passage's initial premise agrees with the opponent but gradually steers readers' attentions toward the flaws, boasting of unassailable rebuttal. This approach is a pertinent aspect of *al-Munqidh*. However, Abūlaylah, an heir to the Arabic heritage, could not but adjust the translation with his own orate attitude. He preserved the implicit argument by connecting the claim with the

counter claim using the subordinate “which”, obliterating the most essential feature of the counter argument and thus, failed to point out the “Strawman Gambit”. His translation resulted in a linear text that hardly expresses the process of reasoning of the source text to the target audience. Therefore, the first two translations, through their analytical and rational style, relay the intended meaning more coherently and with the use of subordination, Abūlaylah lost the packaging of information altogether.

In other parts of his biography, al-Ghazālī does not state the counter argument bluntly. He rather states an idea and then negates it using negation elements such as “*lam*” and “*lā*” translated in English as “not”, as the following sample illustrates:

SAMPLE 2:

ST. 2	فلما خطرت لي هذه الخواطر وانقدحت في النفس، حاولت لذلك علاجاً <b>فلم يتيسر</b> ، إذ لم يكن دفعه إلا بالدليل، ولم يكن نصب دليل إلا من تركيب العلوم الأولية، <b>فإذا لم تكن</b> مسلمة لم يكن تركيب الدليل. فأعضل هذا الداء، ودام قريباً من شهرين أنا فيها على مذهب السفسطة بحكم الحال، <b>لا يحكم</b> النطق والمقال (p.36).
TT. 2.1	McCarthy: when these thoughts occurred to me, they penetrated my soul, and so I tried to deal with that objection. <b>However</b> , my effort was unsuccessful, since the objection could be refuted only by proof. <b>But</b> the only way to put together a proof was to combine primary cognitions. So if, as in my case, these were inadmissible, it was impossible to construct the proof. This malady was mysterious and it lasted for nearly two months. During that time, I was a skeptic in fact, <b>but</b> not in utterance and doctrine (p. 57).
TT. 2.2	Watt: When these thoughts had occurred to me and penetrated my being, I tried to find some way of treating my unhealthy condition; <b>but</b> it was not easy. Such ideas can only be repelled by demonstration; <b>but</b> a demonstration requires knowledge of first principles; since this is not admitted, <b>however</b> , it is impossible to make the demonstration. The disease was baffling, and lasted almost two months, during which I was a skeptic in fact <b>though not</b> in theory <b>nor</b> in outward expression (p. 11).
TT. 2.3	Abūlaylah: Then these thoughts came to my mind and gnawed at me I tried to

find some way of treating my unhealthy condition, <b>but</b> this was in vain. They could be dispelled only by reasoning, which is impossible without recourse to the first principles of knowledge. If these are not admissible, no construction of a proof is possible. My disease grew worse and lasted almost two months, during which I fell prey to skepticism ( <i>safā</i> ), <b>though neither</b> in theory <u>nor</u> in outward expression (para. 34).
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At the stage when al-Ghazālī succumbs to skepticism, he not only doubts the authenticity of knowledge he acquired, the sum of his dictum, but even suspects his own rational. These mood swings are reflected in his writing causing his style to fluctuate significantly. Usually, when discussing conventional philosophical topics or experiences, he uses philosophical argumentation where the counterarguments, unlike orate conventions, are clearly stated. However, he discusses the most serious stage of his skepticism and sophistry that chagrined him deeply and affected his faith, yet he neither assails a robust argument nor uses counterargument elements. On the contrary, in order to express his analytical reasoning, he simply resorts to negation.

Although the three translations depicted the negations equally and switched them to counterargument, McCarthy’s rendering is the most coherent for several reasons; not only is his the only translation to switch the last negation to “but”, whereas the other two resorted to the correlative conjunctions “neither, not”, but also because he preserves the smooth flow of information by adding few words here and there such as “as in my case”. These simple touches not only preserve the lucidity of the source text but also prevent loose floating of ideas that many translators fall prey to. Nevertheless, the author’s argumentation style is full of inconsistencies, sometimes he resorts to orality even when discussing philosophy, and other times he uses clear elements of argumentation even when discussing religion. However, the further from orality he is, the easier it is for translators to maintain coherence.

The following passage is another part of the autobiographical account which intends to refute the theologians and promote the pursuit of truth:

SAMPLE 3:

ST. 3	<p>نعم ، لما نشأت صنعة الكلام وكثر الخوض فيه وطالت المدة ، تشوق المتكلمون إلى محاولة الذبّ (عن السنة) بالبحث عن حقائق الأمور ، <b>وخاضوا</b> في البحث عن الجواهر والأعراض وأحكامها. <b>ولكن</b> لما لم يكن ذلك مقصود علمهم ، لم يبلغ كلامهم فيه الغاية القصوى ، <b>فلم يحصل</b> منه ما يحق بالكلية ظلمات الحيرة في اختلافات الخلق ؛ ولا أبعد أن يكون قد حصل ذلك لغيري! <b>بل</b> لست أشك في حصول ذلك لطائفة ولكن <b>حصولاً</b> مشوباً بالتقليد في بعض الأمور التي ليست من الأوليات! (p. 40)</p>
TT. 3.1	<p>McCarthy translation: <b>to be sure</b>, when the discipline of <i>kalām</i> acquired some status and had been engaged in for some length of time, the <i>mutakallimūn</i> showed an earnest desire for attempting to defend orthodoxy by the study of the true nature of things. They plunged into the study of substances and accidents and their principles. <b>But</b> since that was not the aim of their own science, their discussion of the subject was not thoroughgoing; therefore it did not provide an effective means of dispelling entirely the darkness due to the bewilderment about the differences dividing men. I do not regard it as improbable that such may have been the result in the case of others. I do not even doubt that it has actually been the experience of a limited group of men, <b>but</b> in a way vitiated by servile conformism in some matters which are not among the primary truths (p. 60).</p>
TT. 3.2	<p>Watt's translation: <b>It is true that</b>, when theology appeared as a recognized discipline and much effort had been expended in it over a considerable period of time, the theologians, becoming very earnest in their endeavors to defend orthodoxy by the study of what things really are, embarked on a study of substances and accidents with their nature and properties. <b>But</b>, since that was not the aim of their science, they did not deal with the question thoroughly in their thinking and consequently did not arrive at results sufficient to dispel universally the darkness of confusion due to the different views of men. I do not exclude the possibility that for others than, myself these results have been sufficient; indeed, I do not doubt that this has been so for quite a number. <b>But</b> these results were mingled with naive belief in certain matters which are not included among first principles (pp. 15-6).</p>

TT. 3.3	<p>Abūlaylah translation: <b><i>It is true</i></b> that after a long time the advocates of <i>Kalām</i> wished to defend the tradition by searching deeply into the nature of things. They have undertaken research into substances, accidents and natural laws. <b><i>But</i></b> since the purpose of their science lay elsewhere, what they said fell short of its goal; due to the differences of opinion the result has not helped to dissipate the dark confusion due to the differences of opinion among persons. I do not doubt that others have had a better experience than I, perhaps even a whole category of persons. <b><i>But</i></b> for them this was mixed with a blind acceptance of questions which have nothing to do with basic principles (para. 48).</p>
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The source text is stamped by a lucid tone of argumentation. Although the Strawman Gambit is depicted by the three translators alike, their style of introducing the claim and the counterclaim differs. While McCarthy and Watt gently introduce the claim followed by a robust counter claim, Abūlaylah’s tone is unchanged. To illustrate, McCarthy and Watt used “had been engaged in” and “much effort had been expanded in it” respectively, while Abūlaylah puts it much more straightforward, “search deeply at the nature of things”. Despite his attempts, Abūlaylah’s translation remains the least coherent, simply because he is applying his innate oral attitude while translating without much interference to moderate the target text (TT).

The repetition of the items (*khawḍ*), (*khāḍū*) and (*haṣal*), (*yaḥṣulu*), (*ḥuṣūl*) in the source text is a pertinent aspect of orate speech and functions as a cohesive device that is motivated and is often referred to by linguists as “recurrence”. It reflects the author’s effort to maneuver readers to recognize the opponent’s fallacies before he completely rebuts the adversary’s premise. Recurrence is used in order to channel the previous words in a particular direction, thus, corresponding to a counter argumentative strategy. When translated, the overall effect of repetition, when not relayed, is compromised. For example, Watt deviated from literal, word for word translation, varying between the utterances he chose; “efforts have been expanded” for “*khawḍ*” and “embarked on” for “*khadū*” respectively. McCarthy deviated from literal translation also and did not

preserve the repetition, but his choices remain the closest to the intended meaning: “engaged in” and “plunged into” respectively. Abūlaylah’s omission, along with other inconsistencies, resulted in a mistranslation as he fronted “for a long time”, drifting away from the intended meaning. All three translations therefore instead of relaying recurrence, replaced it with synonymy, compromising motivation and the overall effect. However, due to differences in the characteristics of the source language and the target language, if translators opted for only literal translation, without any interventions, readers will struggle to absorb the meaning. Therefore, successful communication is best maintained with mediated interventions.

Elsewhere, al-Ghazālī continues tirelessly to pinpoint the theologians’ pitfalls, proving that their attempts to attain the truth were rather superficial and failed to tackle the essential problem:

SAMPLE 4:

ST. 4	وكان أكثر خوضهم في استخراج مناقضات الخصوم ، ومؤاخذتهم بلوازم مسلماتهم. <u>وهذا قليل النفع</u> في حق من لا يسلم سوى الضروريات شيئاً ( أصلاً ) (p. 40).
TT. 4.1	McCarthy: most of their polemic was devoted to bringing out the inconsistencies of their adversaries and criticizing them for the logically absurd consequences of what they conceded. This, <i>however</i> , is of little use in case of one who admits nothing at all except the primary and self-evident truths (pp. 59-60).
TT. 4.2	Watt: For the most part their efforts were devoted to making explicit the contradictions of their opponents and criticizing them in respect of the logical consequences of what they admitted. <i>This was</i> of little use in the case of one who admitted nothing at all save logically necessary truths (p. 15).
TT. 4.3	Abūlaylah: Most often their argument was restricted to revealing the contradictions in the opposing view and to attacking their conclusions from their premises. <i>This was</i> not of great use to anyone who does not concede anything beyond the basic certainties (para. 47).

This excerpt is stamped by a heavy admixture of evaluation. The theologians are initially praised for defending orthodoxy against the corruptors but ultimately condemned for their incapability to proceed beyond their mere task of argumentation. Al-Ghazālī, addressing Muslim theologians, resorted to typical oral argumentation conventions. The additive ‘and = *wa*’ is used along with a suppressive adversative, (*wa hadhā qalīl al-naf’* = this is of little use). In this case, the translator needs to turn the implicit counter-argument into an explicit one, by retrieving the suppressed connector (but, however), and using this to initiate a counter stance.

Among the three translators, it is only McCarthy who recognized how this subtle persuasive strategy functions differently across cultures and so he restructured the statement to present the counter-argument element explicitly using ‘*however*’. Indeed, the utilization of the Strawman Gambit highlights the contrast and brings the argument home to those unfamiliar with oral culture conventions.

In the following lengthy excerpt, al-Ghazālī, in order to deal with the philosophers, combines both oral and philosophical argumentation conventions. Despite the noticeable tendency in Arabic towards through-argumentation that tends to be implicit in comparison with English, which has a preference for counter-argumentation, the two kinds of argumentation overlap as the following excerpt illustrates:

SAMPLE 5:

ST. 5	<p>اعلم: أنهم، على كثرة فرقهم واختلاف مذاهبهم ، ينقسمون إلى ثلاثة أقسام: الدهريون ، والطبيعيون ، والإلهيون... والصنف الثاني: الطبيعيون:- وهم قوم أكثروا بحثهم عن عالم الطبيعة ، وعن عجائب الحيوان والنبات ، وأكثروا الخوض في علم تشريح أعضاء الحيوانات ، فرأوا فيها من عجائب صنع الله تعالى وبدائع حكمته ، مما اضطروا معه إلى الاعتراف بفاطر حكيم ، مطلع على غايات الأمور ومقاصدها. <u>ولا يطالع</u> التشريح وعجائب منافع الأعضاء مطالع ، <u>إلا</u> ويحصل له هذا العلم الضروري بكمال تدبير الباني لبنية الحيوان ؛ لا سيما بنية الإنسان. <u>إلا</u> أن هؤلاء ، لكثرة بحثهم عن الطبيعة ، ظهر عندهم - لاعتدال المزاج - تأثير عظيم في قوام قوى الحيوان به. ... فذهبوا إلى أن النفس تموت ولا تعود ، فجددوا الآخرة ، وأنكروا الجنة والنار ، [ والحشر والنشر ] ، والقيامة والحساب ، فلم يبق</p>
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	<p>عندهم للطاعة ثواب ، ولا للمعصية عقاب ، فانحل عنهم اللجام وانهمكوا في الشهوات انهماك الأنعام. وهؤلاء أيضاً زنادقة لأن أصل الإيمان هو الإيمان بالله واليوم الآخر. وهؤلاء جحدوا اليوم الآخر ، وإن آمنوا بالله وصفاته (pp. 43-4).</p>
TT. 5.1	<p>McCarthy: know that the philosophers, notwithstanding the multiplicity of their groups and the diversity of their doctrines, can be divided into three main divisions: Materialists, Naturalists, and Theists.... The second category, the Naturalists, were men who devoted much study to the world of nature and the marvels found in animals and plants; they also were much taken up with the dissection of animal organs. In these they saw such marvels of God Most High's making and such wonders of His wisdom that they were compelled, with that in mind, to acknowledge the existence of a wise Creator cognizant of the aims and the purposes of all things. Indeed, <b><i>no one can study</i></b> the science of anatomy and the marvelous uses of the organs <b><i>without</i></b> acquiring this compelling knowledge of the perfect governance of Him Who shaped the structure of animals, and especially that of man. <b><i>However</i></b>, it appeared to these philosophers, because they had studied nature so much, that the equilibrium of the mixture of humors had a great effect on the resulting constitution of the animal's power... So they adopted the view that the soul dies, never to return. Consequently, they denied the afterlife and rejected the Garden and the Fire, the Assembly and the Recall, and the Resurrection and the Reckoning. So in their view there would be no future <b>reward</b> for obedience, and no <b>punishment</b> for disobedience. Therefore, they lost all restraint and abandoned themselves to their passions like beasts. These were also Godless men, because basic faith is belief in God and the Last Day_ and these men denied the Last Day, even though they believed in God and His Attributes (pp. 61-2).</p>
TT. 5.2	<p>Watt: The many philosophical sects and systems constitute three main groups: the Materialists (<i>Dahrīyyūn</i>), the Naturalists (<i>Tabī'iyūn</i>), and the Theists (<i>Ilāhyūn</i>).... The second group, the <i>Naturalists</i>, are a body of philosophers who have engaged in manifold researches into the world of nature and the marvels of animals and plants and have expended much effort in the science of dissecting the organs of animals. They see the sufficient of the wonders of</p>

	<p>God’s creation and the inventions of His wisdom to compel them to acknowledge a wise Creator Who is aware of the aims and purposes of things. No one can make a careful study of anatomy and the wonderful uses of the members and organs without attaining to the necessary knowledge that there is perfection in the order which the framer gave to the animal frame, and especially to that of man. <b><i>Yet</i></b> these philosophers, immersed in their researches into nature, take the view that the equal balance of the temperament has great influence in constituting the powers of animals Thus it is their view that the soul dies and does not return to life, and they deny the future life-heaven, hell, resurrection and judgment; there does not remain, they hold, any reward for Continued: obedience or any punishment for sin. With the curb removed they give way to a bestial indulgence of their appetites.</p> <p>These are also irreligious for the basis of faith is faith in God and in the Last Day, and these, though believing in God and His attributes, deny the Last Day (pp. 18-20).</p>
TT. 5.3	<p>Abūlaylah: Considering their many groups and their different theories, the philosophers can be divided into three categories: materialists, naturalist and theists:</p> <p><i>The naturalists (tabī’iyyūn)</i> have carried out much research into the natural world and the wonders of the animal and vegetable kingdom; they have advanced the anatomical study of animal organisms. What they have seen of the wonders of creation, the works of divine wisdom, has obliged them to acknowledge a wise creator, knowledgeable about things and their ends. It is not possible to study anatomy and the marvelous functioning of the organs without perceiving the necessary perfection of Him who formed the body of the animal, or above all that of human beings.</p> <p><b><i>Nevertheless</i></b>, the naturalists have concluded on the basis of their research that the balance of one's humors has a great influence on one's physical constitution... Hence, they held that the human soul dies and does not return to life. They denied the last things, paradise and hell, resurrection and judgment. The reward for good behavior and the punishment of the bad becomes</p>

	pointless. Unchecked, these naturalists have plunged like animals into lechery. They are also atheists, since faith has to be in God and the Day of Judgment, whereas even if the naturalists believed in God and His attributes, they have denied the existence of the last judgment (para. 55-59).
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The claim is presented with a desire to stay objective, but only in favor of the counter argument stance. The writer, while stating the claim, uses evaluative words to suppress the adversary and simultaneously, enhance his own credibility. The use of words such as (*khawḍ*), (*iḍṭarrū*), (*al-i'tirāf*) pave the way for a robust rebuttal. The counter claim, however, is kept implicit and is instead substituted with (*illā anna*). This implicitness is a typical feature of oral languages. It is the overlap between the two argumentation styles that preserves the amiability of this sample. When translated, the implicit (*however*) is made explicit. Nevertheless, none of the translators' rendering portrayed the suppression of the adversary presented in the claim.

The '*illā anna*', which is often referred to as restriction in English linguistics, is a familiar feature of *al-Munqidh*. Before any counter argumentation takes place, the opponent's premise is carefully cited only to be followed by an '*illā anna*', which pinpoints all the conceptual gaps, nebulosity and ambivalence. Generally, what follows '*illā anna*' presents 'reasons' to the text receiver as to why the opponent is incorrect. McCarthy preserved the '*illā anna*' by using 'no one...., without..' and the addition of 'indeed' at the beginning. He also depicted the '*lā siyyamā*', which has a similar function of '*illā anna*', as 'especially that of...'. Watt and Abūlaylah too depicted both the '*illā anna*' and '*lā siyyama*' in a fashion similar to that of McCarthy. However, the three translators did not stop at mere rendering of '*illā anna*' and went beyond opting for a more coherent translation by adding 'however', 'yet' and 'nevertheless' respectively.

Argumentation here is also displayed through an evaluative texture that is realized by the linguistic expression of emphasis. For instance, rhythmic language, a pertinent feature of expression in Arabic, is employed. Examples include, alliteration (*jinās*), e.g. '*ḥashr - nashr*'; assonance (*saj*), e.g. '*thawāb - 'iqāb*', as well as antithesis (*tibāq*) e.g.

‘*tā‘ah - ma‘siya*’ and ‘*jannah - nār*’. It is almost impossible to preserve all such oral language-specific features. McCarthy, however, succeeded at preserving alliteration and assonance, ‘resurrection and reckoning’, and ‘obedience and disobedience’ preserving “sense” and “interesting-ness”.

To further support the counter-argument, a metaphor is adeptly drawn out and it portrays the hideousness of the opponents. They are likened to beasts in their heedlessness, lack of self-control, and their disability to subjugate their excessive temptations and restore it to a state of equilibrium. Their utter ignorance about the purpose of their desires caused them to descend to levels lower than that of savage, untamed, animals. The use of the absolute object intends to emphasize on the blatantly sensationalist acts, and the excessive indulgence in them. McCarthy did not opt for *cataphora* as Watt and Abūlaylah did. However, the three translations didn’t render the absolute object successfully. They could have preserved it by adding adjectives that intensify the verb, such as excessively, blatantly, etc. Yet, it is only Watt’s rendering that preserved the sequence of events, ‘with the curb moved, they give way to...’

Ultimately al-Ghazālī’s crisis of epistemological skepticism is resolved. While other disciplines have only failed him miserably, the mystical experience is what elevated both his soul and his intellect and inspired him to explicate Sufism, as the following text illustrates:

SAMPLE 6:

ST. 6	و بالجملۃ، فماذا يقول القائلون في طريقة، طهارتها - وهي أول شروطها - تطهير القلب بالكلية عما سوى الله (تعالى) ومفتاحها الجاري منها مجرى التحريم من الصلاة ، استغراق القلب بالكلية بذكر الله ، وآخرها الفناء بالكلية في الله؟ <b>وهذا</b> آخرها بالإضافة إلى ما يكاد يدخل تحت الاختيار والكسب من أوائلها. <b>وهي</b> على التحقيق أول الطريقة، وما قبل ذلك كالدلهيز للسالك إليه (p. 69).
TT. 6.1	McCarthy: in general, how can a man describe such a way as this? Its purity- the first of its requirements- is the total purification of the heart from everything other than God Most High. Its key, which is analogous to the beginning of the Prayer, is the utter absorption of the heart in the remembrance of God. Its end is being completely lost in God. <b><i>But</i></b> the latter is

	its end with reference to its initial stages which just barely fall under the power of choice and personal acquisition. <b>But</b> these are really the beginning of the way, and everything prior to it is like an antechamber for him who follows the path to it (p. 81).
TT. 6.2	Watt: In general, then, how is a mystic `way' ( <i>ṭarīqah</i> ) described? The purity which is the first condition of ii (sc. as bodily purity is the prior condition of formal Worship for Muslims) is the purification of the heart completely from what is other than God most high, the key to it, which corresponds to the opening act of adoration in prayer, is the sinking of the heart completely in the recollection of God; and the end of it is complete absorption ( <i>fanā'</i> ) in God. At least this is its end relatively to those first steps which almost come within the sphere of choice and personal responsibility; <b>but</b> in reality in the actual mystic `way' it is the first step, what comes before it being, as it were, the antechamber for those who are journeying towards it (p. 54).
TT. 6.3	Abūlaylah: What can be said about such a Way? Its purification consists above all of cleansing the heart of everything which is not God, the Almighty. This begins, not with the state of <i>sacralization</i> which opens prayer, but by the fusion of the heart with God's name, and is completed by the total annihilation of the self in God. Even this completion is only the first step with regard to one's free will and all that one has learned. It is the first step on the Way itself. What went before was only the waiting room (para. 150-152).

When it comes to mysticism, the rules are reversed. Can an ineffable experience ever be described? If the initial stages are hard to attain, how can al-Ghazālī proceed with describing the attainment of its objective? This juxtaposition of stages would have been best said with ‘*qaṣr* = restriction’; (*wa mā hādhā illā*), which is kept implicit and which the three translations failed to do justice to. McCarthy and Watt, even if they were aware of the *qaṣr*, substituted it with “but”. In addition, the word (*fanā'*), a profound term in the mystical vernacular, is dealt with haphazardly. It is translated as ‘completely lost in God’, ‘complete absorption (*fanā'*) in God’, and ‘total annihilation of the self in God’

respectively. This random rendering of the same term, along with the unsystematic treatment of the implicit *qaṣr*, although kept cohesion ensured, failed to convey the overall coherence.

Essentially, Sufism can be summarized as being aware of God's presence in all cases and under all conditions. This state of watchfulness restores within the heart the primordial state of and innate state (*fiṭra*), which results only in serene behavior. Driven by the single motivation of love of God with the chief aim of pleasing Him, such people are lead to fully embrace the divine presence '*fanā*'. It is when the miserable self, which has an inherent yearning for an ideal, realizes what it always strived for and is finally transformed into a healthy soul. The *qaṣr* contrasts between the antechamber; the initial stages; 'the miserable self' and the objectives of the journey; 'a healthy soul enjoying *fanā*'.

## 5. CONCLUSION

This thesis set out to examine coherence and its representation in three different translations of a highly argumentative text, *al-Munqidh*, in an attempt to investigate to what extent the argumentative element of the text has been conveyed in translation. In order to fulfill its purpose, the thesis looked at conventions of argumentation in both orate and literal languages. In this fifth and final chapter, the findings and shortcomings of the research will be briefly summarized and better cultural representations and future research will be suggested.

The main finding of the research is shown in the analysis of six excerpts from *al-Munqidh*, and is reflective of each translator's awareness of the text at hand:

1. McCarthy's rendering turns all the implicit arguments in the ST in all the six samples into explicit arguments;
2. Watt's translation turns the implicit arguments into explicit ones too but, however, it keeps one of the arguments implicit, which makes him less effective as a translator;
3. Abūlaylah's translation is the most problematic, as it turns the implicit arguments into explicit arguments only twice.

The results of the analysis indicate that, while the former translations are reflective of the linguistic tradition they belong to, being native English speakers who adhere to English language conventions Abūlaylah's translation on the other hand is a predictable result for a non-native English speaker, since his translation is more orally oriented in contrast with the former two translators. In general, therefore, it seems that translation is not only knowledge of grammar and vocabulary, as much as it is a comprehension of the underlying culture as well. In other words, it is comprehension of both languages along with the tradition they belong to that emerge as reliable predictors of success in translation. Bilingualism is not enough as translators need to be bi-cultural as well.

One more important finding proves that the argumentation conventions resorted to by al-Ghazālī are not bound to or reflective of the conventions of the group being refuted. In other words, oral conventions of persuasion-argumentation would be used with groups of literal traditions such as the philosophers and literal conventions would be used with groups of oral traditions such as theologians (*mutakallimūn*). This is what makes his

writing unconventional and his argumentation style difficult to fit into any one category. Translators did not necessarily pay attention to this fact, and hence, the arguments are handled unsystematically.

This thesis does not claim an exhaustive analysis of arguments in classical texts as only six excerpts from *al-Munqidh* were briefly analysed and indeed, much more remains to be said regarding the nature of orate language and especially the sophisticated language of Sufism, which is also intrinsic to *al-Munqidh*. The relation between Sufism and orality, for example, is not addressed in the current study. How would an ecstatic, ineffable experience be expressed in mere words? What is the main feature of the language produced by such experiences? Is it orally oriented or literally oriented? All these questions are the subject of further research. This is due to the fact that the main concern of this presentation is not Sufism itself, but rather the translation and linguistic perspective of classical Sufi texts.

All in all, this thesis, albeit short, tried to touch upon the most important features that make a translated text a text. Further work is needed to estimate the biases translators fall prey to when dealing with different text types, especially regarding argumentative texts. The results of this study indicate that culture is a key factor in the performance of translators. The problems that we have identified, therefore, enhance our understanding of the role of translators as mediators. A suggestion for translators would be to make use of the following basic translation strategies, such as, Restriction, Strawman Gambit, Clift, etc. Throughout *Al-Munqidh*, it is evident that translation was carried out intuitively and the previous strategies were not employed.

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