

IDEOLOGY IN TRANSLATING RELIGION RELATED DISCOURSE

A THESIS IN ENGLISH/ARABIC/ENGLISH TRANSLATION AND
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IDEOLOGY IN TRANSLATING RELIGION RELATED DISCOURSE Malik
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ABSTRACT

In this thesis, the importance of equivalence in the translation of religious discourse is discussed and the role of ideology in translation is analyzed. It is assumed that *equivalence*, defined as the relation that holds between a Source Language text and a Target Language text, represents the constitutive notion in the process of translation. This thesis, while asserting this essentiality of equivalence, aims at assessing the role ideology, defined as a systematic body of ideas organized from a particular point of view, plays in the translation of texts about religion where words become loaded symbols of specific meanings. To this end, a chapter from Bernard Lewis's book *The Crisis of Islam* is translated into Arabic and analyzed. The thesis concludes that in the translation of such texts, the mere establishment of equivalence between the Source Text and the Target Text as the only factor needed in the translation process may render neither the connotative meaning nor the effect of the Source Text, and so the all-fold concept of ideology should be approached.

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DEDICATION

THIS THESIS IS DEDICATED TO MY LATE PARENTS WHO WERE BEHIND EVERYTHING I COULD OBTAIN, TO MY BROTHERS AND SISTERS IN IRAQ, AND TO MY WONDERFUL FAMILY: MY WIFE AND MY THREE BOYS.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRUDUCTION

In the era of globalization, and following the September 11th events in particular, the nature of religious discourse between the West and the Islamic World has drastically changed. Now, not only do we live in an interdependent global atmosphere, but we also witness the rise of a universal polarization of cultures and faiths. Translation, together with intercultural communication, has played a major role in mediating between the different spheres of the world, as well as in reshaping, to a considerable degree, a new base of understanding or misunderstanding between different cultures. This era has, indeed, more evidently proved that language is always a powerful tool and component of culture and that meaning is, directly or indirectly, related to producing and receiving cultures.

In the wake of September 11th in particular, Samuel Huntington's *Clash of Civilization* theory has found a bigger foot in the often very delicate rapport between the West and the Islamic East. No wonder then that many new or derived or even revived terms are coined now and then. The term Mujahedin, for example, is no longer in use and the negatively connotated term Jihadists has taken its place. Whereas President Bush defined the course as "global war on terror", the 9/11 Commission rejected in its final report on New York/Washington attacks that term and described the "enemy" as "Islamist Terrorists" and so defining "Islamism" as "radical Islam" in the "Islamic World". And while the American media describe those attacking Saudi targets as terrorists, the Saudi media and authorities prefer calling them as "Alfiaa Aldhallah" or The Deviated Minority. The translator, therefore, has had to handle the perplexing

situation of how to render into Arabic, for instance, the terms “Islamic World” and “Islamist World” when used by the same writer or the same speaker in one article or speech. Some degree, however small, of communication loss should be expected with the absence of the text originator be it a writer or speaker.

This thesis, therefore, aims to explore the role ideology plays in affecting the denotative meaning of a term when used in sensitive texts, such as religious or quasi religious texts. It seeks to suggest a way whereby a cultural equivalence can be used in such cases.

Following this introduction is Chapter Two which reviews the notion of equivalence in translation. It shows that the notion of equivalence is one of the most controversial concepts in translation studies: Catford (1965) sees that ‘the central problem of translation is that of finding target language equivalence’, or Nida and Taber (1969) who seek “the closest natural equivalence” in relation to the “receptor” effect. The chapter also discusses, in relation to the very notion of equivalence, the “metafunctions of Halliday (2001) (ideational, interpersonal, and textual) where he notices that “equivalence at different strata carries different values”. This concept of equivalence has been previously observed by Hatim & Mason (1990; 1997) who refer to other contextual factors, i.e. pragmatic and semiotic parameters involved in the process of translation:

continue to assume that identifying register membership of a text is an essential part of discourse processing; it involves the reader in a reconstruction of context through an analysis of what has taken place (field), who has participated (tenor), and what medium has been selected for relaying the message (mode).

Chapter Three aims to emphasize that cultural meaning is intricately woven into the texture of the language and that the translator needs to capture the cultural implication in the source text and project it successfully to the target reader. The chapter focuses on the major role ideology plays in producing the implied meanings in particular in texts regarded by many as “sensitive” such as political and religious texts or texts that deal with these fields. In this context, translation is defined as an ideology- laden activity, or as Hatim and Mason

(1997) put it as “an act of communicating which attempts to relay across cultural and linguistic boundaries”.

Further, the chapter discusses the strategies of *domestication* where the aim of translation is fluency, transparency and smooth readability, and *foreignization* whereby the translator tries to retain as many ‘foreign’ elements as possible of the source language.

Chapters Four and Five respectively cover the Source Text and the Target Text (my translation). Chapter Six, reporting on the commentary and analysis, deals with the Arabic translation of the text at the levels of terminology and ideology. It argues that religious terminology encompasses linguistic boundaries composed of cultural, (ideological, and religious) backgrounds which, ultimately, necessitate negotiations on the part of the translator to establish some understanding between the source and target texts. The chapter examines some frequently exchanged terms that impose difficulty in the process of English into Arabic translation, particularly in the current international environment.

Chapter seven, the final one, concludes the thesis. It summarizes the whole work and calls for the need to establish a project for translation that aims to create understanding between communities or cultures, therefore giving translation its appropriate “historical role” as “intercultural communication par excellence” (Faiq, 2006).

CHAPTER TWO

Translation Theory: The Equivalence Controversy

The study of translation is relatively new and began almost in the second half of the twentieth century when scholars called for a scientific study of translation.

Bolanos (2005) suggests that translation:

could be accounted for within the field of linguistics if gradual approximation to explaining its nature was used beginning with the revision of the contribution Structural Linguistics and Transformational Grammar could eventually make to the understanding of this particular case of languages known as translation.

Baker (1992: 2-4) claims that “translators need to develop an ability to stand back and reflect on what they do and how they do”. Bassnett (1995: 150), on her part, believes that one of the reasons behind this “long-standing marginalization” is the confusion over terminology. She puts it as:

there is a great deal of confusion caused by the use of the same terminology to describe translation as a high status activity, translation as pedagogic instrument and translation as hack work for the mass market.

Recognizing this very value of the theory and practice of translation has so far resulted in a fundamental paradigm shift in translation studies. One of the most common assumptions of translation suggests the existence of stable and universal semantic units in the signifying system of the language from which one translates, the Source Language (SL), and that these universal units have to be faithfully transformed into the signifying system of the language into which

one translates, the Target Language (TL). Such an assumption is based on the Equivalence relation between the SL and the TL.

2.1 Translation Process: The Notion of Equivalence

Translation is often understood as the process whereby the message expressed in the source language is linguistically transformed into a message of the same or at least a very similar meaning in the target language. This comparison of texts necessitates the existence of equivalence theory. In another word, if translation is recognized as a particular bilingual communicative situation, it is for granted, then, that the linguistic unit of such communicative interaction is the text. Once that is established, the relationship between the Source Language Text (SLT) and Target Language Text (TLT) will inevitably come across the notion of equivalence.

The concept of equivalence represents the translation-based definition by, for instance, Catford (1965: 20) as “the replacement of textual material in one language by equivalent material in another language”, or by Nida & Taber (1969, 12) as “translating consists in reproducing in the receptor language the closest natural equivalent of the source-language message”.

These two definitions, as well as others, clearly associate the notion of equivalence with the target texts (TT) only, or with the products resulting from the translation process. It is not used to describe the source texts (ST), nor the textual material as it is received instead of the translator. In this product-oriented equivalent, Hatim and Mason (1990: 3-4) criticize the viewpoint from which translation is evaluated as a “product-to-product comparison which overlooks the communication process” and suggest a model in which there is a “negotiation of meaning between producers and receivers of texts”, which are:

the results of motivated choice: producers of texts have their own communicative aims and select lexical items and grammatical arrangement to serve these aims.

2.2 Equivalence: The Notion of Controversy

Shuttleworth (1997: 49) defines equivalence as “the nature and the extent of the relationship which exist between SL and TL texts or smaller linguistics units”.

Equivalence is one of the most critical concepts in translation theory. It is considered by some as “constitutive for translation” (Koller, 1997: 189), the “nucleus of all translation theory” (Albrecht, 1987: 13), and by others as “provoking contradictory opinions and carrying in its wake a plethora of definitions” (Wills, 1977: 156). In addition, the different types of equivalence identified and defined by translation specialists render it quite difficult to ignore the notion. For example, Baker (1998: 80) cites Kenny’s eleven types of equivalence notions used by translation theorists. These are: (i) “referential” (denotative), (ii) “connotative”, (iii) “text-normative”, (iv) “pragmatic”, (dynamic), (v) “formal”, (vi) “textual”, (vii) “functional”, (viii) “one-to-one”, (ix) “one-to-many”, (x) “one-to-part-of-one”, and (xi) “nil” equivalence.

2.2.1 Roman Jakobson: equivalence in difference

Jakobson’s approach to meaning as “there is no signatum without signum” (1959: 232) introduces the notion of equivalence in difference and suggests, as well, three kinds of translation (Chesterman, 1989: 55):

- 1- Intralingual translation or *rewarding* (an interpretation of verbal signs by means of other signs of the same language);
- 2- Interlingual translation or *translation proper* (an interpretation of verbal signs by means of some other language);
- 3- Intersemiotic translation or *transmutation* (an interpretation of verbal signs by means of nonverbal sign systems).

Jakobson claims that translation involves “two equivalent messages in two different codes”, and that translators may face the problem of not finding a translation equivalent since, in interlingual translation, there is no full

equivalence between code units. Therefore, “whenever there is deficiency, terminology “may be qualified and amplified by loanwords or loan-translations” (ibid.: 233).

2.2.2 Vinay & Darbelnet: Definition of Equivalence

Vinay & Darbelnet think that the controversy over literal and free translation should give place to that “between exact and inexact translation” (1958, cited in Chesterman 1989: 61). They view equivalence-oriented translation as a procedure which “replicates the same situation as in the original, whilst using completely different wording”. (1958: 342) Based on that, the translation process can maintain the stylistic impact of the SLT in the TLT.

Moreover, Vinay & Darbelnet conclude that equivalent expressions are acceptable only if they are listed in a bilingual dictionary as “full equivalents”, and that “the need for creating equivalences arises from the situation and it is in the situation of the SL text that translators have to look for a solution” (ibid.: 255).

Corresponding to the old notion of literal-free translation, and based on their examining English-French translation, Vinay & Darbelnet (1958, cited in Chesterman, 1989: 62-69) suggest direct and oblique translation. Of the seven procedures: 1) Borrowing, 2) Calque, 3) Literal translation, 4) Transposition, 5) Modulation, 6) Equivalence, 7) Adaptation, the first three constitute the direct translation, while the last four outline the oblique. In addition, they suggest that “word for word” is the most common type of translation and that “literalness should be sacrificed only because of structural and metalinguistic requirements and only after checking that the meaning is fully preserved”. Literal translation, for them, may be judged unacceptable because of five situations:

- when it gives a different meaning;
- when it has no meaning;
- when it is impossible for structural reasons;

- when it does not have a corresponding expression within the metalinguistic experience of the TL;
- when it corresponds to something at a different level language.

2.2.3 Catford: Translation Shift

Catford (1965: 20) defines translation as “the replacement of textual material in one language (SL) by another textual material in another language (TL)”. So, the purpose of translation for Catford is “not to transfer meaning between languages but to replace a source language meaning by a target language meaning that can function in the same way in the situation at hand” (Hatim 2001: 14). He makes a distinction between “textual equivalence” and “formal correspondence”. The former is “any TL text or portion of text which is observed on a particular occasion to be the equivalent of a given SL text or portion of text”, while the latter is “any TL category (unit, class, structure, element of structure) which can be said to occupy, as nearly as possible, the same place in the economy of the TL as the given SL category occupies in the SL” (Catford, 1965: 27)

Formal correspondence, then, exists if relations between ranks have approximately the same configuration in both languages (translating adjective by adjective). This correspondence, though useful to comparative linguistics, falls short when assessing translation equivalence between ST and TT. This justifies Catford’s turn to his “textual equivalence” which is again criticized by Hatim (2001: 17) as “fairly broad and may even include intercultural issues as how users of different languages perceive reality in different ways”.

As to his translation shifts, Catford defines them as “departure from formal correspondence in the process of going from the SL to TL” (ibid.: 73). He proposes two main types of translation shifts: a- level shifts which occur where the SL item at one linguistic level (e.g. grammar) has a TL equivalent at a

different level (e.g. lexis), and b- category shifts which are of four types (structure shifts, class shifts, unit shifts, and inter-system shifts).

2.2.4 Nida: Dynamic Equivalence

Nida (1964: 159) presents two different types of equivalence: “formal equivalence” (or formal correspondence) which “focuses attention on the message itself, in both form and content” and “dynamic equivalence” which focuses on the “principle of equivalent effect”. Formal correspondence consists of a TL item which represents the closest equivalent of a SL word or phrase. But there is not always a formal equivalent between language pairs, and so this equivalent should be used if the aim of the translation is to obtain formal rather than dynamic equivalence, which aims at translating the meaning of the original so that TLT could have on its readers the same impact the SLT had on its readers.

On that base, Nida and Taber (1969: 12) claim that “translating consists in reproducing in the receptor language the closest natural equivalent of the source language message, first in terms of meaning and secondly in terms of style”.

Nida (1964: 166) already explains this “closest natural equivalent” as:

- 1- equivalent, which points toward the source language message,
- 2- natural, which points toward the receptor language,
- 3- closest, which binds the two orientations together on the basis of the highest degree of approximation.

So, Nida’s equivalence can be figured as (Chesterman 1989: 82):




Figure 2.1

Nida's most frequently cited example from the bible translation where "Lamb of God" was rendered into "Seal of God" to obtain the "equivalence of response" on the Eskimos, the ignorant to "Lamb" in their culture, may represent this figure. This approach of "reproducing message" was taken up by others (Beekman & Callow, 1974; Shuttleworth & Cowie, 1997, cited in Gutt) and Hatim (2001) to cover the translation of non-biblical literature as well.

Gutt (2005) wonders: "What do these approaches mean by meaning or message of the original?" He answers, "there are no explicit definitions given, but it is clear ...that the notions held are very comprehensive; they include both the "explicit" and "implicit" information content of the original, and extend to connotations and other emotional aspects of meaning as well".

Still remains the questions which Nida's dynamic equivalence falls short of answering:

- How is the effect to be measured and on whom?
- How can a text have the same effect/ response in two different cultures and times?


2.2.5 House: Overt and Covert Translation

House's (1977) semantic and pragmatic equivalence suggests that "ST and TT should match one another ... and that it is possible to characterize the function of a text by determining the situational dimensions of the ST" (ibid.: 49). Her central discussions are the Overt and Covert translations. Whereas the first approach margins the TT audience and, therefore, omits the need for the "second original", the second approach aims at producing a text which is functionally equivalent to the ST and so "is not specifically addressed to a TC audience", (1977: 194). She hands out the types of ST that would produce these two categories of translation: an academic article that has no specific cultural features in the SL and so would have the same impact on the TL readers, and a political speech which is usually addressed to a particular group of people and

so implies particular cultural or ideological features in the ST that should be preserved in the TT.

In addition, House's (2001) modal of translation presents analysis and comparison between the ST and the TT on three levels: Language/Text, Register (field, mode, and tenor) and Genre as illustrated figure 2.2, (cited in Bzour, 2006: 10):

Figure 1. House's scheme for analyzing and comparing ST and TT



House (1997: 247) proposes a “functional pragmatic equivalence” where three aspects of the “meaning” are significant for translation. These are: “semantic”, “pragmatic”, and “textual” aspects. This means that her concept of translation is the “recontextualization of a text in L1 by a semantically and pragmatically equivalent text in L2”. She later argues (2001) that to have “function equivalent- consisting of an ideational and an interpersonal functional component- which is equivalent to the ST function” is the basic element for a TT to be equivalent to the ST.

Finally, House (1997: 26) clarifies her stand on the notion of equivalence as:

The attack against the concept of ‘equivalence’ in the field of translation studies has a slightly dated touch: definitions of equivalence based on formal, syntactic and lexical similarities alone have actually been criticized for a long time, and it has long been recognized that such narrow views of equivalence fail to recognize that two linguistic units in two different languages may be ambiguous in multiple ways. Formal definitions of equivalence have further been revealed as deficient in that they cannot explain appropriate use in communication. This is why functional, communicative or pragmatic equivalence have been accredited concepts in contrastive linguistics for a very long time, focusing as they do on language use rather than structure. It is these types of equivalence which have become particularly relevant for translation, and this is nothing new.

2.2.6 Koller: Equivalence in New Perspective

Koller (1979), revisiting the definitions of translation presented by Catford, Wills, Nida & Taber, concludes that equivalence must be the most specific component of translation, but to say that translation must be equivalent to some original is “to posit a relation devoid of content” (1979: 186).

Koller’s equivalence matches the textual nature of translation, e.g., it is placed in the “plane of *la parole* and not *la langue*” (1978, cited in Bolanos):

“what is translated are utterances and texts: the translator establishes equivalence between SL-utterances/texts and TL-utterances/texts, not between structures and sentences of two languages”.

He identifies an alternative typology of five translation equivalences “frameworks of equivalence” which described in Hatim (2001: 28), as “turning equivalence into a relative concept”. These are: (i) formal equivalence, (ii) denotative equivalence, (iii) connotative equivalence, (iv) text-normative

equivalence, and (v) pragmatic or dynamic equivalence. Moreover, Hatim argues that the “relative concept” into which turned Koller’s five types of equivalence could “inscribe in it the notion of difference (i.e. minimum equivalence), as well as identity (i.e. maximum equivalence)”. (ibid.: 30)

Recently, Koller (2000: 11) proposes two different concepts of equivalence, which are:

- 1- “as a theoretic-descriptive concept equivalence” aims to assign “the relation between a B text in language L2 (TL text) and an A text in language L1 (SL text) which allows to speak of B as a translation of A. Equivalence is then understood as a basic, constitutive translation concept”;
- 2- “as a translation normative critical concept” to refer to the “sense of sameness of value between a target text and a source text”.

Therefore, the concept of equivalence adopted by Koller “should be dynamic” since translation is characterized essentially by:

a double-bound relationship: on the one hand by its specific relation with the *source text* and on the other hand by its relation with the *communicative conditions* on the part of the *receiver*.
(Koller, 2000: 21)

Bolanos (2005), on his part, doesn’t fully agree with the theoretic-descriptive concept of Koller’s equivalence though it is essential to distinguish translation from other strategies such as adaptation or paraphrasing. He believes, instead, that it is “the same concept of equivalence that accounts for the relation between ST and TT in case we are describing and assessing the way these relations have been established, that is in translation criticism”. So, Bolanos proposes a “Dynamic Translation Model (DTM)” in an attempt to demonstrate that “translation should always be understood within the framework of a communicative process”. Figure 2.3:




Figure 2.3

Here, the three main components are the participants, conditions/determinants, and text. The main task of the translator, again, is to find equivalences in a “continuous and dynamic problem-solving process”. And instead of Koller’s five frames of equivalences, Bolanos proposes:

that equivalence is the relationship that holds between a SL-text and a TL-text and is activated (=textualized) in the translation process as a communicative event in the five text levels we identified in DTM: (stylistic) syntactic, (stylistic) lexical, semantic, pragmatic, and semiotic, based on the SL-text verbalization and taking into account the conditions and determinants of the process, that is, participants’ socio-psychological characterization and competences, and context. It is clear that equivalence is carried out at the different text levels. We would speak then of equivalence at the stylistic-lexical, stylistic-syntactic, semantic, pragmatic, and semiotic text-levels. It is important to bear in mind that one cannot know beforehand which text-levels will be activated as problematic in the translation process, however one can say that equivalence-problem activation will take place at one or more of the described text-types of the DTM.

2.2.7 Beaugrande: Textual Modal of Equivalence

Beaugrande’s (1978, cited in Hatim 2001: 31) notion of equivalence suggests a text-based equivalence that is built on a number of assumptions:

- 1- The text, and not the individual word or the single sentence, is the relevant unit for translating.
- 2- Translation should be studied not only in terms of similarities and differences between a source and target text, but also as a process of interaction between author, translator, and reader of translation.
- 3- The interesting factors are not text eaters in themselves, but underlying strategies of language use as manifested in text features.
- 4- The strategies must be seen in relation to the context of communication.

- 5- The act of translating is guided by several sets of strategies signaled within the text. These cater for:
- The systematic differences between the two languages involved (e.g. the area of grammar)
 - The type of language use found in an individual text (e.g. in the area of register of genre)
 - The selection of equivalent items within their relevant context (e.g. denotative or connotative equivalence).

Moreover, Beaugrande & Dressler (1980, cited in Hatim & Munday, 2004: 67-68) define a text as a “communicative utterance which meets seven standards of textuality”. These are: cohesion, coherence, intentionality, acceptability, informativity, situationality, and inter-textuality. Hatim and Munday (*ibid.*) link these aspects of texture as

bottom-up with situationality, a cover term for the way utterances relate to situations. Situational appropriateness (together with efficiency and effectiveness provided by cohesion and coherence) is regulated by informativity, or the extent to which a text or parts of a text may be expected or unexpected, thus exhibiting varying degrees of dynamism.

2.2.8 Baker: A different-level Equivalent

Baker (1992: 11-12) explores the notion of equivalence at different levels in relation to the translation process. These are:

- Equivalence at the word level and above word level where the translator should consider a number of factors such as number, gender, and tense.
- Equivalence at the grammatical level where the different grammatical structures in the SL and TL may cause real changes in the way the message is transformed.
- Equivalence at the text level where information and text should be the benchmarks of comparison between the ST and TT.

- Equivalence at the pragmatic level where the translator should look for the implied meaning of the message, i.e., recreating the intentionality of the author in the Target Culture in a way that enables the TC reader understand it.

2.2.9 Halliday: Thematic Equivalence

Halliday (1967, cited Zequan) measures the process of translation at three stages:

“(a) item for item equivalence; (b) reconsideration in the light of the linguistic environment and beyond this to a consideration of the situation; (c) reconsideration in the light of the grammatical features of the target where source language no longer provides any information”.

As to the process of translation, Halliday (1994: 37) uses a clause as a unit of analysis and divides it, textually, into two parts: Theme and Rheme. He defines the former as “the point of departure of the message”, and the latter as “the remainder of the message”. The clause, therefore, consists of a “Theme accompanied by a Rheme”. To his variables of Register (field, tenor, and mood), two further points are to be stressed here. First, Halliday (2001: 17) necessitates the “context” to decide the “value” of different strata”

Equivalence at different strata carries differential values; ...in most cases the value that is placed on it goes up the higher the stratum—semantic equivalence is valued more highly than lexicogrammatical, and contextual equivalence perhaps most highly of all.

Second, in respect to the notion of equivalence, Halliday (2001: 15) wonders “equivalence with respect to what?” He thinks that equivalence should be identified within the three “metafunctions: ideational, interpersonal, and textual”.

2.3 Hatim: Text Type and Intertextuality

2.3.1 Text

It is so far clear that texts or fragments of texts are the study-base concept when dealing with the notion of equivalence in the translation process. Beaugrande and Dressler (1981: 3), for example, define text as a “communicative occurrence” and that “all texts are located in particular situations and serve as a vehicle for communicating the sender’s intention to the recipient”. So, the communicative intention is the most element of text and that “intentionality forms an integral part of the basis for distinguishing texts from non-texts” (ibid.: 3). So, in order to transfer this intentionality to the addressee, the “most visible linguistic way of expression intention is through the choice of a particular text type and genre” (Sager, 1997, cited in Lee).

2.3.2 Text Type

Hatim & Mason (1990: 140) define text type as a “conceptual framework which enables us classify texts in terms of communicative intention serving an overall rhetorical purpose”. They further argue that “multifunctionality” is the key feature of texts, and this clears out the non-existence of “only particular text type used throughout a text.” Such texts are called “hybrid texts” (Hatim & Mason, 1990: 138-139) which give rise to “text-type focus”.

2.3.3 Intertextuality

Winter (1994: 47) presents the notion of communication incompleteness simply because it is “impossible to say everything about anything at any point of time”. And to obtain the intended meaning, we need to “modify semantic representations of linguistic input” by using “inferences based on context”. This context is seen by Winograd & Flores (1986, cited in Ennis) as “the space of possibilities that allows us to listen to both what is spoken and what is unspoken”. This space of possibilities, as seen by Ennis (2002) is the “subset of

recipient's entire cognitive environment" and that concept of cognitive environment is what is called "intertextuality".

Hatim & Munday (2004: 86) define intertextuality, to quote Bakhtin (1981) and Beaudrande (1980) as a "processing mechanism through which textual elements convey meaning by virtue of their dependence on other relative texts. So is the mechanism through which a text refers background or forward to previous or future texts. Intertextuality, (Hatim & Mason 1997: 18) can "operate at any level of text organization" (phonology, morphology, or semantic).

In addition, Hatim & Munday (2004: 86-87) believe that "for an optimally effective expression of these meanings (signs between speaker and hearer or writer and reader), text users tend to engage in higher-level interaction of utterances or texts with other utterances or texts". They present Fairclough's (1989) two basic types of intertextuality: "horizontal intertextuality, and "vertical intertextuality". Whereas the former involves "concrete reference to, or straight quotation from, other texts" (that is to say the relationship between two texts is explicit), the latter (which is more implicit) helps in:

- 1- clarity of expression and accessibility of the intention (a text matter),
- 2- the conventionality governing this mode of political speaking (genre),
- 3- the sense of commitment to a cause conveyed (discourse).

Conclusion

It is obvious that the notion of equivalence is one of the most controversial concepts of translation studies. Whereas the works on equivalence such as those of Vinay and Darbelnet (1958: 342), Catford (1965: 20), and Nida and Taber (1969: 12) focus on highlighting the relation between ST and TT, recent theorists, such as House (1977: 194), Baker (1992: 2-4), Beaugrande (1978, 1981), Koller (1979,186), Halliday (1994, 2000), Hatim & Mason (1990, 3-4), narrow the scope of equivalence to the rank of word, clause/sentence, and text. Intertextuality, on the other hand, is crucial to dealing with text within the language or between languages. The main task of the translator is the translation of intertextual references into the target language and culture.

CHAPTER THREE

Culture & Ideology in Translation: The Strategy of Domestication and Foreignization

As seen in chapter two, despite the huge amount of literature written about translation, the cultural perspective has not been carefully examined. Catford's definition (1965:20), e.g., of translation as "the replacement of textual material in one language by equivalent textual material in another language" totally ignores the notion of culture, while that of Nida & Taber (1969:12), "translating consists of reproducing in the receptor language the closest natural equivalent of the source language message, first in terms of meaning and secondly in terms of style", does not cover this matter explicitly. It is only after their explanation of "closest natural equivalent" that the cultural aspect was considered. That of Brislin (1976:1) characterizes translation in "the transfer of thoughts and ideas from one language (source) to another (target), and so does that of Newmark (1981:7) that sees translation as "a craft consisting in the attempt to replace a written message and/ or statement in one language by the same message and/ or statement in another language".

In all these definitions, translation is not of much help than rendering an expression or message from one language into another, and limiting the task of the translator to finding the closest equivalent in the target language.

This non inclusion of culture in the then existing approaches to translation (though the exercise of culture (and ideology as part of culture) is as old as the history of translation itself as such seen by Fawcett (1998: 107): "throughout the centuries, individuals applied their particular beliefs to the production of certain effect in translation" may be justified by Snell-Hornby (1988: 39-40) who attributes this failure to the distinction between language and "extralinguistic reality" (culture, situation, etc). Venuti (1998:1) believes that the failure of

linguistics-oriented approaches to translation to handle the notion of culture and ideology in translation is due to the “reluctant (of these approaches) to take into account the social values {and ideologies} that enter into translating as well as the study of it”. This has given rise to a new trend of research called Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) “whose primary aim is to expose the ideological forces that underline communicative exchanges [like translating]“ (Calzada-Perez, 2003: 8).

3.2 Culture in Translation

Whereas language can be identified as the manifestation of culture and individuality of both its speakers and community, translation is defined by Toury (1978: 200) as “a kind of activity which inevitably involves at least two languages and two cultural traditions”. This definition implies that cultural meanings are intricately woven into the texture of the language and that the translator needs to capture these cultural implications in the source text and project them successfully to the target reader.

Further, the American ethnologist Ward Goodenough’s (1988, cited in <http://ilze.org/semio>) definition of culture implies that culture reflects the way in which a particular group of people perceives and interprets meaning and that different cultural groups do not necessarily attach the same meaning to reality:

as I see it, a society’s culture consists of whatever it is one has to know or believe in order to operate in a manner acceptable to its members, and do so in any role that they accept for any one of themselves. Culture, being what people have to learn as distinct from their biological heritage, must consist of the end product of learning: knowledge, in a most general, if relative, sense of the term. ...we should note that culture is not a material phenomenon; it does not consist of things, people, behavior, or emotions. It is rather an organization of these things. It is the form of things that people have in mind, their models for perceiving, relating, and otherwise interpreting them. As such, the things people say and do their social arrangements and events, are products or by-products of their cultures –

they apply it to the task of perceiving and dealing with their circumstances.


Faiq's perception (2004: 2) of the "intrinsic relation between language and culture in translation studies" has let him call for "the treatment of translation as a primarily cultural act". He quotes Casagrande (1954):

that it is possible to translate one language into another at all attests to the universalities in culture, to common vicissitudes of human life, and to the like capabilities of men throughout the earth, as well as the inherent nature of language and the character of the communication process itself: and a cynic might add, to the arrogance of the translator.

In this very context, Darrida (1987) suggests the same position that translation depends on the context it is written with. Simon (1996, cited in www.qualititivesociologyreview.org) briefs this position:

The solution to many of the translator's dilemmas are not to be found in dictionaries, but rather in an understanding of the way language is tied to social realities, to literary forms and to changing identities. Translators must constantly make decisions about the cultural meanings which language carries, and evaluates the degree to which the two different worlds they inhabit are [the same]. These are not technical difficulties, they are not the domain of specialists in obscure or quaint vocabularies. They demand the exercise of a range of intelligences. In fact, the process of meaning transfer has less to do with finding the cultural inscription of a term than in reconstructing its value.

Stating Lotman's theory that "no language can exist unless it is steeped in the context of culture; and no culture can exist which does not have at its centre, the structure of natural language' (Lotman, 1978: 211-32), we may present the continuum visualized by Harvey (Harvey et al, 1992) as to the inclusion of cultural notion in translation:



This continuum may be rendered in words, as I see it, into: there are no texts that can exist as “the same” in different languages. Snell- Hornby (1988: 41) may present this phenomenon:

the extent to which a text is translatable varies with the degree to which it is embedded in its own specific culture, also with the distance that separates the cultural background of source and target audience in terms of time and place,.... the problems do not depend on the source text itself, but on the significance of the translated text for its readers as members of a certain culture.

That issue of “untranslatability” can be found in Catfoed’s (1965, cited Bassnett-McGuire, 1980:32) distinction between “linguistic untranslatability” and “cultural untranslatability”. The former refers to the non existence of a lexical or syntactical substitute in the target language for a source language item, while the latter shows the absence in the target language culture of a relevant situational feature for the source text. This very notion, again, may justify Halliday (Halliday& Hassan 1985:5) advocating the emergence of the theory of context, i.e. context of situation and culture before the theory of text.

As a strategy to deal with some culture-caused problems in translation, I may suggest, together with the rest of well known strategies such as adaptation, domestication, foreignization etc, the strategy of “cultural alternation” whereby a source culture-specific item or expression can be “swapped” for a target-language item or expression which does not have the same “lexicon” meaning but is able to project the propositional meaning and so to have a similar impact on the target reader. For example, the *white* color in the Chinese culture is mainly worn in funerals (sadness), whereas it is the wedding color (happiness) in, let’s say, Arabian culture. Translation a Chinese text into Arabic, the color “white” can be rendered into “*black*: اسود” to preserve the “cultural significance” of the source text and to have a “similar” effect on the target reader.

3.3 Ideology in Translation

Ideology has always been, and will remain, one of the key factors influencing translation. Calzada Perez (2003: 2) and Schaffner (2003: 23) claim that “all language use is ideological” and “any translation is ideological”.

The “New Oxford Dictionary of English” defines ideology, believed to be entered the English dictionary in 1769 as a direct translation of the French newly coined word *ideologie*, as “a system of ideas and ideals, especially one which forms the basis of economic or political theory and policy”. Simpson (1993, cited in Hatim & Mason, 1997: 144) defines ideology as “the tacit assumptions, beliefs, and value systems which are shared collectively by social groups”. However, Calzada- Perez (2003: 5), quoting Eagleton, thinks that recent definitions of ideology are linked with power domination “ideology is ideas and beliefs which help to legitimate the interest of a ruling group or class by distortion or dissimulation”. Hodge & Kress (1993:6), on their part, present ideology as “a systematic body of ideas organized from a particular point of view”, which, as a definition, puts special emphasis on the notion of subjectivity.

Translation, therefore, is defined by some linguists and theorists as an ideology-laden activity. Hatim & Mason (1997: 1), for instance, define it as:

an act of communicating which attempts to relay across cultural and linguistic boundaries, another act of communication (which may have been intended for different purposes and different readers/ hearers).

So they think that a translator works on the verbal record of an act of communication between source language speaker/writer and readers/ hearers and seeks to relay perceived meaning values to a group of target language receivers as a separate act of communication.

Most translations are initiated by an *actor* of the targeted culture such as state ideology, cultural atmosphere, economic situation etc. the job of the translation, in this case, is to *rewrite* the foreign text in the domestic culture and in

accordance with the cultural norms of the target language, or, in less cases, *cultivate* the foreign text in the target culture. Here, Venuti (1998:67) argues that:

in instances where translations are governed by the state or a similar institution, the identity-forming process initiated by a translated text has the potential to affect social mores by providing a sense of what is true, good, and possible. Translations may create a corpus with the ideological qualification to assume a role of performing a function in an institution.

Faiq (2004: 2), again, goes further to say that culture and ideology form “the starting point” for some theorists who urge that “the act of translation involves manipulation, subversion, appropriation, and violence”.

However, the idea that ideologies reside in texts has been opposed by Fairclough (1992). In spite of his admitting that the forms and contents of texts carry the *imprint* of ideological processes and structures, Fairclough contends the difficulty of “reading off” ideologies from texts. He argues that:

ideology is located both in the structures that constitute the outcome of past events and the conditions for current events, and in the events themselves as they reproduce and transform their conditioning structures.

3.4 Ideology of Translation: Foreignization and Domestication

Hatim and Mason (1997: 143) make a distinction between the *ideology of translation* and *the translation of ideology*. Whereas the latter defines the translator’s filtration, as the processor of texts, to the source text through his/her own world view or ideology and thus producing varying results, the former discusses the two strategies of *domestication* and *foreignization* (ideology of translation) presented by Venuti (1995) from the viewpoint of translating into a minority language:

thus, it is not domestication or foreignization as such which is [culturally imperialistic] or otherwise ideologically slanted; rather, it is the effect of a particular strategy employed in a particular socio-cultural situation which is likely to have ideological implications. The translator acts in a

social context and is part of that context. It is in this sense that translating is, in itself, an ideological activity.

So the ideology of translation can be felt both in the process of translation and in its product. Tymoczko (2003: 182-183) identifies this notion as:

the combination of the content of the source text and the various speech acts represented in the source text relevant to the source context, layered together with the representation of the content, its relevance to the receptor audience, and the various speech acts of the translation itself addressing the target context.

3.4.1 Domestication

Venuti (1995: 20) says that domesticating strategies have been used in translation since, at least, ancient Rome, when translation was a kind of “conquest, and translators into Latin not only deleted culturally specific markers but also added allusions to Roman culture”.

In addition, Venuti (*ibid.*) sees domestication as dominating Anglo-American translation culture, so he bemoans the phenomenon of domestication since it involves ‘an ethno-centric reduction of the foreign text to Anglo-American cultural values’. This entails translating in a transparent, fluent, ‘invisible’ style in order to minimize the foreignness of the target text.

The main two elements that characterize domestication as a strategy are fluency and transparency. The “fluent translation” is the one that should “read smoothly”, i.e. the translated text should not be interrupted by the words (lexicon) nor by the syntax that may be difficult to grasp by the target reader, and so that text seems more “foreign” than of target language lexicon. The result will be a “transparent text” where the translator’s aim is “invisibility”, producing the “illusory” effect of transparency and so the translated text seems “natural” (Venuti, 1998: 12):

the popular aesthetic requires fluent translations that produce the illusory effect of transparency, and this means adhering to the current standard dialectic while avoiding any dialectic, register or style that calls attention

to words as words and therefore pre-empts the reader's identification. As a result, fluent translation may enable a foreign text to engage a mass readership.... But such a translation simultaneously reinforces the major language and its many other linguistic and cultural exclusions while masking the inscription of domestic values. Fluency is assimilation, presenting to domestic readers a realistic representation inflected with their own codes and ideologies as if it were an immediate encounter with a foreign text and culture.

3.4.2 Foreignization

The aim of a foreignization strategy is to retain as many 'foreign' elements as possible, 'foreign' meaning elements of a source language. These elements may include linguistic and cultural features used in the source language. The task of the translator, therefore, is to retain in the target language that "foreign" image of all its values and characteristics so as to give his readers all the delight the reading of the source text has created on its source readers.

Foreignizing translation, though sometimes tends to increase difficulty of understanding, especially among local- culture readers, plays a role in adding more vocabulary to the target language and expanding cultural exposure of that target language audience to other cultures. Moreover, the readers here may feel the difference between their language culture and the source language and culture. In this strategy, to quote Schleiermacher, a prominent German translator in the 18th century Germany when there was a desperate need for appropriate words in the German literature from other languages, the reader "can be moved towards the author" if the translator follows the following maxim (Venuti 1997: 101):

the translator must therefore take as his aim to give his reader the same image and the same delight which the reading of the work in the original language would afford any reader educated in such a way that we call him, in the better sense of the word, the lover and the expert [...] ...he no longer has to think every single part in his mother tongue, as schoolboys

do, before he can grasp the whole, but he is still conscious of the difference between that language and his mother tongue, even where he enjoys the beauty of the foreign work in total peace.

However, in the modern world of globalization and media exchange, time and place distances seen in the 18th century between different countries are no longer exist, and cultures have more and more contact with each other. This statement simply means that foreignizing a text in translation is not any more of much help to add more vocabulary and expand cultural knowledge than of creating the source text reading favor on the target reader. Of course the intercultural communication benefits from knowledge and understanding of the others' cultural features and peculiarities, and one good way of getting a deeper insight into a foreign culture is through its literature, yet the on-line daily chat and break news have not left much space to obtaining "cultural turn" (Bassnett and Lefevere, 1990) in translation. In this era of ever changing technology and traditions, translated texts are only part of the "influencing portfolio" in the "construction of national identities for foreign cultures" (Venuti 1998: 67).

3. 5 Meaning and Situation

Language usually serves, when performed, a variety of functions over its 'ideational' function (cf. Halliday, 1976). In performing all these functions, language is determined situationally, i.e., the selection of linguistic elements to convey a particular meaning is determined by the elements of the situation in which these elements are used. This relation, indeed, brings about two kinds of implication. The first necessitates the role of situational variables in defining the meaning of the ST, while the second states that part of the meaning involved drawn by the linguistic organization of the language in which this meaning is encoded. So, of the context of situation is changed, "changes will inevitably take place in the linguistic texture." (Wilss, 1982:71).

Translation, therefore, cannot be haphazard matching of SL lexical items with their TL counterparts, as stated by Baldinger (1980:251) "Translation is nothing

than a problem of synonymy". The translator, by contrast, needs first to analyze the meaning of the SL lexical items prior to finding TL equivalents for these items. He/she further needs to play the reader's role through identifying the areas of cultural overlap and linguistic interference between the two languages. The real challenge begins when identical symbols in the two languages do not necessarily convey the same meaning, thus holding different experiences and explanations in people's minds "in a way that defies principled explanation" (Leech, 1974:3, cited in Zoubi), or in languages where emphasis lies more on symbol than on meaning like Arabic (Hatim, 1997: 161).

On that base, the pragmatic shifts in translation can be achieved by matching the cultural context of the situation in the ST to that in the TT by means of accounting for variables such as the writer's intention and expectations. The realization of this matching can be obtained by means of formal variations which include lexical and syntactic means employed by the grammar of each language (e.g. nominal and verbal sentences), and by the contextual spectrum which necessitates the use of suitable cultural acts.

Conclusion

Translating usually involves more than linguistic considerations, and this becomes more apparent when the source culture is geographically or temporally distant from or otherwise alien to the target culture. The concept of linguistic equivalence has gradually given way to "the cultural turn" (Bassnett & Lefevere 1990) in translation studies, as broader issues, such as context, conventions. Translation, as an ideology-laden activity, is seen here of ideological implicature and identified in two strategies: domestication and foreignization. The former strategy frames the source text within the borders of the target language structure and culture to create a "fluent", "transparent" and "smoothly-readable" text, while the latter exposes the target reader to the "foreign" structural and cultural elements of the source text in order to obtain in the target reader the "same image" and the "same delight" that the source reader would have enjoyed.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Crisis of Islam

The Translator's Introduction

(Bernard Lewis, one of the most influential academic voices on the decision-making circles on the United States in particular, examines in this book and from his ideological and political views the historical roots of the *resentments that dominate the Islamic world today and that are increasingly being expressed in acts of terrorism*. He looks at the theological origins of political Islam and takes us through the rise of militant Islam in Iran, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. The Crisis of Islam ranges widely through thirteen centuries of history, but in particular it charts the key events of the twentieth century leading up to the violent confrontations of today: the creation of the “state of Israel”, the Cold War, the Iranian Revolution, the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan, the Gulf War, and the September 11th attacks on the United States. While hostility toward the West, as he sees it, has a long and varied history in the lands of Islam, its current concentration on America is new. So too is the cult of the suicide bomber. Further, Bernard Lewis helps his Western readers understand the reasons for the increasingly dogmatic rejection of “modernity” by many in the Muslim world in favor of a return to a “sacred past”. Finally, it was Lewis who coined the term “clash of civilizations,” using it in a 1990 essay titled “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” and Samuel Huntington admits he picked it up from him.

“Chapter IX”

The Rise of Terrorism

Most Muslims are not fundamentalists, and most fundamentalists are not terrorists, but most present-day terrorists are Muslims and proudly identify themselves as such. Understandably, Muslims complain when the media speak of terrorist movements and actions as “Islamic” and ask why the media do not similarly identify Irish and Basque terrorists and terrorism as “Christian”. The answer is simple and obvious – they do not describe themselves as such. The Muslim complaint is understandable, but it should be addressed to those who make the news, not to those who report it. Usama Bin Ladin and his Al-Qa’ida followers may not represent Islam, and many of their statements and actions directly contradict basic Islamic principles and teachings, but they do arise from within Muslim civilization, just as Hitler and the Nazis arose from within Christendom, and they too must be seen in their own cultural, religious and historical context.

There are several forms of Islamic extremism current at the present time. The best known are the subversive radicalism of Al-Qa’ida and other groups that resemble it all over the Muslim world; the preemptive fundamentalism of the Saudi establishment; and the institutionalized revolution of the ruling Iranian hierarchy. All of these are, in a sense, Islamic in origin, but some of them have deviated very far from their origins.

All these different extremist groups sanctify their action through pious references to Islamic texts, notably the Qur’an and the traditions of the Prophet, and all three claim to represent a truer, purer, and more authentic Islam than that currently practiced by the vast majority of Muslims and endorsed by

most though not all of the religious leadership. They are, however, highly selective in their choice and interpretation of sacred texts. In considering the sayings of the Prophet, for example, they discard the time-honored methods developed by the jurists and theologians for testing the accuracy and authenticity of orally transmitted traditions, and instead accept or reject even sacred texts according to whether they support or contradict their own dogmatic and militant positions. Some even go so far as to dismiss some Qur'anic verses as "revoked" or "abrogated". The argument used to justify this is that verses revealed during the early years of the Prophet's mission may be superseded by later, presumably more mature revelations.

A revealing example of such deviation was the famous fatwa issued by the Ayatollah Khomeini on February 14, 1989 against the novelist Salman Rushdie because of his novel entitled *The Satanic Verses*. In the fatwa, the Ayatollah informed "all the zealous Muslims of the world that the blood of the author of this book . . . which has been compiled, printed, and published in opposition to Islam, the Prophet, and the Qur'an, as also of those involved in its publication who were aware of its contents, is hereby declared forfeit. I call on all zealous Muslims to dispatch them quickly, wherever they may be found, so that no one will dare to insult Islamic sanctities again. Anyone who is himself killed in this path will be deemed a martyr." To supplement and anticipate the rewards of paradise, an Islamic charitable trust in Tehran offered a bounty to anyone who killed Salman Rushdie consisting of 20 million *tumans* (at that time about \$3 million at the official rate, about \$170,000 at the open-market rate) for an Iranian, or \$1 million for a foreigner. Some years later the bounty, still unclaimed, was increased by the trust.

Not surprisingly, many uninformed readers in the Western world got the impression that "to issue a fatwa" was the Islamic equivalent of "to put out a contract" – i.e., to target a victim and offer a monetary reward for murdering him. Like *madrassa*, the word *fatwa* has acquired, in common international usage, a wholly negative connotation. This is in fact a monstrous absurdity. *Fatwa* is a technical term in Islamic jurisprudence for a legal opinion or ruling on a point of

law. It is the shari'a equivalent of the *response prudentium* of Roman law. The Islamic jurisconsult who is authorized to issue a fatwa is called a mufti, an active participle from the same root. In using a fatwa to pronounce a death sentence and recruit an assassin, the ayatollah was deviating very considerably from standard Islamic practice.

The deviation was not only in the verdict and sentence but also in the nature of the charge. Insulting the Prophet – the charge brought against Salman Rushdie – is certainly an offense in Muslim law, and the jurists discuss it in some detail. Almost all these discussions turn on the question of a non-Muslim subject of the Muslim state who insults the Prophet. The jurists devote considerable attention to the definition of the offense, the rules of evidence, and the appropriate punishment. They show great concern that accusations of this offense should not be used as a device to achieve some private vengeance, and insist on careful scrutiny of evidence before any verdict or sentence is pronounced. The majority opinion is that a flogging and a term of imprisonment are sufficient punishment. – the severity of the flogging and the length of the term to depend on the gravity of the offense. The case of the Muslim who insults Prophet is hardly considered and must have been very rare. When it is discussed, the usual view is that this act is tantamount to apostasy.

This was the specific charge brought against Salman Rushdie. Apostasy is a major offense to Muslim law and for men carries the death penalty. But the important word in this statement is *law*. Islamic jurisprudence is a system of law and justice, not of lynching and terror. It lays down procedures according to which a person accused of an offense is to be brought to trial, confronted with his accuser, and given the opportunity to defend himself. A judge will then give a verdict and, if he finds the accused guilty, pronounce sentence.

There is however another view, held by a minority of jurists, that the offense committed by a Muslim who insults the Prophet is so great that one may, indeed must, dispense with the formalities of arraignment, trial, and conviction, and proceed directly with the execution. The basis of this view is a

saying ascribed to the Prophet but by no means universally accepted as authentic: “If anyone insults me, then any Muslim who hears this must kill him immediately”. Even among the jurists who accept the authenticity of this saying, there is disagreement. Some insist that some form of procedure or authorization is required and that summary killing without such authorization is murder and should be punished as such. Others argue that the text of the saying as transmitted makes it clear that the summary and immediate execution of the blasphemer is not only lawful but obligatory, and that those who do not do it are themselves committing an offense. Even the most rigorous and extreme of the classical jurists only require a Muslim to kill anyone who insults the Prophet in his hearing and in his presence. They say nothing about a hired killing for a reported insult in a distant country.

The sanctification of murder embodied in Khomeini’s fatwa appears in an even more advanced form in the practice – and cult- of the suicide murderer.

If one looks at the historical record, the Muslim approach to war does not differ greatly from that of Christians, or that of Jews in the very ancient and the very modern periods when this option was open to them. While Muslims, perhaps more frequently than Christians, made war against the followers of other faiths to bring them within the scope of Islam, Christians – with the notable exception of the Crusades – were not prone to fight internal religious wars against those whom they saw as schismatics or heretics. Islam, no doubt owing to the political and military involvement of its Founder, takes what one might call a more pragmatic view than the Gospels of the realities of societal and state relationships. Its position is nearer to that of the earlier books of the Old Testament, and to the doctrine of smiting the Amalekites, rather than to the Prophets and the Gospels. Muslims are not instructed to turn the other cheek, nor do they expect to beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks (Isaiah 2:4). These injunctions did not of course prevent Christians from waging a series of bloody wars of religion within Christendom and wars of aggression outside.

This raises the larger issue of the attitude of religions to force and violence, and more specifically to terrorism. Followers of many faiths have at one time or another invoked religion in the practice of murder, both retail and wholesale. Two words deriving from such movements in Eastern religions have even entered the English Language: *thug*, from India, and *assassin*, from the Middle East, both commemorating fanatical religious sects whose form of worship was to murder those they regarded as enemies of the faith.

The practice and then the theory of assassination in the Islamic world arose at a very early date, with disputes over the political headship of the Muslim community. Of the first four caliphs of Islam, three were murdered, the second by a disgruntled Christian slave, the third and fourth by pious Muslim rebels who saw themselves as executioners carrying out the will of God. The question arose in an acute form in 656 C.E., with the murder of the third caliph, 'Uthman, by Muslim rebels. The first of a succession of civil wars was fought over the question of whether the killers were fulfilling or defying God's commandment. Islamic law and tradition are very clear on the duty of obedience to the Islamic ruler. But they also quote two sayings attributed to the Prophet: "There is no obedience in sin" and "Do not obey a creature against his creator". If a ruler orders something that is contrary to the law of God, then the duty of obedience is replaced by a duty of disobedience. The notion of tyrannicide – the justified removal of a tyrant – was not an Islamic innovation; it was familiar in antiquity, among Jews, Greeks, and Romans alike, and those who performed it were often acclaimed as heroes.

Members of the Muslim sect known as the Assassins (from the Arabic *Hashishiyya*), active in Iran and then in Syria from the eleventh to the thirteenth century, seem to have been the first to transform the act that was named after them into a system and an ideology. Their efforts, contrary to popular belief, were primarily directed not against the Crusaders but against Muslim rulers, whom they saw as impious usurpers. In this sense, the Assassins are the true predecessors of many of the so-called Islamic terrorists of today, some of whom explicitly make this point. The name *Hashishiyya*, with its connotation of

“hashish taker”, was given to them by their Muslim enemies. They called themselves *fidayeen*, from the Arabic *fida’i* – one who is ready to sacrifice his life for the cause.

After the defeat and suppression of the Assassins in the thirteenth century, the term passed out of use. It was briefly revived in the mid-nineteenth century, by a small group of Turkish conspirators who plotted to depose and perhaps assassinate the sultan. The plot was discovered and the conspirators imprisoned. The term reappeared in Iran, in the so-called Fida’i yan-i Islam, the *fida’is* of Islam, a political-religious terrorist group in Tehran, which between 1943, when it began its activities, and 1955, when it was suppressed, carried out a number of political assassinations. After an unsuccessful attempt on the life of the prime minister in October 1955, they were arrested, prosecuted, and their leaders executed. The term was revived again by the militant wing of the Palestine Liberation Organization and, from the 1960s onward, designated terrorist activists of the Palestinian organizations.

In two respects, in their choice of weapons and in their choice of victims, the assassins were markedly different from their present-day successors. The victim was always an individual, a highly placed political, military, or religious leader who was seen as the source of evil. He, and he alone, was killed. This action was not terrorism in the current sense of that term but rather what is now called targeted assassination. The weapon was always the same: the dagger. The Assassins disdained poison, crossbows, and other weapons that could be used from a distance, and the assassin did not expect – or, it would seem, even desire – to survive his act, which he believed would ensure him eternal bliss. But in no circumstance did he commit suicide. He died at the hands of his captors. The Assassins were finally defeated by military expeditions which captured their strongholds and bases in both Iran and Syria, the two countries in which they principally operated. It may well be that the present-day assassins will be similarly defeated, but it will be a long and hard road. The medieval Assassins were an extremist sect, very far from mainstream Islam. That is not true of their present-day imitators.

The twentieth century brought a renewal of such actions in the Middle East, though of different types and for different purposes, and terrorism has gone through several phases. During the last years of the British Empire, imperial Britain faced terrorist movements in its Middle Eastern dependencies that represented three different cultures: Greeks in Cyprus, Jews in Palestine, and Arabs in Aden. All three acted from nationalist, rather than religious, motives. Though very different in their backgrounds and political circumstances, the three were substantially alike in their tactics. Their purpose was to persuade the imperial power that staying in the region was not worth the cost in blood. Their method was to attack military and, to a lesser extent, administrative personnel and installations. All three operated only within their own territory and generally avoided collateral damage. All three succeeded in their endeavors.

For the new-style terrorists, the slaughter of innocent and uninvolved civilians is not “collateral damage”. It is the prime objective. Inevitably, the counterattack against the terrorists – who do not of course wear uniforms – also targets civilians. The resulting blurring of distinction is immensely useful to the terrorists and to their sympathizers.

Thanks to the rapid development of the media, and especially of television, the more recent forms of terrorism are aimed not at specific and limited enemy objectives, but at world opinion. Their primary purpose is not to defeat or even to weaken the enemy military but to gain publicity and to inspire fear – a psychological victory. The same kind of terrorism was practiced by a number of European groups, notably in Germany, Italy, Spain, and Ireland. Among the most successful and most enduring in this exercise has been the Palestinian Liberation Organization.

The PLO was founded in 1964 but became important in 1967, after the defeat of the combined Arab armies in the Six-Day War. Regular warfare had failed; it was time to try other methods. The targets in this form of armed struggle were not military or other government establishments, which are usually too well guarded, but public places and gatherings of any kind, which are overwhelmingly civilian and in which the victims do not necessarily have a

connection to the declared enemy. Examples of this tactic include, in 1970, the hijacking of three aircraft – one Swiss, one British, and one American – which were all taken to Amman; the 1972 murder of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics; the seizure in 1973 of the Saudi Embassy in Khartoum and the murder there of two Americans and a Belgian diplomat; the takeover of the Italian cruise ship *Achille Lauro*, in 1985, and the murder of a crippled passenger. Other attacks were directed against schools, shopping malls, discotheques, and even passengers waiting in line at European airports. These and other operations by the PLO were remarkably successful in attaining their immediate objective – the capture of newspaper headlines and television screens. They also drew a great deal of support in sometimes unexpected places, and raised their perpetrators to starring roles in the drama of international relations. Small wonder that others were encouraged to follow their example. The Arab terrorists of 1970s and 1980s made it clear that they were waging a war for an Arab or Palestinian national cause, not for Islam. Indeed, a significant proportion of the PLO leaders and activists were Christians.

But despite its media successes, the Palestinian Liberation Organization achieved no significant results where it mattered – in Palestine. In every Arab land but Palestine, the nationalists achieved their purposes – the defeat and departure of foreign rulers and the establishment of national sovereignty under national leaders.

For a while, freedom and independence were used as more or less synonymous and interchangeable terms. The early experience of independence, however, revealed that this was a sad error. Independence and freedom are very different, and all too often the attainment of one meant the end of the other, and the replacement of the foreign overlords by domestic tyrants, more adept, more intimate, and less constrained in their tyranny.

There was an urgent, growing need for a new explanation of what was wrong, and a new strategy for putting it right. Both were found, in religious feeling and identity. This choice was not new. In the first half of the nineteenth century, when the European empires were advancing on many of the lands of

Islam, the most significant resistance to their advance was religiously inspired and defined. The French in Algeria, the Russians in the Caucasus, the British in India all faced major religious uprisings, which they overcame only after long and bitter fights.

A new phase in religious mobilization began with the movement known in Western languages as pan-Islamism. Launched in the 1980s and '70s, it probably owed something to the examples of the Germans and the Italians in their successful struggles for national unification in those years. Their Muslim contemporaries and imitators inevitably identified themselves as and defined their objectives in religious and communal rather than nationalist or patriotic terms, which at that time were still alien and unfamiliar. But with the spread of European influence and education, these ideas took root and for a while dominated both discourse and struggle in the Muslim lands. Yet the religious identity and loyalty were still deeply felt, and they found expression in several religious movements, notably the Muslim Brothers. With the resounding failure of secular ideologies, they acquired a new importance, and these movements took over the fight – and many of the fighters – from the failed nationalists.

For the fundamentalists as for the nationalists, the various territorial issues are important but in a different, more intractable form. For example, for the fundamentalists in general, no peace or compromise with Israel is possible, and any concession is only a step toward the true final solution – the dissolution of the State of Israel, the return of the land of Palestine to its true owners, the Muslim Palestinians, and the departure of the intruders. Yet this would by no means satisfy the fundamentalists' demands, which extend to all the other disputed territories – and even their acquisition would only be a step toward the longer, final struggle.

Much of the old tactic was retained, but in a significantly more vigorous form. Both in defeat and in victory, the religious terrorists adopted and improved on the methods pioneered by the nationalists of the twentieth century, in particular the lack of concern at the slaughter of innocent bystanders. This unconcern reached new proportions in the terror campaign launched by Usama

Bin Ladin in the early 1990s. The first major example was the bombing of two American embassies in East Africa in 1998. In order to kill twelve American diplomats, the terrorists were willing to slaughter more than two hundred Africans, many of them Muslims, who happened to be in the vicinity. In its issue immediately after these attacks, an Arabic-language fundamentalist magazine called *Al-Sirat al-Mustaqim*, published in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, expressed its mourning for the “martyrs” who gave their lives in these operations and listed their names, as supplied by the office of Al Qa’ida in Peshawar, Pakistan. The writer added an expression of hope “that God would . . . reunite us with them in paradise”. The same disregard for human life, on a vastly greater scale, underlay the actions in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001.

A significant figure in these operations was the suicide terrorist. In one sense, this was a new development. The nationalist terrorists of the 1960s and ‘70s generally took care not to die along with their victims but arranged to carry out their attacks from a safe distance. If they had the misfortune to be captured, their organizations usually tried, sometimes successfully, to obtain their release by seizing hostages and threatening to harm or kill them. Earlier religiously inspired murderers, notably the Assassins, disdained to survive their operations but did not actually kill themselves. The same may be said of the Iranian boy soldiers in the 1980-1988 war against Iraq, who walked through minefields armed only with a passport to paradise, to clear the way for the regular troops.

The new type of suicide mission in the strict sense of the word seems to have been pioneered by religious organizations like Hamas and Hizbullah, who from 1982 onward carried out a number of such missions in Lebanon and Israel. They continued through the 1980s and ‘90s, with echoes in other areas, for example in Eastern Turkey, in Egypt, in India, and in Sri Lanka. From the information available, it would seem that the candidates chosen for these missions were, with occasional exceptions, male, young, and poor, often from refugee camps. They were offered a double reward – in the afterlife, the minutely described delights of the paradise; in this world, bounties and stipends for their families. A remarkable innovation was the use of female suicide

bombers – by Kurdish Terrorists in Turkey in 1996-1999, and by Palestinians from January 2002.

Unlike the medieval Holy warrior or assassin, who was willing to face certain death at the hands of his enemies or captors, the new suicide terrorist dies by his own hand. This raises an important of Islamic teaching. Islamic law books are very clear on the subject of suicide, it is a major sin and is punished by eternal damnation in the form of the endless repetition of the act by which the suicide killed himself. The following passages, from the traditions of the Prophet, make the point vividly:

The prophet said: Whoever kills himself with a blade will be tormented with that blade in the fires of Hell.

The Prophet also said: He who strangles himself will strangle himself in Hell, and he who stabs himself will stab himself in Hell he who throws himself off a mountain and kills himself will throw himself downward into the fires of Hell for ever and ever. He who drinks poison and kills himself will carry his poison in his hand and drink it in Hell for ever and ever Whoever kills himself in any way will be tormented in that way in Hell Whoever kills himself in any way in this world will be tormented with it on the day of resurrection.

The early authorities make a clear distinction between facing certain death at the hands of the enemy and dying by one's own hand. A very early tradition by the type known as *hadith qudsi*, denoting a statement of the Prophet citing God Himself, gives a striking example. The Prophet was present when a man mortally wounded in the Holy war killed himself to shorten his pain. Whereupon God said: "My servant pre-empted me by taking his soul with his own hand; he will therefore not be admitted to paradise". According to another early tradition, the Prophet refused to say prayers over the body of a man who had died by his own hand.

Two features mark the attacks of September 11 and other similar actions: the willingness of the perpetrators to commit suicide and the ruthlessness of

those who send them, concerning both their own emissaries and their numerous victims. Can these in any sense be justified in terms of Islam?

The answer must be a clear no.

The callous destruction of thousands in the World Trade center, including many who were not American, some of them Muslims from Muslim countries, has no justification in Islamic doctrine or law and no precedent in Islamic history. Indeed, there are few acts of comparable deliberate and indiscriminate wickedness in human history. These are not just crimes against humanity and against civilization; they are also acts – from a Muslim point of view – of blasphemy, when those who perpetrate such crimes claim to be doing so in the name of God, His Prophet, and His scriptures.

The response of many Arabs and Muslims to the attack on the World Trade Center was one of shock and horror at the terrible destruction and carnage, together with shame and anger that this was being done in their name and in the name of their faith. This was the response of many – but not all. There were reports and even pictures of rejoicing in the streets in Arab and other Muslim cities at the news from New York. In part, the reaction was one of envy – a sentiment that was also widespread, in a more muted form, in Europe. Among the poor and the wretched there was a measure of satisfaction – for some indeed of delight – in seeing the rich and self-indulgent Americans being taught a lesson.

Responses in the Arabic press to the massacres in New York and Washington were an uneasy balance between denial and approval, rather similar to their response to the Holocaust. On the Holocaust three positions are not infrequently found in the Arabic media: it never happened; it was greatly exaggerated; the Jews deserved it anyway. On the last point, some more enterprising writers add a rebuke to Hitler for not having finished the job. No one has yet asserted that the destruction of the World Trade Center never happened, though with the passage of time this will not be beyond the capacity of conspiracy theorists. The present line among many though by no means all Muslim commentators is to argue that neither Muslims nor Arabs could have

done this. Instead, they offer other explanations. These include American white supremacists and militias, with reference of course to Oklahoma and Timothy McVeigh; opponents of globalization; European, Chinese, and other opponents of the missile defense shield project; the Russians, seeking vengeance for the breakup of the Soviet Union; the Japanese, as a long-delayed reprisal for Hiroshima; and the like. One columnist even suggests that the attack was organized by President Bush, to distract attention from his election by “a minuscule minority that would not have suffered to elect a village counselor in upper Egypt”. This writer also implicates Colin Powell as an accomplice of both Presidents Bush.

By far the most popular explanation attribute the crime, with minor variations, to their favorite villains – to Israel, to the Mossad (according to some, in association with the CIA), to the Elders of Zion, or most simply and satisfactorily, to “the Jews”. This enables them at once to appreciate and to disown the attacks. The motive ascribed to the Jews is to make the Arabs and more generally the Muslims look bad and to sow discord between them and the Americans. A Jordanian columnist added an interesting additional theme – that “the Zionist Organizations” perpetrated the attack so that Israel could destroy the Aksa mosque while the attention of the world was diverted to America. This kind of explanation does not inhibit – on the contrary, it encourages – the frequently expressed view that what happened, though criminal, was a just retribution for American crimes. Perhaps the most dramatic – and explicit – response came from the Hamas weekly, *Al-Risala*, in Gaza, in its issue of September 13, 2001: “Allah has answered our prayers”.

As the full horror of the operation became better known, some writers were willing to express condemnation of the perpetrators and compassion for the victims. But even these rarely missed the opportunity to point out that the Americans had brought it on themselves. The catalog of the American offenses they cite is long and detailed, beginning with the conquest, colonization, and settlement – emotive words – of the New World and continuing to the present

day; so too is the list of victims who have fallen prey to American greed and ruthlessness, in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Usama Bin Ladin has made clear how he perceives the struggle by repeatedly defining his enemy as “Crusaders”. The Crusaders, it will be recalled, were neither Americans nor Jews; they were Christians fighting a Holy war to recover the lost holy places of Christendom. A “letter to America” published in November 2002, and attributed to Usama bin Ladin, enumerates in some detail various offenses committed not just by the government but also by the people of the United States and sets forth, under seven headings, “what we are calling you to do, and what we want from you”. The first is to embrace Islam; the second, “to stop your oppressions, lies, immortality, and debauchery”; the third, to discover and admit that America is “a nation without principles or manners”; the fourth, to stop supporting Israel in Palestine, the Indians in Kashmir, the Russians against the Chechens, and the Manila government against the Muslim in the Southern Philippines; the fifth, “to pack your luggage and get out of our lands”. This is offered as advice for Americans’ own good, “so do not force us to send you back as cargo in coffins”. The sixth, “to end your support of the corrupt leaders in our countries. Do not interfere in our politics and method of education. Leave us alone, or else expect us in New York and Washington; seventh, to deal and interact with the Muslims on the basis of mutual interests and benefits, rather than the policies of subjugation, theft and occupation”. The document ends by telling the Americans that, if they reject this advice, they will be defeated like all the previous Crusaders, and “their fate will be that of the Soviets who fled from Afghanistan to deal with their military defeat, political breakup, ideological downfall, and economic bankruptcy”.

The case against America made in this document is very detailed. It includes, apart from the familiar list of specific grievances, a range of accusations both general and particular. These are of varied and usually recognizable provenance, reflecting the successive ideologies that have at different times influenced Middle Eastern politicians and policies. Some date from the Nazi era, e.g., degeneracy and ultimate Jewish control; others from the

period of Soviet influence, e.g., capitalist greed and exploitation. Many are of recent European and even American origin, and come from both left and right. They include world pollution and the refusal to sign the Kyoto accords; political corruption through campaign financing; privileging the “white race”; and, from the right, the neo-Nazi, white supremacist myth that Benjamin Franklin gave warning against the Jewish danger. The sinister role of the Jews is stressed in almost all these offenses.

Even the wanted merits of the American way of life become crimes and sins. The liberation of women means debauchery and the commercial use of women as “consumer products”. Free elections mean that the American people freely chose their rulers and must therefore be held accountable and punishable for those rulers’ misdeeds – that is, there are no “innocent civilians”. Worst of all is the separation of church and state: “You are the nation who, rather than ruling by the Shariah of Allah in its Constitution and Laws, choose to invent your own laws as you will and desire. You separate religion from your policies, contradicting the pure nature which affirms Absolute Authority to the Lord and your Creator”. In sum, “You are the worst civilization witnessed by the history of mankind”. This judgment is the more remarkable coming at a time when the Nazi and soviet dictatorships are still living memories – not to speak of early tyrannies preserved in the historical record which Usama bin Ladin and his associates so often cite.

The basic reason is that America is now perceived as the leader of what is variously designated as the West, Christendom, or more gently the “Lands of the Unbelievers”. In this sense the American president is the successor of a long line of rulers – the Byzantine emperors of Constantinople, the Holy Roman emperors in Vienna, Queen Victoria and her imperial colleagues and successors in Europe. Today as in the past, this world of Christian unbelievers is seen as the only serious force rivaling and obstructing the divinely ordained spread of Islam, resisting and delaying but not preventing its final, inevitable, universal triumph.

There is no doubt that the foundation of Al-Qa’ida and the consecutive declarations of war by Usama Bin Ladin marked the beginning of a new and

ominous phase in the history of both Islam and Terrorism. The triggers for bin Ladin's actions, as he himself has explained very clearly, were America's presence in Arabia during the Gulf War – a desecration of the Muslim Holy land – and America's use of Saudi Arabia as a base for an attack on Iraq. If Arabia is the most symbolic location in the world of Islam, Baghdad, the seat of the caliphate for half a millennium and the scene of some of the most glorious chapters in Islamic history, is the second.

There was another, perhaps more important, factor driving bin Ladin. In the past, Muslims fighting against the West could always turn to the enemies of the West for comfort, encouragement, and material and military help. Now, for the first time in centuries, there is no such useful enemy. Bin Ladin and his cohorts soon realized that, in the new configuration of world power, if they wished to fight America they had to do it themselves. In 1991, the same year that the Soviet Union ceased to exist, bin Ladin and his cohorts created Al-Qa'ida, which included many veterans of the war in Afghanistan. Their task might have seemed daunting to anyone else, but they did not see it that way. In their view, they had already driven the Russians out of Afghanistan, in a defeat so overwhelming that it led directly to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Having overcome the superpower that they had always regarded as more formidable, they felt ready to take on the other; in this they were encouraged by the opinion, often expressed by bin Ladin among others, that America was a paper tiger.

Muslim terrorists had been driven by such beliefs before. One of the most surprising revelations in the memoirs of those who held the American embassy in Tehran from 1979 to 1981 was that their original intention had been to hold the building and the hostages for only a few days. They changed their minds when statements from Washington made it clear that there was no danger of serious action against them. They finally released the hostages, they explained, only because they feared that the president-elect, Ronald Reagan, might approach the problem "like a cowboy". Bin Ladin and his followers clearly have no such concern, and their hatred is neither constrained by fear nor diluted by respect. As precedents, they repeatedly cite the American retreats

from Vietnam, from Lebanon, and – the most important of all, in their eyes – from Somalia. Bin Ladin’s remarks in an interview with John Miller, of ABC News, on May 28, 1998, are especially revealing:

We have seen in the last decade the decline of the American government and the weakness of the American soldier, who is ready to wage cold wars and unprepared to fight long wars. This was proven in Beirut when the Marines fled after two explosions. It also proves they can run in less than twenty-four hours, and this was also repeated in Somalia.

. . . [Our] youth were surprised at the low morale of the American soldiers After a few blows, they ran in defeat. . . . They forgot about being the world leader and the leader of the new world order. [They] left, dragging their corpses and their shameful defeat.

For Usama bin Ladin, his declaration of war against the United States marks the resumption of the struggle for religious dominance of the world that began in the seventh century. For him and his followers, this is a moment of opportunity. Today, America exemplifies the civilization and embodies the leadership of the House of War, and like Rome and Byzantium, it has become degenerate and demoralized, ready to be overthrown. But despite its weakness, it is also dangerous. Khomeini’s designation of the United States as “the Great Satan” was telling, and for the members of Al Qa’ida it is the seduction of America and of its profligate, dissolute way of life that represents the greatest threat to the kind of Islam they wish to impose on their fellow Muslims.

But there are others for whom America offers a different kind of temptation – the promise of human rights, of free institutions, and of a responsible and representative government. There are a growing number of individuals and even some movements that have undertaken the complex task of introducing such institutions in their own countries. It is not easy. Similar attempts, as noted, led to many of today’s corrupt regimes. Of the fifty-seven member states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, only one, the

Turkish Republic, has operated democratic institutions over a long period of time and, despite difficult and ongoing problems, has made progress in establishing a liberal economy and a free society and political order.

In two countries, Iraq and Iran, where the regimes are strongly anti-American, there are democratic oppositions capable of taking over and forming governments. We, in what we like to call the free world, could do much to help them, and have done little. In most other countries in the region, there are people who share our values, sympathize with us, and would like to share our way of life. They understand freedom and want to enjoy it at home. It is more difficult for us to help those people, but at least we should not hinder them. If they succeed, we shall have friends and allies in the true, not just the diplomatic, sense of these words.

Meanwhile, there is a more urgent problem. If the leaders of al-Qa'ida can persuade the world of Islam to accept their views and their leadership, then a long and bitter struggle lies ahead, and not only for America. Europe, more particularly Western Europe, is now home to a large and rapidly growing Muslim community, and many Europeans are beginning to see its presence as a problem, for some even a threat. Sooner or later, Al-Qa'ida and related groups will clash with the other neighbors of Islam – Russia, China, India - who may prove less squeamish than the Americans in using their power against Muslims and their sanctities. If the fundamentalists are correct in their war, then a dark future awaits the world, especially the part of it that embraces Islam.

CHAPTER FIVE

“For the purpose of this thesis, the translator has sought to preserve the spirit of the source text, both in form and content, as it is. All the “sensitive” terms and culturally and ideologically imbued sentences are rendered into Arabic in the way they were intended to mean to the Source Reader.”

أزمة الإسلام

الفصل التاسع

نشأة الإرهاب

معظم المسلمين ليسوا اصوليين ومعظم الأصوليين ليسوا إرهابيين، بيد أن معظم إرهابي اليوم هم مسلمون وهم بكل تفاخر يعرفون أنفسهم كذلك. وإنه لأمر مفهوم أن يتذمر المسلمون عندما تتحدث وسائل الإعلام عن الحركات والأعمال الإرهابية بأنها "إسلامية" ويتساءلون لم لا تصف وسائل الإعلام تلك بالطريقة ذاتها الإرهاب والإرهابيين في إيرلندا وإقليم الباسك بـ "المسيحية". الجواب بسيط وجلي: انهم لا يعرفون أنفسهم كذلك. ان تذمر المسلمين مسألة مفهومة، لكنه يجب أن يوجه الى أولئك الذين يصنعون الأخبار لا الى الذين ينقلون الأخبار. فأسامة بن لادن وأتباعه من القاعدة قد لا يمثلون الإسلام وأن كثيرا من بياناتهم وأفعالهم تتعارض مباشرة مع مبادئ وتعليمات الإسلام الأساسية، غير أنهم نهضوا من بين حضارة المسلمين، تماما كما نهض هتلر والنازيون من بين العالم المسيحي (النصرانية) والذين يجب النظر اليهم ايضا في إطارهم الثقافي والديني والتاريخي.

ثمة نماذج متعددة لـ "التطرف الإسلامي" في يومنا هذا، وأكثر تلك النماذج شيوعا هي تلك الراديكالية التخريبية التي تجسدها القاعدة والجماعات الأخرى التي تنتهج نهجها في كل "عالم المسلمين" وكذلك "الأصولية المنعية" لدى المؤسسة السعودية والثورة المؤسساتية لدى هرم الحكم في ايران. كل هذه النماذج والى حد ما هي إسلامية في الأصل لكن بعضها قد انحرف بعيدا جدا عن أصوله.

كل هذه الجماعات المتطرفة المتباينة تشرّع أعمالها من خلال الرجوع الى اشارات دينية من نصوص اسلامية أبرزها القرآن وأحاديث النبي، وكل هذه الجهات الثلاثة تدعي أنها تمثل الإسلام الأصح والأفقى والأصدق من الإسلام الذي تمارسه اليوم الغالبية العظمى من المسلمين والذي تؤيده غالبية القيادة الدينية وليس جميعها. ومع هذا، فإن هذه الجماعات جد انتقائية في اختيارها وترجمتها للنصوص المقدسة. فهي تستبعد تماما، في عملية مراجعة أقوال النبي على سبيل المثال، منهجية التدقيق الصحيحة التي طورها الفقهاء وعلماء الدين للتأكد من مدى دقة وصحة تلك الأحاديث المنقولة شفهيًا، بينما تراهم، بدلا عن ذلك، يقبلون أو يرفضون حتى نصوصا مقدسة وفقا لقاعدة أن تدعم تلك النصوص أو تتعارض مع مواقف تلك الجماعات العقائدية والقتالية. بل ان بعضها يذهب الى أبعد من ذلك بكثير لينبذ آيات قرآنية باعتبارها "باطلة" أو "منسوخة". والحجة في ذلك أن هناك آيات نزلت خلال السنوات الأولى من بعثة النبي وأن من الممكن ان تكون قد نسختها آيات أخرى نزلت بعد ذلك هي، كما يفترض بها ان تكون، أنضج آيات من سابقتها.

ومن الأمثلة الصارخة على هذا الإنحراف هي الفتوة الشهيرة التي أصدرها (آية الله الخميني) في 15 فبراير (شباط) عام 1989 ضد الروائي (سلمان رشدي) بسبب روايته الموسومة بـآيات شيطانية. ففي تلك الفتوة، أعلم آية الله "جميع غيارى المسلمين في العالم أن دم مؤلف هذا الكتاب..... الذي تم تأليفه وطبعه ونشره بما يتعارض وما جاء به الإسلام والنبي والقرآن، وكذلك دماء الذين ساهموا في نشره والذين كانوا مدركين لمحتواه هو دم مهذور. انني أناشد غيارى المسلمين بقتل هؤلاء على وجه السرعة حيثما كانوا حتى لا يجرؤ أحد بعد ذلك في التطاول على الحرمات الإسلامية. وان كل من يقتل في سبيل ذلك هو شهيد". ولتضيف على جوائز الجنة وتستبقها، قدمت مؤسسة اسلامية خيرية ومقرها طهران جائزة مقدارها 20 مليون تومان (أي ما يعادل آنذاك مبلغ 3 مليون دولار حسب قيمة التحويل الرسمية أو مبلغ 170 ألف دولار حسب قيمة تحويل السوق) للإيراني أو مليون دولار لغير الإيراني (لمن ينفذ الفتوى). وبعد سنوات، رفعت تلك المؤسسة قيمة الجائزة التي لم يحصل عليها أحد بعد.

ليس غريبا اذا أن يتكون انطباع لدى العديد من قادة موحدّين في الغرب أن "اصدار فتوة" يعني في القاموس الإسلامي "توقيع عقد" أو بعبارة أخرى أن تستهدف ضحية وتقدم مكافأة مالية لقتلها. لقد اكتسبت كلمة فتوى، وكسابتها كلمة "مدرسة" دلالة سلبية تماما في الاستخدام الدولي عموما. وتلك في حقيقة الأمر سذاجة حمقاء. فالفتوى هي مصطلح فني في الفقه الإسلامي يستخدم للدلالة على الرأي القانوني أو للحكم على مسألة قانونية. انها المرادف في الشريعة الإسلامية الى "ردود الفقهاء" في القانون الروماني. أما المستشار القانوني الإسلامي المسؤول عن اصدار الفتوى فيطلق عليه اسم "المفتي" وهي اسم فاعل مشتق من نفس الجذر. انه باستغلال الفتوى لنطق حكم الموت وتجنيّد مغتال لذلك يكون آية الله قد انحرف كثيرا عن الممارسة الإسلامية الأساسية.

لم يكن ذلك الإنحراف في اطار الحكم أو العقوبة حسب، بل وفي طبيعة التهمة نفسها. "الإساءة الى النبي"- تلك كانت التهمة الموجهة ضد سلمان رشدي- هي من دون شك إثم في قانون المسلمين

ويناقشها الفقهاء ببعض التفاصيل. هذه النقاشات برمتها تقريبا غالبا ما تتعامل مع قضية موجهة ضد شخص غير مسلم في دولة المسلمين يتعرض بالإساءة الى النبي. وهنا يوجه الفقهاء حيزا كبيرا من الإهتمام الى تعريف الإساءة والى لائحة الأدلة والى نوع العقوبة المناسبة. وهم يبدون قلقا بالغا ألا تستغل التهم الموجهة عن هذه الإساءة كوسيلة لتحقيق بعض الإنتقام الشخصي، ويصرّون ايضا على اجراء فحص دقيق للأدلة المقدمة قبل النطق بأي حكم أو عقوبة. اذ يتفق رأي الأغلبية ان الجلد والسجن هما عقوبتان كافيتان- حيث تعتمد قسوة الجلد وفترة السجن على خطورة الإساءة. أما أن يوجه مسلم اساءة الى النبي فتلك قضية فلما يتم التأمل فيها ولا بد أن تكون نادرة الحدوث. فإن تمت مناقشتها، كان الرأي العام أن هذا الفعل يرقى الى حد الإرتداد عن الدين.

وتلك هي تحديدا التهمة الموجهة ضد سلمان رشدي. فالردّة اساءة كبرى في قانون المسلمين ولدى الأشخاص الأ أن الكلمة المهمة هنا هي قانون. فالفقه الإسلامي منظومة قانون وعدالة وليس قانون لنش (اعدام من غير محاكمة قانونية) وارهاب. انه يضع سلسلة اجراءات يتم على أساسها محاكمة الشخص المتهم بالإساءة ومواجهته بمن وجهوا اليه التهمة وإعطائه فرصة الدفاع عن نفسه، بعدها يصدر القاضي حكما. فاذا ما تبين أن المتهم مذنب، صدرت بحقه العقوبة.

ومع ذلك، ثمة رأي آخر تتبناه قلة من الفقهاء يقول أن الإساءة التي يرتكبها مسلم يُسيء الى النبي هي جد كبيرة يتوجب معها على المرء أن يُحل نفسه من شكليات إحضار المتهم والمحاكمة واصدار الحكم وأن يمضي بدلا من ذلك مباشرة الى تنفيذ حكم الإعدام. وأساس وجهة النظر هذه هو قول منسوب الى النبي غير متفق على صحته بأي شكل من الأشكال جاء فيه "ان سبني أحد، فعلى كل مسلم سمع بذلك قتله مباشرة". بل ثمة عدم اتفاق حتى بين الفقهاء الذين يأخذون بصحة هذا القول أنفسهم.. فبعضهم يصر على الحاجة الى نوع من الإجراءات أو التفويض وبأن القتل الفوري بدون وجود مثل ذلك التفويض يُعد جريمة قتل تجب المعاقبة عليها. أما البعض الأخر فيجادل أن نص الحديث كما هو منقول صريح جدا لايجعل من تنفيذ حكم الموت أو الإعدام بحق الكافر أمرا قانونيا بل ملزما وان أولئك الذين يتغاضون عن تنفيذه هم أنفسهم يرتكبون اساءة. بل وحتى أكثر الفقهاء التقليديين صرامة وتطرفا لا يطلبون من المسلم حتى يقتل أي شخص يسب النبي أكثر من مجرد سماعه وهو يسب وجاهيا. لكنهم لايقولون شيئا حيال القتل المأجور عن اهانة للنبي تم نقلها من بلد بعيد.

ان تبرير القتل العمد دينيا الذي انطوت عليه فتوى الخميني يتجلى الآن على نحو أكثر تطورا في ممارسات- وعبادة- القتل الانتحاريين.

اذا ما تأمل أحد في سجل التاريخ سيجد أن مفهوم المسلمين عن الحرب لا يختلف كثيرا عن مفهوم المسيحيين أو اليهود خلال حقب التاريخ القديمة جدا وبدايات العصر الحديث عندما كان خيار الحرب مفتوحا امامهم. لقد شن المسلمون حروبهم، وهي أكثر من حروب المسيحيين كما يبدو، ضد أتباع المعتقدات الأخرى لإجبارهم على اعتناق الإسلام، بينما نجد المسيحيين- باستثناء الحروب الصليبية المعروفة- كانوا أكثر نزعة صوب خوض حروب دينية داخلية ضد المنشقين والزنادقة. فالإسلام يتبنى،

وهو ما يعزى من دون شك الى التدخل السياسي والعسكري لمؤسسه، ما يمكن أن نطلق عليه نظرة أكثر براغماتية من الأناجيل حيال حقائق علاقات المجتمع والدولة. وموقف الإسلام هنا أقرب الى الموقف الموجود في أول كتب "العهد القديم" والى عقيدة قتل "الأمالك" (الشعب المحارب) منه الى الأنبياء والأناجيل. والمسلمون لم يتلقوا تعليمات بأن يديروا خدهم الآخر ولا عليهم ان يتوقعوا أن تجرح سيوفهم بأسنة المحراث ورماحهم بمناجيل تشذيب (شعيا 2:4). هذه الوصايا لم تمنع أيضا المسيحيين من شن سلسلة من حروب دينية دموية داخل العالم المسيحي وحروب عدوان خارجة.

هذه المسألة تثير قضية أكبر تتعلق بموقف الأديان من استخدام القوة والعنف، وأكثر تحديدا موقفها من الإرهاب. لقد استجار أتباع الكثير من العقائد بين الحينة والأخرى بالدين في ممارسة القتل العمد بالجملة والمفروق. وهنا نستشهد بكلمتين دخلتا معجم اللغة الإنجليزية ومصدرهما حركات من الديانات الشرقية هما: كلمة "سفاح: Thug" ومصدرها الهند وكلمة "مغتال: Assassin" ومصدرها الشرق الأوسط، وكلاهما تحتفي بالطوائف الدينية المتعصبة التي اتخذت شكل عبادتها قتل كل من يعتبرونه عدوا لعقيديتهم.

نشأت ممارسة الاغتيال ومن ثم تنظيره في العالم الإسلامي في مرحلة مبكرة جدا وتحديدا عندما طفقت الخلافات حول القيادة السياسية لمجتمع المسلمين. فمن بين أول أربعة خلفاء للمسلمين، تم قتل ثلاثة منهم: الثاني على يد عبد مسيحي ساخط والثالث والرابع على أيدي متمردين مسلمين مدعين الصلاح رأوا في أنفسهم جلادين ينفذون ارادة الله. لقد اتخذت تلك المسألة شكلا حادا عام 656 مع مقتل الخليفة الثالث "عثمان" على أيدي متمردين مسلمين. وتم خوض أولى سلسلة الحروب الأهلية حول مسألة ان كان أولئك القتلة ينفذون أم يعصون وصايا الله. فالقانون والأحاديث الاسلامية واضحة تماما فيما يتعلق بواجب اطاعة الحاكم الإسلامي. غير أن ينقلون أيضا حديثين ينسبونهما الى النبي جاء في أحدهما "لاطاعة في معصية" وفي الآخر "لاطاعة لمخلوق في خالقه". هذا يعني انه اذا أمر حاكم ما بشيء يتعارض مع شريعة الله، فان واجب الطاعة يتحول عندئذ الى واجب العصيان. وحقيقة للذكر هنا ان مفهوم "قتل المتجبر"- أي تبرير ازالة الطاغية- هو ليس بالصياغة الاسلامية، بل هو كان متداول منذ قديم الأزمنة بين اليهود والأغريق والرومان على حد سواء وطالما وُصف الذين كانوا ينفذونه بالأبطال.

ويبدو أيضا ان أعضاء طائفة المسلمين المعروفة بإسم "المغتالون" - (المأخوذة من الكلمة العربية الحشاشية) والتي كانت ناشطة في ايران ومن ثم في سوريا ما بين القرنين الحادي عشر والثالث عشر- هي أول من نقل النشاط الذي سُمي بإسمهم الى نظام وأيديولوجية. أما جهودهم فقد انصبت وعلى عكس الإعتقاد الشائع ليس ضد الصليبيين بل ضد الحكام المسلمين بإعتبارهم غاصبين فاسقين. وفي هذا المعنى يكون "المغتالون" هم السلف الحقيقي لكثير ممن يُسمون الارهابيون الاسلاميون هذا اليوم، والذين يؤكد بعضهم هذا الأمر علانية. اما اسم "الحشاشية" بدلالته اللغوية "متعاطي الحشيش" فقد أطلقه عليهم اعداؤهم المسلمون. انهم يسمون أنفسهم "فدائيون" من الكلمة العربية "فدائي" التي تعني أن يضحي الإنسان بحياته من أجل قضية.

بعد ان تمت هزيمة "المغتالون" وقمعهم في القرن الثالث عشر، اندثر المصطلح ولم يعد مستخدماً ريثما تم احيائه ولمدة وجيزة منتصف القرن التاسع عشر على أيدي جماعة صغيرة من المتآمريين الأتراك الذين خططوا للإطاحة بالسلطان وربما اغتياله. وأنداك تم اكتشاف المؤامرة وسُجن المتآمرون. وثانية ظهر المصطلح في ايران تحت ما يسمى "فدائيو الإسلام" وهي جماعة إرهابية سياسية-دينية ظهرت في طهران ما بين عامي 1943 عندما بدأت بممارسة نشاطاتها و1955 يوم تم قمعها وارتكبت عددا من عمليات الإغتيال السياسي. فبعد محاولة غير ناجحة استهدفت حياة رئيس الوزراء الإيراني في اكتوبر (تشرين الأول) عام 1955 تم اعتقال الجماعة ومحاكمتها وإعدام قادتها. ومن جديد تم إحياء المصطلح على يد الجناح العسكري لمنظمة التحرير الفلسطينية ابتداء من ستينيات القرن الماضي للتعريف بالنشاطات الإرهابية للمنظمات الفلسطينية.

ثمة خصوصيتين اختلف فيهما "المغتالون" وبشكل جلي عن أحفادهم الحاليين هما اختيار نوع السلاح واختيار نوع الضحية. فالضحية كانت دوماً "فرداً" يتمتع بمكانة سياسية أو عسكرية أو دينية عالية وكان يعتقد أنه مصدراً للشر. وكان يُقتل ذلك الشخص وحسب. وعليه لم يكن هذا النوع من الفعل إرهابياً بالمعنى الحالي للكلمة بل هو يطابق ما بات يُعرف اليوم باسم "هدف الإغتيال". وكان السلاح هو ذاته دوماً: الخنجر. والمغتالون قد ازدروا السم والبرقيل أو أي سلاح آخر يمكن استخدامه عن بعد، تماماً كما لم يتوقعوا أو حتى يرغبوا في البقاء على قيد الحياة بعد تنفيذ مهمتهم التي اعتقدوا انها ستضمن لهم نعمة أبدية. وما كان أحدهم وتحت أي الظروف ليرتكب فعل الانتحار، بل كان يموت على أيدي أسريه. وأخيراً انهزم المغتالون بالحملة العسكرية التي استولت على قلاعهم وقواعدهم في ايران وسوريا، وهما البلدان اللتان عملوا فيهما بشكل رئيسي. وربما يكون مصير المغتالين المعاصرين الهزيمة ذاتها، غير أن ذلك سيكون طريقاً طويلاً وصعباً. وان كان المغتالون في العصور الوسطى طائفة متطرفة بعيدة جداً عن النهج الإسلامي الاعتيادي، فان هذا القول لا ينطبق على مقلديهم الحاليين.

جلب القرن العشرون معه تجديداً لمثل هذه الأفعال في الشرق الأوسط حتى وان كانت بأنماط مختلفة ولأغراض متباينة مر فيها الارهاب بمراحل متعددة. فخلال السنوات الأخيرة من حكم الإمبراطورية البريطانية، واجهت بريطانيا الإمبريالية حركات إرهابية في الدول التابعة لها في الشرق الأوسط والتي مثلت ثلاث ثقافات مختلفة هي: اليونانيون في قبرص واليهود في فلسطين والعرب في عدن. وكل هذه الجماعات تصرفت بدوافع قومية أكثر منها دينية، وتشابهت جميعها والى حد كبير في اساليب ادارة عملياتها حتى وان اختلفت كثيراً في مرجعياتها وظروفها السياسية. وكان هدفهم اقتناع القوة الإمبريالية بأن البقاء في المنطقة لا يستحق تكلفة الدم المدفوع. أما اسلوبهم فكان استهداف شخصيات ومؤسسات عسكرية والى حد أقل مدنية وكانت تعمل كل منها في مناطقها الخاصة بها وتتجنب التخريب المتناظر، أو غير المباشر وكلها نجحت في مساعيها.

اما لإرهابي النمط الجديد، فقد أمسى ذبح الأبرياء والمدنيين غير المتورطين بشيء ليس بالتخريب المتناظر، بل هو الهدف الرئيسي. وعلى نحو حتمي فان الهجوم المضاد على الإرهابيين -

الذين لا يرتدون زيا موحدًا- يستهدف المدنيين ايضا وستكون النتيجة جد نافعة للإرهابيين ومن يتعاطف معهم.

وبفضل التطور السريع في وسائل الإعلام لاسيما التلفاز، باتت عمليات استهداف الأشكال المعاصرة من الإرهاب لا يتحدد في اطار أهداف معادية خاصة بل على مستوى الرأي العام العالمي. والهدف الرئيسي من وراء ذلك ليس هزيمة أو حتى اضعاف العدو عسكريا، وإنما الفوز بالدعاية عليه وزرع الخوف فيه- أي تحقيق انتصار نفسي. ونفس هذا النوع من الإرهاب قد مارسه عدد من الجماعات الأوروبية ولاسيما في المانيا وايطاليا واسبانيا وايرلندا. ان من الجماعات التي حققت نجاحا أكبر ولفترة زمنية أطول في ممارسة هذا النوع من النشاط كانت منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية.

تأسست منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية عام 1964 بيد أنها أمست مهمة عام 1967 أي بعد هزيمة الجيوش العربية مجتمعة في حرب الأيام الستة. فالحرب النظامية قد فشلت وحن الوقت لتجربة وسائل أخرى. اما الأهداف في هذا النوع من الكفاح المسلح ليست المؤسسات العسكرية أو الحكومية والتي هي غالبا ما تكون جد محصنة، بل هي الأماكن العامة وتجمعات من هذا النوع ذات الطابع المدني على الأعم الأغلب وضحاياها ممن ليس لهم بالضرورة علاقة مع العدو المعلن. ومن الأمثلة على هذا النوع من الممارسة الحربية هي حوادث اختطاف ثلاث طائرات عام 1970 تابعة للخطوط السويسرية والبريطانية والأمريكية والتي أجبرت على التوجه الى عمان، وهناك ايضا حادثة قتل الرياضيين الإسرائيليين خلال دورة الألعاب الأولمبية في ميونخ عام 1972 وحادثة الإستيلاء على السفارة السعودية في الخرطوم عام 1973 وقُتل فيها اميريكيان ودبلوماسي بلجيكي وبعدها حادثة الإستيلاء على السفينة السياحية الإيطالية "اشيلا لورو" عام 1985 وقتل مسافر مشلول كان على ظهرها. وهناك هجمات أخرى كانت أهدافها المدارس ومراكز التسوق والنوادي الليلية بل حتى مسافرين يقفون في طوابير نظامية داخل المطارات الأوروبية. لقد كانت هذه العمليات وغيرها من التي نفذتها منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية ناجحة والى حد كبير في تحقيق هدف مباشر واحد هو الإستيلاء على الإهتمام الإعلامي المقروء والمرئي. وهم قد جلبوا اليهم في أحيابن معينة وفي أماكن غير متوقعة الكثير من الدعم وأناطوا بمجرميهم أدوارا نجومية في دراما العلاقات الدولية. ومن بعض الدهشة هنا أن يتم تشجيع آخرين ليحذوا حذو المنظمة. فالإرهابيون العرب في سبعينيات وثمانينيات القرن الماضي أعلنوها صراحة أنهم يشنون حربا من أجل القضية القومية العربية والفلسطينية وليس دفاعا عن الإسلام. ولا عجب في هذا الأمر اذا ما علمنا ان شريحة مهمة من قادة منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية ونشطاءها هم مسيحيون.

الا أن منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية وبرغم نجاحاتها الإعلامية لم تحقق نتائج ملموسة في المكان الذي ينبغي أن يتحقق لها فيه شيئا، أي داخل فلسطين. ففي كل ارض عربية باستثناء فلسطين، حقق القوميون العرب أهدافهم المتمثلة بهزيمة وإزالة الحكام الأجانب وإقامة السيادة الوطنية في ظل قادة قوميين.

ولبعض من الوقت تم استخدام مصطلحا الحرية والإستقلال كمصطلحين مترادفين ومتبادلين، ومع ذلك كشفت تجربة الإستقلال الأولى ان ذلك كان غلطة محزنة. فالإستقلال والحرية مختلفان تماما، وان تحقيق أحدهما غالبا ما أفضى الى نهاية الآخر وإلى إستبدال السيد المطلق الأجنبي بطاغية محلي هو أكثر مهارة وأشد حميمية وأقل قيادا في ممارسة طغيانه.

وبرزت حاجة ملحة ومنتامية لتفسير جديد لما كان خطأ والى استراتيجية جديدة لتصحيح ذلك الخطأ. وتم العثور على كليهما في الشعور الديني وفي الهوية. وذا اختيار لم يكن جديدا. ففي النصف الأول من القرن التاسع عشر وعندما كانت الإمبراطوريات الأوروبية تتقدم صوب الكثير من بلاد الإسلام، كانت أشد المقاومة ضد هذا الزحف هي المقاومة الدينية الإلهام والهوية واجه فيها الفرنسيون في الجزائر والروس في القوقاز والبريطانيون في الهند انتفاضات دينية لم يتمكنوا من التغلب عليها الا بعد قتال طويل ومرير.

بدأت مرحلة جديدة من التعبئة الدينية مع ظهور حركة باتت تعرف في اللغات الغربية بإسم "الشمولية الإسلامية". فهذه الحركة التي انطلقت في ستينيات وسبعينيات القرن التاسع عشر ربما تدين بعض الشيء لنماذج لدى الألمان والاطليان في نضالاتهم الناجحة من أجل تحقيق الوحدة القومية. آنذاك عرف معاصروهم ومقلدوهم من المسلمين أنفسهم وحددوا أهدافهم في الإطارين الديني والطائفي وليس في الحدود القومية أو الوطنية والتي لما تزل في تلك الحقبة الزمنية غريبة وغير مألوفة. ومع انتشار التأثير والتعليم الأوروبيين، بدأت تلك الأفكار تأخذ حيزا لها، بل وهيمنت لحين من الدهر على الخطاب والكفاح داخل بلاد المسلمين. ومع هذا كان الولاء والهوية الدينيين عميقين جدا ووجدا طريقا لهما في العديد من الحركات الدينية ولاسيما عند "الإخوان المسلمين". وقد حصلت تلك الحركات على أهمية خاصة وتحديدًا بعد الفشل المدوي للآديولوجيات العلمانية فأمسكت بزمام حلبة القتال وكان معظم مقاتليها من الجماعات القومية المهزومة.

والأمر سيان للإصوليين كما هو للقوميين، اذ انبرت القضايا الإقليمية المختلفة مهمة لكليهما وإن كان ذلك بشكل متباين جامع يصعب التحكم فيه. فالأصوليون عموما وجدوا، وعلى سبيل الذكر، ان لا سلام أو مهادنة مع اسرائيل وان أي تنازل هو خطوة صوب حل نهائي حقيقي- أي حل دولة اسرائيل وعودة أرض فلسطين الى أصحابها الحقيقيين- أي الفلسطينيين المسلمين- ورحيل الدخلاء. الا أن ذلك ما كان ليرضي بأي شكل من الأشكال مطالب الأصوليين والتي تمتد الى جميع المناطق الأخرى محل النزاع، بل هم يرون ان الحصول على ذلك سيكون مجرد خطوة نحو صراع نهائي أطول (من الصراع الفلسطيني).

عندها تم الرجوع الى اسلوب القتال القديم في أغلب حيثياته، ولكن بطابع أشد قوة بكثير. لقد تبنى الأرهابيون الدينيون وطوروا- في الهزيمة والانتصار على حد سواء- أساليب ابتدعها القوميون في القرن العشرين وكان من أشد ملامحها وضوحا اللاكتراث عندما يُذبح أبرياء من عابري السبيل. وقد طفق هذا اللاكتراث الى السطح أكثر في الحملة الإرهابية التي شنها "أسامة بن لادن" مطلع التسعينيات.

وكان من أول وأكبر نماذجها تفجير سفارتين أميريكيتين في شرق أفريقيا عام 1998. فمن أجل قتل اثني عشر دبلوماسي أميركي، أبدى الإرهابيون رغبة في ذبح أكثر من مائتي أفريقي كان الكثير منهم مسلمين تواجدوا صدفة في الجوار القريب. وفي عددها الأول الذي صدر مباشرة بعد هاتين الهجمتين، نعت المجلة الأصولية *الصراط المستقيم* والتي تصدر باللغة العربية من ولاية بنسلفانيا "الشهداء" الذين سقطوا هناك وأدرجت أسمائهم كما زودها بذلك مكتب القاعدة في بيشاور في باكستان. وأضاف كاتب مقالة النعي عبارة نأمل "أن يجمعنا الله وياهم في الجنة". تلك اللامبالاة لحياة البشر قد تكررت ثانية وإن كان ذلك على نطاق أوسع بكثير في هجمات الحادي عشر من سبتمبر (أيلول) عام 2001 في كل من نيويورك وواشنطن.

كانت الشخصية المهمة في هذه العمليات هي الإرهابي الانتحاري. فهو يمثل تطورا جديدا اختلف فيه عن الإرهابيين القوميين خلال الستينيات والسبعينيات عندما كانوا يتجنبون الموت مع ضحاياهم من خلال الإعداد لهجمتهم من مسافة آمنة. وهم ان ساءت بهم الأمور ووقعوا في الأسر، سعت منظماتهم الى اطلاق سراحهم وكانت تنجح في ذلك أحيانا عن طريق أخذ رهائن والتهديد بإيذائهم أو قتلهم أن لم يتم اطلاق سراح أعضائها. بل وحتى القتل الأوائل الملهمون دينيا سيما "المغتالون" قد ازدروا النجاة بأرواحهم بعد عملياتهم، لكنهم ما كانوا ليقتلوا أنفسهم. وربما صح ذات القول على الجنود الإيرانيين الشبان خلال الحرب ضد العراق ما بين 1980-1988 عندما كانوا يسرون فوق حقول الألغام مسلحين فقط بجواز السفر الى الجنة ليمهدوا الطريق أمام الجيش النظامي.

النوع الجديد من المهمة الانتحارية وبالمعنى الصارم للكلمة يبدو انه من بنات أفكار منظمات دينية مثل حماس وحزب الله اللتين نفذتا منذ العام 1982 فصاعدا العديد من مثل هذه المهمات في لبنان واسرائيل. واستمر كذلك في حقبة الثمانينيات والتسعينيات بأصداء جديدة لهما في مناطق أخرى مثل شرق تركيا ومصر والهند وسريلانكا. وتشير المعلومات المتوفرة لدينا ان مرشحي تنفيذ هذه المهام كانوا، وباستثناء حالات قليلة، من الشباب الذكور الفقراء ومن مخيمات اللاجئين في أغلب الأحيان. وكانت جوائز هؤلاء مضاعفة: بهجات الجنة في الحياة الآخرة والمنح والرواتب التي تعطى الى ذويهم في عالم الدنيا. تلاه بعد ذلك الإبتكار الجديد المثير للإنتباه والمتمثل باستخدام النساء الانتحاريات على يد الإرهابيين الأكراد في تركيا ما بين عامي 1996-1999 وعلى يد الفلسطينيين ابتداء من عام 2002.

وعلى خلاف المغتال أو المحارب المبارك في العصور الوسطى الذي كان ميالا للموت بين يدي عدوه أو أسرته، يسعى الإرهابي الانتحاري الجديد الى قتل نفسه بنفسه، وتلك مسألة تثير تساؤلا حول التعاليم الإسلامية. ان الكتب التي تتناول القانون الإسلامي صريحة جدا في مسألة الانتحار: انه إثم كبير وعقابه الخسران المستديم على شكل تواتر أبدي لذات الفعل الذي قتل فيه الانتحاري نفسه. وتوضح الفقرات التالية المأخوذة من أحاديث النبي تلك النقطة جليا:

قال النبي: من قتل نفسه بسيف سيعذب بذات السيف في نيران جهنم.

وقال النبي ايضا: من يشنق نفسه سيشنق نفسه في جهنم..... ومن يطعن نفسه سيطعن نفسه في جهنم..... ومن يرمي بنفسه من جبل ويقتلها سيرمي بنفسه الى نيران جهنم خالدا فيها. ومن يشرب السم ويقتل نفسه سيحمل معه ذلك السم بيديه ويشربه في جهنم خالدا فيها..... ومن يقتل نفسه بأنى وسيلة سيعمل بمثلها في جهنم..... ومن يقتل نفسه بأنى وسيلة في الدنيا سيعذب بمثلها يوم القيامة.

تميز المراجع الأولى والى حد كبير بين مواجهة الموت على أيدي الأعداء وقتل النفس بالنفس. وفي هذا يبين حديث يسمى بالحديث القدسي (ينقله النبي عن الله) هذه المسألة بجلاء وجاء فيه: كان النبي شاهدا عندما أصيب رجل بجراح قاتلة في الحرب المقدسة لكنه قتل نفسه حتى يخفف عنه آلامه وعندها قال الله "لقد سبقني عبدي وأخذ نفسه بيده، انه لن يدخل الجنة أبدا". واستنادا الى ما ورد في حديث آخر فقد رفض النبي أن يصلي على جنازة رجل قتل نفسه بنفسه.

ان الملامح التي توسم هجمات الحادي عشر من سبتمبر ومثيلاتها هي رغبة الجناة بالانتحار وقساوة أولئك الذين يبعثون بهم حيال رسيليم (الانتحاريون انفسهم) وحيال العدد الهائل من ضحاياهم. فهل يمكن تبرير هذه الأفعال باسم الإسلام تحت أي حجة كانت؟ ولا بد للجواب ان يكون "كلا" بكل وضوح.

ان القتل القاسي جدا للآلاف في برج التجارة العالمي ومن بينهم الكثير ممن هم ليسوا أميريكين وبعضهم كان مسلما ومن بلاد اسلامية ليس له ما يبرره في القانون والعقيدة الإسلاميتين ولم يكن له سابقة في التاريخ الإسلامي. حقا أن هناك ما يناظرها من قليل من الأفعال ذات الخبث المتعمد والعشوائي، الا أن هذه الجرائم (ويقصد بها هجمات سبتمبر) ليست جرائم ضد الإنسانية والحضارة حسب، بل هي أعمال كفر- من وجهة النظر الإسلامية نفسها- عندما يدعي مقترفوها أنهم يفعلون ذلك باسم الله ونبيه وكتبه السماوية.

تراوح رد الفعل لكثير من العرب والمسلمين على هجمات مركز التجارة العالمي بين الصدمة والرعب مما حدث من دمار وتخريب وبين الخجل والغضب أن يحدث ذلك باسمهم وباسم عقيدتهم. اذن كانت تلك ردة فعل الكثيرين وليس الجميع. لقد كشفت تقارير وحتى صور مشاعر الإبتهاج التي عاشتها شوارع مدن عربية ومدن اسلامية بالأخبار القادمة من نيويورك. فكان رد الفعل حسودا في بعضه، أو بمعنى اخر نوع من الغبطة التي عمت حتى أوروبا وان كان ذلك بشكل صامت. ومن بين الفقراء والمعدومين صعدت علامات الرضا وللبيض البهجة في رؤية الأميركيين، اولئك الأثرياء والمشبعين، يُلقنون درسا.

وكذا الصحافة العربية في ردود أفعالها أزاء مجزرتي نيويورك وواشنطن قد حاولت تحقيق توازن صعب بين الرفض والقبول، انها الى حد ما أشبه برد فعلهم حيال "الهولوكوست". فهناك ثلاثة مواقف مهيمنة في الإعلام العربي من الهولوكوست: انها لم تحدث، انها مبالغ فيها الى حد كبير، ان اليهود يستحقون ذلك، وهذه النقطة الأخيرة قد وجدت لها فوق ذلك بعض همام الكتاب الذين ما برحوا يوبخون هتلر لأنه لم يمهته. لم يقل أحد بعد جازما أن تدمير مركز التجارة العالمي لم يحدث ابدا برغم حقيقة

أن عقارب الزمن قد لاتستبعد أن يُقال ذلك فيما بعد بأقلام منظري "نظرية المؤامرة". بل قد انبرى اليوم من بين أولئك ممن يجادل -ولا يعني هذا القول بأي شكل من الأشكال جميع المعلقين المسلمين- أنهم ليسوا مسلمين أو عربا ممن فعل ذلك. انهم يقدمون تفسيرات أخرى تشمل الأميركيين البيض ممن يؤمنون بسمو الجنس الأبيض والمليشيات الأميركية (في اشارة الى تيموثي ماك في ةتفجير أو كلاهوما) وتشمل خصوم العولمة من الأوروبيين والصينيين وبعض خصوم مشروع الردع الدفاعي الصاروخي، تماما كما تشمل الروس الساعين للإنتقام ضد تفكيك الإتحاد السوفيتي ومعهم اليابانيين الذين انتظروا طويلا ليرردوا الصاع على قصف هيروشيما. وذهب كاتب عمود الى أبعد من ذلك ليقترح أن الهجوم قد دبره الرئيس بوش نفسه لصرف الإهتمام عن انتخابه بـ "بأقلية ضئيلة جدا لاتكفي لإنتخاب عمدة قرية في مصر العليا"، وهو قد أقحم "كولن باول" في شرك الجريمة مع الرئيسين بوش الأب وبوش الأبن.

ومن دون ريب فان التفسير الأكثر جماهيرية هو ذلك الذي ينسب الجريمة ولو بتباينات طفيفة الى الأشرار المفضلين وهم اسرائيل والموساد (بالتواطىء كما روى البعض مع المخابرات المركزية الأمريكية) و "أبناء صهيون" و "اليهود" بكل بساطة وقناعة. انهم بذلك في تفسيرهم هذا قد ثمنوا فعل الهجمات وتبرؤوا منها في الوقت ذاته، اما الدافع الذي أنسبوه لليهود فهو تشويه صورة العرب والمسلمين عموما وزرع بذرة الخلاف بينهم وبين الأميركيين. ثم زاد على ذلك كاتب عمود أردني بفكرة مثيرة مفادها أن المنظمات الصهيونية قد دبرت لهذا الهجوم حتى يتسنى لإسرائيل تهديم المسجد الأقصى ولما اتجهت أنظار العالم صوب أميركا. لم يكبح هذا التفسير بل هو قد غذى الرأي الذي ما فتأ يُنقل بين الفينة والأخرى أن ما حدث (وإن كان جريمة) فانه مجرد جزاء على الجرائم الأمريكية. وقد تكون مجلة الرسالة الأسبوعية التي تصدرها حماس في قطاع غزة في عددها الصادر بتاريخ 13 سبتمبر 2001 أكثر من تمخضت عنه ردة الفعل المؤثرة والصريحة عندما قالت "الله قد استجاب لصلواتنا".

وبعد أن تكشف هول العملية، أبدى بعض الكتاب رغبتهم في التعبير عن ادانة الجناة والتعاطف مع الضحايا. لكنهم حتى في ذلك لم يهدروا الا قليلا فرصة الإشارة الى مسألة أن الأميركيين هم من جلب ذلك على أنفسهم واستشهدوا بدليل الإعتداءات الأمريكية الطويل والمفصل ابتداء من الغزو والإستعمار والإستيطان- كلمات عاطفية- في "العالم الجديد" واستمرارا الى يومنا هذا، ومعه كان الإستشهاد بقائمة الضحايا الطويلة الذين سقطوا فريسة للجشع والقساوة الأميركيين في آسيا وأفريقيا وأمريكا اللاتينية.

واسامة بن لادن نفسه قد أوضح الكيفية التي يرى فيها الصراع عندما عرف عدوه مرارا بإسم "الصليبيين". والصليبيون، ودعنا هنا نستذكر الأمر، لم يكونوا أميركيين أو يهود، بل هم مسيحيون خاضوا حربا مقدسة لإستعادة الأماكن المقدسة لمملكة المسيح. ففي "رسالة الى أميركا" نُشرت في نوفمبر (تشرين الثاني) 2002 وتُسبت الى أسامة بن لادن عدّد فيها ببعض التفاصيل الإعتداءات التي لم ترتكبها أميركا حسب بل الشعب الأميركي ايضا. ثم قال بعدها وتحت عناوين سبعة "ماذا ندعوكم لتفعلوه وماذا نريد منكم". أولا أن تعتنقوا الإسلام وثانيا "ان توقفوا عدوانكم وأكاذيبكم وفجوركهم وفسوقكم" وثالثا أن تكتشفوا وتعترفوا بأن أميركا هي "أمة بلا مبادئ وأخلاق" ورابعا ان توقفوا دعم

اسرائيل في فلسطين والهنود في كشمير والروس ضد الشعب الشيشاني وحكومة مانيللا ضد المسلمين في جنوب الفلبين وخامسا أن "تحزموا أمتعتكم وتخرجوا من ديارنا". تلك هي نصائح مقدمة الى أمريكا من أجل مصلحتها "فلا تجبرونا أن نعيدكم الى دياركم مشحونين في التواييت". وسادسا "ان تنهوا دعمكم للزعماء الفاسدين في بلداننا وألا تتدخلوا في سياساتنا ومناهج تعليمنا. اتركونا وشأننا وإلا عليكم ان تتوقعونا في نيويورك وواشنطن وسابعا ان تتعاملوا وتتفاهموا مع المسلمين على أساس المصالح والمنافع المشتركة وليس وفقا لسياسات الخضوع لكم والسرقة منا وإحتلالنا". وتختتم الوثيقة كلامها بإخبار الأمريكيين أنهم اذا ما رفضوا هذه النصيحة، فإنهم سيُهزمون كما انهزم الصليبيون من قبل وأن "مصيرهم سيكون كمصير السوفيت الذين فروا من أفغانستان يجرون معهم الهزيمة العسكرية والتقهقر السياسي والسقوط العقائدي والإفلاس الإقتصادي".

ان القضية المرفوعة ضد أمريكا في هذه الوثيقة مفصلة جدا. فهي تتضمن، ناهيك عن قائمة التظلمات المعروفة، سلسلة اتهامات عامة وخاصة على حد سواء. انها تنبع من مصدر متعدد الألوان ومعروف يعكس الأيديولوجيات المتعاقبة التي تركت في أوقات مختلفة بصماتها على ساسة الشرق الأوسط وسياساته. اذ يرجع بعضها الى الحقبة النازية، أي الإحتلال والسيطرة اليهودية المطلقة، و أخرى الى فترة التأثير السوفيتي، أي الجشع والإستغلال الرأسمالي، وكثير منها من أصل أوروبي وأميريكي تتحدر من اليمين واليسار. وتلك تشمل التلوث العالمي ورفض التوقيع على معاهدة كيوتو وكذلك الفساد السياسي من خلال تمويل الحملات الانتخابية وتفضيل "الجنس الأبيض"، ومن اليمين فتتمثل بالنازيين الجدد وخرافة تفوق الجنس الأبيض والتي انطلق منها "بنجامين فرانكلين" في تحذيره ضد الخطر اليهودي. لقد تم التركيز على الدور المشؤوم لليهود في كما من هذه الانتهاكات.

اليوم تصبح حتى استحقاقات نمط الحياة الأمريكية المتباهية جرائم وآثام، نذكر منها ان تحرير المرأة بات يعني انحلالا خلقيا واستخداما تجاريا للمرأة على أنها "مستهلك وبضاعة" والانتخابات الحرة أمست تعني أن الأميركيين قد اختاروا بحرية زعماءهم وعليه يجب أن يتحملوا المسؤولية والعقاب عن أخطاء زعمانهم، أو بمعنى آخر لا يوجد شيء اسمه "مدنيون أبرياء". والأسوأ من هذا كله هو فصل الكنيسة عن الدولة: "أنتم أبناء الأمة الذين عليهم بدلا من الحكم بشريعة الله ودستورها وقوانينها أن تختاروا لتبتدعوا قوانينكم كما تشاءون وترغبون. انتم تفصلون دينكم عن سياساتكم لتعارضوا بذلك الفطرة النقية التي تؤكد السلطة المطلقة للرب والخالق". وبإختصار "انتم أسوأ حضارة شهدتها تاريخ البشرية". هذا الحكم وهو الأكثر لفتا للإنتباه يأتي في وقت ما زال فيه طغاة النازية والحقبة السوفيتية يعيشون على هامش الذكريات، ناهيك عن الحديث عن حكومات استبدادية أقدم من هؤلاء سجلها التاريخ ويستشهد بها أسامة بن لادن وأقرانه دوما.

يكمن السبب الرئيسي وراء ذلك هو تصور أميركا على أنها زعيمة الغرب والعالم المسيحي أو زعيمة "بلاد الكفار". وبهذا المعنى يغدو الرئيس الأمريكي خليفة لسلسلة طويلة من الحكام تبدأ من الإمبراطور البيزنطي في القسطنطينية وتمر بالإمبراطور الروماني المقدس في فيينا وتصل الى الملكة

فكتوريا ومعها زملاؤها وأسلافها في أوروبا. واليوم كما كان بالأمس، يبدو أن عالم المسيحيين الكفرة هو القوة الجديدة الوحيدة التي تعادي وتعيق انتشار الإسلام الذي شاءت له السماء ان ينتشر، وما تلك الا مقاومة وتأخير لبعض الوقت لكن الإسلام سينتصر عالميا في نهاية المطاف.

من المؤكد أن تأسيس القاعدة وبيانات الحرب المتعاقبة لأسامة بن لادن قد رسمت ملامح بداية مرحلة جديدة ومشؤومة في تاريخ الإسلام والإرهاب معا. ان الدوافع وراء أعمال بن لادن- كما هو أوضحها بجلاء- كانت التواجد الأمريكي في الجزيرة العربية خلال حرب الخليج وهو ما يشكل تنديسا "لأرض المسلمين المقدسة" وكذلك استخدام الولايات المتحدة اراضي العربية السعودية قاعدة للهجوم على العراق. فإن كانت السعودية الموقع الأكثر رمزية للعالم الإسلامي، فان بغداد التي كانت عاصمة الخلافة لخمسة قرون وموطننا لبعض أكثر فصول التاريخ الإسلامي مجدا تأتي بالمركز الثاني.

ويبدو ايضا أن ثمة عامل محرّض آخر هو أكثر أهمية من سابقه. لقد اعتاد المسلمون في الماضي في قتالهم ضد الغرب على التوجه الى أعداء الغرب طلبا للمواساة والتشجيع والدعم العسكري والمادي. والآن وللمرة الأولى منذ قرون لا يوجد مثل هذا العدو المعين. من هنا أدرك بن لادن وعصبته أنهم وفي ظل التوليفة الجديدة للقوة العالمية اذا أرادوا محاربة أمريكا فعليهم فعل ذلك بأنفسهم. ففي عام 1991 وهي السنة التي لم يعد فيها الإتحاد السوفيتي قائما، أسس بن لادن وعصبته "القاعدة" التي ظمت الكثير من محنكي الحرب في أفغانستان. لربما بدت مهمتهم تلك محبطة لأي طرف آخر، غير أنهم لم يروها كذلك، لأنهم، كما تصوروا، قد أخرجوا الروس من افغانستان من قبل بهزيمة كانت مجلجلة تمخض عنها بشكل مباشر انهيار الإتحاد السوفيتي. واذن هم قد تفوقوا على قوة عظمى اعتبروها دوما أكثر رعبا (من أمريكا) فشعروا أنهم جاهزون للنيل من الأخرى يحتهم الى ذلك الرأي الذي دوما ما عبر عنه أسامة بن لادن من بين آخرين أن أميركا مجرد نمر من ورق.

لقد انقاد "الإرهابيون المسلمون" بفعل مثل هذه المعتقدات. نذكر هنا أن من الإفشاءات الغربية التي كانت في ذاكرة الذين احتلوا السفارة الأمريكية في طهران ما بين عامي 1979-1981 بأن نيتهم الأصلية كانت الإستيلاء على المبتى وأخذ الرهائن لمجرد بضعة أيام. بعدها غيروا رأيهم عندما أوضحت واشنطن في بيانات متتالية لها أنها لاتنوي القيام بعمل خطير ضدهم. فأطلقوا الرهائن في آخر المطاف لأنهم، كما شرحوا ذلك، خشوا ان يتعامل الرئيس المنتخب آنذاك رولاند ريغان مع المشكلة بطريقة "أفلام رعاة البقر". غير أن بن لادن وأتباعه ليسوا ممن يعيشون هذا الخوف طالما أن كراهيتهم لايردعها خوف ولا يُضعفها احترام. انهم يكررون دوما- كسابقاتٍ يستشهدون بها- الانسحاب الأمريكي من فيتنام ومن لبنان وأهم من هذا وذلك من الصومال، وما تعليقات بن لادن التي قالها في مقابلة أجراها معه "جون ميللر"، من شبكة ABC الإخبارية في 28 مايو (أيار) 1998 الا أكثر الأقوال الهاما لهم:

"رأينا في العقد الماضي تهاوي الحكومة الأمريكية وضعف الجندي الأمريكي الذي هو مستعد لخوض الحرب الباردة وغير جاهز للقتال في حروب طويلة. لقد ثبت ذلك في بيروت عندما هرب جنود المارينز بعد انفجارين فقط، وهذا يُثبت أيضا انهم مستعدون للهروب في أقل من أربع وعشرين ساعة وتكرر هذا

الحال في الصومال..... و(شبابنا) قد تفاجأوا بالمعنويات المنهارة للجنود الأمريكيين..... فبعد انفجارات قليلة هربوا مهزومين..... لقد نسوا انهم ينتمون الى زعيمة العالم وزعيمة النظام العالمي الجديد. (هم) رحلوا يجرون قتلاهم وخزي الهزيمة".

يرى اسامة بن لادن ان إعلانه الحرب ضد الولايات المتحدة يرسم بداية استئناف الصراع من أجل الهيمنة الدينية على العالم والذي بدأ في القرن السابع عشر. وله ولأتباعه، هذه لحظة الظفر. فاليوم تجسد أميركا الحضارة وتحتضن "بيت الحرب"، هي أشبه بروما وبيزنطة.. هي قد أصبحت فاسدة ومنحلة أخلاقيا، جاهزة للإطاحة بها. بيد أنها وبرغم ضعفها لازالت خطيرة. ان وصف الخميني للولايات المتحدة بإسم "الشیطان الأكبر" كان قويا، اما بالنسبة لأعضاء القاعدة فإنه اغراء أميركا وتهتك وانحلال نمط الحياة الأمريكية اللذان يمثلان الخطر الأكبر على نوع الإسلام الذي يريدون (أي الأميركيان) فرضه على زملائهم المسلمين.

والأمر ليس كذلك لأخرين يرون في أميركا نوعا آخر من الإغراء، انها معقل حقوق الإنسان والمؤسسات الحرة وحكومة مسؤولة وتمثيلية. وثمة عدد متزايد من الأفراد وحتى الحركات التي تأخذ على عاتقها تلك المهمة المعقدة بإدخال تلك المؤسسات الى بلدانها. انها مهمة ليست باليسيرة. فنحن نعلم ان محاولات مماثلة لذلك قد أسفرت عن ولادة الكثير من الأنظمة الفاسدة اليوم. ودليلنا على ذلك ان من بين 75 دولة عضو في منظمة المؤتمر الإسلامي لانجد الا واحدة هي الجمهورية التركية تتمتع بمؤسسات ديموقراطية منذ فترة طويلة من الزمن وانها برغم المشاكل الصعبة والمستمرة التي تواجهها قد حققت تقدما في بناء إقتصاد ليبرالي ومجتمع حر ونظام سياسي.

في بلدين هما العراق وايران، حيث نظامي الحكم من أقوى المناهضين للولايات المتحدة، نجد معارَصات ديموقراطية قادرة على تولي السلطات وتشكيل الحكومات. ونحن- ممن نرغب أن نسمي أنفسنا بالعالم الحر، قادرون أن نفعل الكثير لمساعدتهم وما فعلناه الا القليل. اما في أغلب بقية بلدان المنطقة، فنجد من الناس من يؤيد وجهة نظرنا ويتعاطف معنا ويرغب في أن يعيش نمط حياتنا. انهم يفهمون معنى الحرية ويرغبون في ممارستها في أوطانهم. وهنا نجد صعوبة بالغة في مساعدة هؤلاء لكننا لا يجب ان نبعثهم في أقل تقدير. فإن نجحوا فاننا سنجد أصدقاء وحلفاء بالمعنى الحقيقي للكلمة لا بمعناها الدبلوماسي.

في غضون ذلك، تطفق أماننا مشكلة ملحة. فاذا ما نجح زعماء القاعدة في إقناع "عالم الإسلام" بقبول وجهات نظرهم وقيادتهم له، فهذا يعني أن امامنا صراع طويل ومرّ لن تتحمل أميركا وحدها أعباءه. هي اذن أوروبا سيما أوروبا الغربية التي هي الآن موطن لمجتمع مسلم كبير ومتنامي بات يراه الكثير من الأوروبيين مشكلة إن لم يكن تهديدا عند البعض الآخر. وعاجلا أم آجلا ستجد القاعدة والجماعات ذات الصلة انهم في صدام مع جيران الإسلام الآخرين- روسيا والصين والهند- التي قد تبدو أقل فرطا للحساسية من أميركا في استخدام قوتها ضد المسلمين وحرمتهم. فإن أصاب الأصوليون في حساباتهم ونجحوا في الحرب، فإن مستقبلا مظلما ينتظر العالم وتحديدا جزء العالم الذي يعتنق الإسلام.

CHAPTER SIX: COMMENTARY

(To all the readers of this thesis: Never has it been a random choice of Bernard Lewis as the writer to translate to. Lewis, over a sixty-year career, is seen nowadays as one of the most influential voices in the Western diplomatic circles. He is, indeed, the postwar icon historian of Islam and the Middle East whose syntheses made Islamic history accessible to the public in Europe and America. He was the one who identified, in his 1990 article *Atlantic* the struggle between Islam and the West as a “clash between civilization”, and he was the one who was invited by the American Vice President Dick Cheney, few months after the September 11th attacks, to conduct a seminar on Islam and Muslim attitudes towards America.)

Does the translator have to live the pain-taking situation in which history is forged, facts are twisted, and terms are coined to serve a purpose which he/she knows it is mischievous? The answer can be “Yes” when the aim is to rebuff that mischief.

In the text in hand, the translator faces, for example, a deep- fact twist in which Prophet Mohammed (PBUH) is covertly depicted as the blood-shedding provoker (Lewis: 110) and a deliberate history- forging intention (Lewis: 111) whereby Islam is seen as a mere sword- faith:

- 1- ST. P: 110: The basis of this view is a saying ascribed to the Prophet but by no means universally accepted as authentic: “If anyone insults me, then any Muslim who hears this must kill him immediately”;
- 2- ST. P: 111: While Muslims, perhaps more frequently than Christians, made war against the followers of other faiths to bring them within the scope of Islam, Christians – with the notable exception of the Crusades –

were not prone to fight internal religious wars against those whom they saw as schismatics or heretics. Islam, no doubt owing to the political and military involvement of its Founder, takes what one might call a more pragmatic view than the Gospels of the realities of societal and state relationships. Its position is nearer to that of the earlier books of the Old Testament, and to the doctrine of smiting the Amalekites, rather than to the Prophets and the Gospels. Muslims are not instructed to turn the other cheek, nor do they expect to beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks (Isaiah 2:4).

In both cases, as it is the case with the whole ST, the translator, for the purpose of this thesis, renders them into Arabic so as to still bear their ideological implications:

- 1- TT. P 54: وأساس وجهة النظر هذه هو قول منسوب الى النبي غير متفق على صحته بأي شكل من الأشكال جاء فيه "ان سبني أحد، فعلى كل مسلم سمع بذلك قتله مباشرة".
- 2- TT. P 55: وإن كان المسلمون قد شنوا حروبهم، وهي أكثر من حروب المسيحيين كما يبدو، ضد أتباع المعتقدات الأخرى لإجبارهم على اعتناق الإسلام، فإن المسيحيين- باستثناء الحروب الصليبية المعروفة- كانوا أكثر نزعة صوب خوض حروب دينية داخلية ضد المنشقين والزنادقة. فالإسلام يتبنى، وهو ما يعزى من دون شك الى التدخل السياسي والعسكري لمؤسسه، ما يمكن أن نطلق عليه نظرة أكثر براغماتية من الأناجيل حيال حقائق علاقات المجتمع والدولة. وموقف الإسلام هنا أقرب الى الموقف الموجود في أول كتب "العهد القديم" والى عقيدة قتل "الأماليك" (الشعب المحارب) منه الى الأنبياء والأناجيل. والمسلمون لم يتلقوا تعليمات بأن يديروا خدوم الآخر ولا عليهم ان يتوقعوا أن تجدح سيوفهم بأسنة المحرثات ورماحهم بمناجيل تشذيب (شعيا 2:4)

So, as mentioned in Chapter One of this thesis, it is not possible to analyze any form of religious speech or text in general simply because religious discourse exists only as Islamic discourse, Christian discourse, etc. the question that may rise here, then, is how that discourse different from other non-religious speech forms?

Above all, there does not exist a language called Islamic language or Christian language, there does not exist religious language vocabulary, and there

does not exist religious language grammar. The answer, as I believe it to be, lies in the way language is manipulated as regards grammar, i.e. the use of “deep grammar” and as regards vocabulary, i.e. the technicality of some terms like praying and salvation.

So, traditional interpretation of “sensitive texts”, such as religious texts, requires a kind of work with the “parameters of constraints” (Hatim, 1997: 124) that impose themselves as distinct genre and with the cultural boundaries which usually operate within the rhetorical conventions (Hatim, 1997: 157) not only of the target language, but those of the translator as well.

Beaugrande (2005) believes that in the translation of sensitive texts, e.g. religious text, is implicated in neither the conception of *literal translation* which “mistakenly implies that single words or even pieces of words have determinate meanings by themselves” nor in the conception of *free translation* which “mistakenly implies that single words are relatively insignificant and can be set aside as soon as one has grasped the meaning”. The ST of this thesis is perceived to:

present and represent a communicative event where the priority of the translator is to invest a well-developed bilingual sensitivity and bicultural sensitivity” in dealing with such competing factors of the text such as word-meanings and text-meanings in light of cultural differences.

6.1 Analysis at: The Level of Terminology

It is well worth noting, first of all, that the ST of this thesis reflects the same ideological beliefs of the same writer, Bernard Lewis, before 15 years when he writes in his 1988 book *The Political Language of Islam*:

In order to approach some understanding of the politics of Islam, of movements and changes which are perceived and expressed in Islamic terms, we must first try to understand the language of political discourse among Muslims, the way in which words are used and understood, the

framework of metaphor and allusion which is a necessary part of all communication.

In most instances, then, the ST builds itself through what Hatim (1997, 40) calls “counter-argument” which is “initiated by a selective summary of someone’s else viewpoint, followed by a counter-claim, a substantiation outlining the grounds for the opposition, and finally a conclusion”. This counter-argument, Hatim and Mason (1997: 136) further explain:

involves two protagonists confronting each other: an ‘absent’ protagonist, who has his or her ‘thesis’ cited to be evaluated, and a ‘present’ protagonist, performing the function of orchestrating the debate and steering the receiver in a particular direction.

The source text, excluding the Hadiths, which Lewis himself questions their authenticities, presents an absent protagonist.

The terminology falls under the three criteria of Holt (cited in Faiq, 2004: 68) which are: 1) assimilated words (jihad, fatwa), 2) translated words in parenthesis (Pan-Islamism), and 3) translated words or terms (Muslim World). In translating the whole text in general, and the controversial terms in particular, the translator strives to protect the “foreign” spirit of the source text, i.e. “foreignizing” the text (Venuti: 1995; 1998) through recognizing what Hatim (1997) calls the text producer’s tendency to “bring attention to his argument” as it is, leaving the space to the target reader to deal with as a such. In addition, the translator prefers to translate even the quotations or citations of Arabic origin as if they were written originally in English, i.e. translating an original English text into Arabic, for the same purpose.

6.1.1 Source Text Title

It is commonly known that English- written titles are short in general and should both attract the reader and bear the general meaning of the book, article, etc. *The Crisis of Islam*, then presents a title-based semantic controversy. The title envelops the Crisis inside Islam itself and inside “few Muslims”. It does not, therefore, present Islam as a heavenly religion, a peaceful faith that is, as a word, derived from the Arabic root “aslama” (surrender), and that it conveys the

promise of peace, justice, and harmony of those who do the will of God. Rather, the title presents Islam in the form of what the Western media have become obsessed with in their voguish lexicon: the threat of the resurgent atavism, fatalistic and reactionary religion, and threatening and obscurantist, and so distinguished from other religions, especially Christianity and Judaism.

6.1.2 Source Text Controversial Terms

The translated text deals with some Islam-derived terms that are of heat debate in the world affairs. Such terms are: Islam, Islamic, Islamism, Islamist, Muslim, fundamentalism, fundamentalist, extremist, radicalism, terrorism and terrorist. Whereas most of these terms have their established lexicon meaning, away from ideation, such as Islam (اسلام), Muslim as (مسلم), and extremist as (متطرف), others are of controversial connotation in particular when used as compound term such as Islamic movement (حركة اسلامية) and Islamist movement, which is again rendered into Arabic as (حركة اسلامية). A brief historical review, it is suggested, may be of much help as to decide on a final Arabic translation to those loose terms of:

1- Islamism: this term first appeared in French in the mid-eighteenth century as a synonym for the religion of “Muslims” who were known at that time in French as “Mahometism”. So, it had no reference to any ideological reference of Islam. The usage of Mahometism itself is dated to the seventeenth century to reflect a new willingness, born with the Renaissance to recognize Islam as a religion. In 1734, the usage became pervasive across Europe when George Sale, the translator of the Quran, wrote “It is certainly one of the most convincing proofs that Mohammedism was no other than a human invention, that it owed its progress and establishment almost entirely to the sword”. In the eighteenth century again, thinkers of Enlightenment knew that Muslims called their faith Islam, and so they wanted a way to reflect that understanding through usage and thus classify Islam as a religion.

It was the French philosopher Voltaire who found the solution when he coined the term *Islamisme*: “This religion is called *Islamisme*.... It was not by

force of arms that *Islamisme* established itself over more than half of our hemisphere. It was by enthusiasm and persuasion”. In the nineteenth century, the term gained ground as the “root of Islamisme is in Judaism”, wrote Alexis de Tocqueville (1838). In 1900, the New English Dictionary, now known as Oxford English Dictionary, defined Islamism as “the religious system of Moslems; Mohammedanism”. By the turn of the twentieth century, the term almost disappeared, and replaced simply by “Islam” (Encyclopedia of Islam: 1938). With the rise of an ideological and political interpretation of Islam, scholars sought for an alternative to distinguish Islam as modern ideology from Islam as a faith.

2- Fundamentalism: the term was originated in America in 1920s when the Protestant Christians sought to assert their belief in the literal text of the Bible and the “fundamentals” of Christian belief. These Christians called themselves “fundamentalists”, which gained, as a term, publicity in the 1925 trial of the Scopes (Monkey). More than fifty years later, the term “Islamic fundamentalism” came to widespread usage mostly with the media coverage of the Iranian Revolution. Bernard Lewis (1988: 12) says:

the use of this term is established and must be accepted, but it remains unfortunate and can be misleading.....Muslim fundamentalists differ from other Muslims and indeed from Christian fundamentalists in their scholasticism and their legalism. They based themselves not only on the Quran, but also on the Traditions of the Prophet and on the corpus of transmitted theological and legal learning.

3- Jihad: this term is hardly surprising if described today as a plastic concept in its current use in the international politics and media discourse. The term was originally used to refer to one’s personal struggle against one’s own mortal failings and weaknesses, which would include battling against one’s pride, fears, and prejudices. Prophet Mohammad himself described, as reported, this personal existential struggle as “Jihad Akbar”. The Quran stipulates that Muslims have to engage in Jihad when they are under attack, but its conditions are strictly defined

within certain ethical prerogatives. So, the term jihad can be loosely translated as “to struggle towards a particular cause”.

In the process of translating such terms into Arabic, we need to consider, besides the historical root of the term, few linguistic criteria as well:

- 1- Is the term morphologically adaptable? In other words, can a term like Islamism be adapted for an adjectival form and the word like “structuralism” (المذهب البنوي) or translated into an abstract noun like existentialism (الوجودي).
- 2- Is the term semantically accurate? In other words, a term like Islamism, again, should not be associated, based on the historical review, with violence and extremism.
- 3- Is the term distinguishable from other related terms? For example, both “Islamic movement” and “Islamist movement” are translated today into (حركة اسلامية) as already stated. Such translation may hardly entail the ideology of the speaker, and may bring two antagonist writers into one camp. Further, this may violate the Gricean Maxims, and so must be “justified” (Hatim: 1997).
- 4- Problems of meaning are related to both syntactic and pragmatic considerations, as Larson (1984, cited in Maalej) notes “translation, then, consists of studying the lexicon, grammatical structure, communication situation, and cultural context of the source language text, analyzing it in order to determine its meaning, and then restructuring this same meaning using the lexicon and grammatical structure which are appropriate in the RECEPTOR LANGUAGE and its cultural context”.

Based on linguistic and historical outlooks, the following translations are suggested to some of these loose terms presented in the source text:

- 1- Islamic: إسلامية أو إسلامي, so Islamic World is (العالم الإسلامي) and Islamic Nation is (الأمة الإسلامية)
- 2- Islamism: الأيديولوجية الإسلامية
- 3- Islamist: الأيديولوجي الإسلامي and Islamist movement is الحركة أيديولوجية الإسلامية

- 4- Fundamentalism: المذهب الأصولي or الأصولية العقائدية
- 5- Islamic fundamentalism: الأصولية العقائدية الإسلامية
- 6- Islamist fundamentalism: أصولية الأيديولوجية الإسلامية
- 7- Extremism: التطرف
- 8- Islamic extremism: to avoid generalization that may lead to misunderstanding between the almost conflicting cultures of the West and the Islamic East, the translator suggests the Arabic equivalent of (التطرف المتلبس بالإسلام)
- 9- Islamist extremism: التطرف الأيديولوجي المتلبس بالإسلام

6.2 Analysis at The Level of Ideology

Since the events of September 11, Islamic discourse, perhaps more than even political discourse, has become full of “plastic” concepts and ideas that are meant to serve political mobilizations and even religious agendas for some. The most prominent concepts, seen in the Western ideologies as antagonistic, are Islamism, Jihad, and Fundamentalism, as already mentioned.

In translation, the discrepancy, (Hatim, 2001: 39) believes, “between what people believe to be true or untrue and how what they say” is not always a “reliable indicator of what they believe” and that may also be seen in “cross-cultural terms within a relevance framework”. In relevance theory, Hatim further explains, two modes of language are to be recognized:

- “An utterance is said to be ‘descriptive’ if the words are intended to be taken as a true (i.e. accurate) representation of a state of affairs.”
- “An utterance is said to be ‘interpretative’ if the words are intended to be what someone else thought or said.”

On that base, the first sentence in the ST can be translated, and so can be read in two different ways:

“Most Muslims are not fundamentalists, and most fundamentalists are not terrorists, but most present-day terrorists are Muslims and proudly identify themselves as such.”

معظم المسلمين ليسوا "أصوليين" ومعظم الأصوليين ليسوا إرهابيين، بيد أن معظم إرهابي اليوم هم -1 (P: 52) مسلمون وهم بكل تفاخر يعرفون أنفسهم كذلك.

This translation is a representation of what the speaker holds to be a true state of affairs. However the same source sentence can be rendered differently:

ليس جميع المسلمين هم أصوليون وليس جميع الأصوليين هم إرهابيون، بيد أن معظم إرهابي اليوم هم -2 مسلمون وهم بكل تفاخر يعرفون أنفسهم كذلك.

This translation does not state what the writer believes is wholly true, rather it is more to what someone else thought or said.

The appropriateness of the first translation can be sustained by almost all the ideology-laden text: “There are several forms of Islamic extremism current at the present time. The best known are the subversive radicalism of Al-Qa’ida and other groups that resemble it all over the Muslim world; the preemptive fundamentalism of the Saudi establishment; and the institutionalized revolution of the ruling Iranian hierarchy. All of these are, in a sense, Islamic in origin, but some of them have deviated very far from their origins.” So the Islamic extremism is everywhere: in Al-Qai’da, in the Saudi establishment (center of the Sunnis) and in the Iranian government order (center of the Shiites). This ideologically, and even politically motivated text, is rendered as:

ثمة نماذج متعددة للتطرف الإسلامي في يومنا هذا، وأكثر تلك النماذج شيوعا هي تلك الراديكالية التخريبية التي تجسدها القاعدة والجماعات الأخرى التي تنتهج نهجها في كل عالم المسلمين وكذلك الأصولية المنعوية لدى المؤسسة السعودية والثورة المؤسساتية لدى هرم الحكم في إيران. كل هذه النماذج والى حد ما هي إسلامية في الأصل لكن بعضها قد انحرف بعيدا جدا عن أصوله. (P:52-53)

In addition, any translation of an ideology-based text between two separates cultures necessitates discussion on Venuti’s (1995, 1998) strategies of domestication and foreignization (see chapter three) who argues that the translation process represents violence, which Faiq (2004: 2) states it as:

“deprives the ST producer of both their voice and the re-representation of their cultural values in a foreign, but dominant culture”.

Based on this assumption that this source text is ideological, and so sensitive, the translator has sought to adopt the strategy of foreignization to lead the Arabic reader towards the writer’s manipulated method of defining Islam as a mere “more than fourteen century of history” (Lewis, 2003: 2). Even the “controversial terms” (see part 6.1) have been translated in conformity with their source text intentionality.

In order to mediate between the pragmatic intentions of the writer and the received expectations of the translation, few pre-assumptions have been adhered to in the translation process which are: 1) to understand the source text entirely, 2) not to, under any circumstance, distort whatever small component of the source text, 3) not to , under any circumstance, omit whatever part or component of the source text.

In addition, the translator has considered some theoretical presuppositions while looking for the closest ideology-based target text. These are:

- 1- various scholars have given different interpretation to the phenomenon of Islam;
- 2- in Arabic language, the words used and the meanings of the words used differ from one discourse to another,
- 3- these discourses are usually shaped by the concepts and political attitudes of different faiths and schools at different times.

Given the overwhelming present of ideological embedding in the source text, few other strategies (together with descriptive and interpretive ones) have been adopted to protect the “cultural turn”(the analysis of translation in its cultural, political, and ideological context) though recognizing that the “process of meaning transfer has less to do with finding the cultural inscription of a term than in reconstructing its value” (Simon 1996, cited in Hatim 2004). These strategies include:

1- Cohesion:

Defined by Hatim and Mason (1997: 150) as “the potential of recurrence to reinforce a point of view or display commitment or attitude”, the translator has found it required in the translation of some structures such as: “and for the members of Al Qa’ida it is the seduction of America and of its profligate, dissolute way of life that represents the greatest threat to the kind of Islam they wish to impose on their fellow Muslims.” The translation aims to protect the intention process through the use of Arabic cataphora as well (the use of a linguistic item to refer forward to subsequent elements in the text):

اما بالنسبة لأعضاء القاعدة فإنه اغراء أميركا وتهتك وانحلال نمط الحياة الأمريكية اللذان يمثلان الخطر الأكبر على نوع الإسلام الذي يريدون (أي الأميركيان) فرضه على زملائهم المسلمين.

2- **Marked Strategy:** this strategy, defined by Hatim (2004: 344) as “An aspect of language use where some linguistic features may be considered less ‘basic’ or less preferred than others. These marked features are used in a *contextual motivated* manner”, has been seen by the translator of this source text as the main strategy whereby the ideational components meant to be read can be protected, thus keeping the spirit of the “foreign” text. The two examples given above can be, as well, read from this angle.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

No sooner had the United States President George Bush pronounced his famous word “Crusade” following the September 11th events than the most Muslims across the world accused him of waging a new “Crusade”. Soon afterwards, the White House Spokesman Ari Fleischer had to explain in a press conference that Bush did mean a “broad cause” to root out terrorism worldwide. When Ayatollah Khomeini on February 14, 1989 issued his “fatwa” against Salman Rushdie, since then ruling fatwa has become a “fixed equivalent” to “death penalty” in the Western media. In other cases, the BCC refuses to label those fighting the American troops in Afghanistan and Iraq as “terrorists” and chooses instead the term “insurgents”.

So, meaning is found more than just in words. It is a total expression of an utterance that is found in words and in the syntax of how these words are connected to each other, how the resultant sentences are connected, how the discourse segments relate to each other, and how the explicit and implicit cultural and ideological clues are reflected in the whole text.

On that base, and with reference to the notion of text sensitivity covered in the previous chapter, the approach adopted in this thesis considers the source text as “sensitive”, and therefore defines translation as an ideology-laden process in which culture imbues the words it uses with ideology. Further, the study builds on some assumptions that languages differ; that translation depends largely on the intended meaning; that translation consists of studying as well cultural context of the source text.

The thesis, therefore, assures the significance of both equivalence (Chapter 2) and culture and ideology (chapter 3). It takes, in its definition to the notion of equivalence, the criticism presented by Hatim & Mason (1990) against the definition of translation as “product-to-product comparison which overlooks the communication process”. It also adopts their position that translation is “negotiation of meaning between producers and receivers of texts”, which are “the results of motivated choice: producers of texts have their own communicative aims and select lexical items and grammatical arrangement to serve these aims”.

In the process of translating Chapter ix of Lewis’s *The Crisis of Islam*, the translator adopts the strategy of Venuti’s (1995, 1998) “foreignizing” the text as it seeks to resist the dominant target-language cultural values so as to take the readers to where the author and the source culture reside. To achieve this goal, the translator makes use of the Translation Theory of Relevance to render that “discrepancy between what they believe to be true or untrue and how they say that” (Hatim, 2005) clearly into the target reader. The “Descriptive Translation” and “The Marked Theory” are among the most strategies adopted here.

The discussion then focuses on the analysis of some controversial terms that nowadays dominate the world media such as *Islamism*, *fundamentalism*, and *jihad*. These terms are categorized as assimilated words (jihad), 2) translated words in parenthesis (Pan-Islamism), and 3) translated words or terms (Muslim World). The Prophet’s (PBUH) traditions included in the source text, Ayatollah Khomeini’s fatwa and Bin Ladin’s interview have been translated as if they were English source texts to serve the same aim of “foreignization”. The translator, based on the historical review of these terms, suggests some Arabic equivalents that may serve accuracy and write out the disputable agreement on a final ideologically translatable concept.

Finally, the significant and practical outcome of this thesis lies in its call to establish a project for a “standardized” translation to such critical religious terms which reflect the history of more than one billion Muslims worldwide,

their sense of identity, and their ultimate criterion of loyalty and unity. It also calls upon Arab Media not to marginalize the Western media real aim behind interpretations of these terms lest they become “fixed” as the final equivalents not only in the process of English-Arabic translation, but also in the ongoing process of writing history. So far, despite the good intentions of many on both sides, the West and the East, the ‘engraved’ picture of the barbarian Arab, to quote the Victorian Orientalist Richard Burton, is still alive today as yesterday:

our Arab at his worst is a mere barbarian who has not forgotten the savage. He is a model mixture of childishness and astuteness, of simplicity and cunning, concealing levity of mind under solemnity of aspect... his mental torpidity, founded upon physical indolence, renders immediate action and all manner of exertion distasteful...while acts of revolting savagery are the natural results of a malignant fanaticism and a furious hatred of every creed beyond the pale of Al-Islam. (cited in Faiq, 2004: 6)

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