| dc.contributor.author | Chen, Bo | |
| dc.contributor.author | Knyazev, Dmitriy | |
| dc.contributor.author | Chen, Bo | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2019-10-27T04:29:22Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2019-10-27T04:29:22Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2019-09 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Chen, B. & Knyazev, D. (2019). Information disclosure in dynamic research contests. School of Business Administration Working Paper Series. | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11073/16496 | |
| dc.description.abstract | We study the design of information disclosure in a dynamic multi-agent research contest, where each agent privately searches for innovations and submits his best to compete for a winner-takes-all prize. We find that although submission is a one-time event for each agent, different disclosure policies on the agents' submissions induce different equilibrium behavior, making the design of disclosure a useful instrument for the contest sponsor. We characterize equilibrium behavior in a public contest where submissions are revealed and in a hidden contest where no submission information is revealed. In addition, for contests with indefinite duration, the public disclosure policy is an optimal policy among a natural set of disclosure policies. | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
| dc.publisher | American University of Sharjah | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | School of Business Administration Working Paper Series | en_US |
| dc.subject | Contest design | en_US |
| dc.subject | Disclosure policy | en_US |
| dc.subject | Innovation | en_US |
| dc.subject | Procurement | en_US |
| dc.subject | Research tournament | en_US |
| dc.title | Information disclosure in dynamic research contests | en_US |
| dc.type | Working Paper | en_US |
